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

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Zbigniew Brzezinski

For Lenin's Centenary

The Soviet Past & Future

THE SOVIET SYSTEM was created by the Leninist Party and it has embodied the Leninist ideology. But though Lenin was the architect, Stalin was the actual builder of the Soviet system. The relationship between Leninism and Stalinism is, therefore, an appropriate point of departure for more wide-ranging reflections on the past and future of the Soviet system.

Lenin & Stalin

THE FACT that Marxism found fertile soil in the specific Russian conditions of an autocratic political tradition, intellectual frustration, and a strong propensity towards messianism inescapably meant that certain facets of Marxism would be reinforced at the cost of others. It was Lenin's contribution, and the mark of his genius, to have effected the adaptation of Marxism to his native setting, and in so doing to have created the Marxist-Leninist ideology and the Bolshevik Party.

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI *is a professor at Columbia University and director of its Research Institute on Communist Affairs. His best-known book is the authoritative study of "The Soviet Bloc" (revised edition, 1967, Harvard University Press, and Oxford University Press). This article will be part of his new book—entitled "Between Two Ages: America's Role in the Technetronic Era"—which is to be published later this year by Viking Press. He has just become a regular foreign affairs columnist for* Newsweek *magazine. Among his articles in* ENCOUNTER *are "Peaceful Engagement" (April 1965), "America in the Technetronic Age" (January 1968), and "Peace and Power" (November 1968).*

A second article on "Can the Super-Powers Survive?"—a study of the sources of American instability by Daniel Bell—will appear next month.

Lenin's victory over his rivals within the Russian Marxist movement and, more importantly, his successful seizure of power when the old autocratic structure collapsed, marked an even more fundamental development. It represented the successful "de-Westernisation" of Marxism, a victory of oriental despotic propensities over occidental democratic tendencies. Accordingly, Lenin's emphasis on dogmatic belief, intolerance towards dissent, violence, conspiratorial activity, almost total subordination of the individual to the party (*partiinost*), not to speak of his paranoiac suspiciousness (noted by most of his biographers), while all to some extent evident in Marx's own behaviour, were not only dictated by the brutal autocratic tradition in which Lenin operated but became also the extension of that very tradition.

Stalin's emergence as the top leader, and particularly his own despotism—so oriental in style and mood—were therefore facilitated, if not dictated, by Lenin's concept of the party as an élitist group, suspicious of the "trade-union mentality" of the workers and hostile to the inertia and conservatism of the peasants. The intolerance towards opposition and insistence on obedience to the Party facilitated the emergence of a bureaucratically skilled dictator, who exploited these formative influences to paralyse would-be opponents and rivals. Writing from entirely different perspectives, Leonard Schapiro and Isaac Deutscher (who certainly did not see eye to eye either on Leninism or Stalinism), both conveyed the degree to which Leninism made Stalinism possible by inhibiting effective

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opposition within the Party to Stalin's consolidation of power. If Lenin did not make Stalin "inevitable," at least he made the victory of Stalin's opponents within the Party impossible.

THE INTERLOCKING of Stalinism and Leninism does not provide, however, an answer to the question whether Stalinist methods *had* to be used to modernise and industrialise Russia and the non-Russian nations of the Soviet Union. The question is important because the entire edifice of Soviet legitimacy—the authority and the power of the present Soviet élite—is derived from the claim that the past is essentially one of glorious and heroic achievement, only slightly marred by Stalin's occasional misconduct *vis-à-vis* some of his comrades. Despite the extraordinarily detailed and gory accounts of Stalin's crimes made available to the entire Soviet public during the 23rd Congress of the Soviet Communist Party in 1961, the tendency of the post-Khrushchev Soviet leaders has been to downgrade Stalin's misdeeds and to stress the accomplishments of the 1930s. The strong implication is that the party acted "correctly" throughout, and hence its claim to power is derived from the essentially infallible leadership that it has provided both in the past and in the present.

It is this claim that endows the present Soviet political system with its asserted morality and universality. To question the form of the transformation of the Soviet society is indirectly to question the legitimacy of the present rulers. Even more, it is to question the international relevance of the Soviet model, and particularly its Leninist-Stalinist concentration of power in the hands of a small bureaucratic party élite. The events in Czechoslovakia in 1968, the Soviet attacks on the Chinese Cultural Revolution because it denigrated the primacy of the Chinese party officials, not to speak of the long-standing Soviet criticism of the Yugoslav dilution of party supremacy, show the extent to which the Soviet élite continues to think of its political model as having broader significance. This linkage of domestic interests and foreign aspirations explains Soviet sensitivity to suggestions made by Marxist and non-Marxist scholars to the effect that the Stalinist mode of transforming Soviet society was wasteful, cruel, and —most important—neither uniquely successful nor necessary to its accomplishments.

The Problem of the Alternative

THE QUESTION inescapably arises whether Stalin had any alternative. At least a partial answer is that some Russians—Marxists as well as non-Marxists—had envisaged Russian industrialisation in a manner less physically and morally costly than that pursued by Stalin,[1] though on a comparatively ambitious scale. Even prior to the Revolution, Russian scholars were drawing up plans for the modernisation of their country. Perhaps foremost among them was the study concluded by 1918 by Professor V. Grinevetsky, Rector of the Moscow Institute of Technology, outlining a systematic programme for the development of the country, which was to last for several decades. According to an extremely informative analysis of Grinevetsky's study by Leon Smolinski,[2] Grinevetsky placed higher emphasis than Soviet planners on price signals and profit criteria, in addition to deliberate state action, for arriving

> nevertheless in most cases at the same priorities, policies, and even specific investment choices as those selected by Soviet planners in disregard of these criteria.

Indeed, the top priorities adopted by Soviet planners in the early five-year plans matched closely those envisaged by Grinevetsky, including electrification, relocation of industry and population eastward, hydro-electric development, canal construction, and so forth. Though the standard Soviet claim has been that Soviet industrialisation was derived from "the granite foundations of Marxism-Leninism," there is abundant evidence that Soviet planners, some of them Grinevetsky's former colleagues, relied heavily on his work, accepting his targets though rejecting his formula for a more flexible decision-making process and for greater (though not exclusive) reliance on the mechanisms of price and profitability.

Within the Communist Party, there were also alternative conceptions concerning industrialisation, most notably those coming from

[1] Stalin's terror consumed at least six-and-a-half million lives during the crucial years of 1930–1940. The most detailed accounting is in Robert Conquest's *The Great Terror* (1968). He concludes that approximately one million persons were actually executed between 1936 and 1938 (p. 529), that at least two million more died in camps during these years (p. 532), to which one may also add the at least three-and-a-half million who died during the collectivisation (p. 533).

My own calculations are that of the Party's 2·4 million members, no less than 850,000 were purged during 1937–38 alone. See my *The Permanent Purge* (1956), pp. 98–110. It should be noted that estimates made by others have been higher.

[2] Leon Smolinski, "Grinevetsky's Economic Plans," *Survey* (No. 67, April 1968).

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Bukharin and the so-called "Right Opposition." Somewhat like Grinevetsky, they advocated a policy designed to encourage, by positive inducements, the peasantry, to increase their production and to make the urban population share some of the social burdens of industrialisation (to be pursued at a somewhat less intense tempo). They were particularly opposed to *rapid* coercive collectivisation—the means used by Stalin to extract a surplus from the peasantry—and in that opposition they were later supported even by Trotsky, who initially had been a strong opponent of Bukharin. By 1930, Trotsky had concluded that the physical liquidation of millions of kulaks was an immoral "monstrosity." It was initiating a vicious circle of compulsion and violence which was bound to engulf the society as a whole and to discredit communism. Perhaps even more damaging from the Soviet point of view have been the more recent observations of the otherwise orthodox and highly pro-Soviet Polish Communist leader, Wladyslaw Gomulka, who (on 23 November 1961) similarly labelled collectivisation

> as the beginning of the process of growing lawlessness, violation of socialist legality, the establishment of an atmosphere of fear, and the growth under these conditions of the personality cult, the cult of Stalin.

It should also be noted that Stalinism brought to an end a period of unprecedented creativity in Russian society—especially in architecture, poetry, and the sciences. During the 1920s, in the immediate post-revolutionary phase, Russia exuded a sense of an awakened, vibrant energy. The massive terror and the ideological orthodoxy of Stalinism prompted caution and uniformity. Even in the ideological realm, Marxist thought was reduced to an intellectually regressive catechism, in which Stalin's *Dialectical and Historical Materialism* (1938) served as the all-encompassing point of reference.

The Question of Uniqueness

A DIFFERENT RANGE of issues is posed by the question whether Soviet development—granted that it was morally and physically costly—involved a *unique* attainment, "unmatched" by any other society. This, of course, has special relevance not only to the internal matter of the historical legitimacy of the present system but particularly to its standing as a model for other societies. This claim has been disputed, not only by Western but even by some East European economic historians. Among the Westerners, Professor Walt Rostow has developed perhaps the most pointed (as well as controversial) challenge to the uniqueness of Russian modernisation, arguing that, first of all, "the Communists have inherited an economy that had taken off" in industrial development in the two decades prior to World War I, and that "Stalin was the architect not of the modernisation of a backward country, but of the completion of its modernisation." Moreover, he sees striking parallels in the pattern and pace of both American and Russian industrialisation, the former commencing around the 1860s and the latter in the 1880s.[3]

Similarly, Professor Cyril Black, in his study of Russian modernisation, has cited cumulative data, showing that

> in the perspective of fifty years, the comparative ranking of the U.S.S.R. in composite economic and social indices per capita has probably not changed significantly. So far as the rather limited available evidence permits a judgment, the U.S.S.R. has not overtaken or surpassed any country on a per capita basis since 1917 with the possible exception of Italy, and the nineteen or twenty countries that rank higher than Russia today in this regard also ranked higher in 1900 and 1919. The per capita gross national product of Italy, which is just below that of the U.S.S.R. today, was probably somewhat higher fifty years ago.[4]

Black's comparisons include countries which, like the Soviet Union, were badly devastated by wars and had to undergo extensive economic recovery. Professor Black is led to the conclusion that *"other societies have achieved similar results at a substantially lower cost,"* thus questioning a major premise of the Soviet view of their own past.

Other students of comparative socio-economic development have also tried to develop a scheme for ranking countries, and there is a consensus among them that the Soviet Union today ranks somewhere in the middle twenties.

At the same time, it should be noted that Soviet achievements in space, in weaponry, or in the magnitude of overall industrial growth have been extraordinary. Moreover, the Soviet Union has made impressive strides in education, mass culture and social services, and it has created a solid and extensive scientific base for its further development. Thus it ranked first among the developed nations in the number of doctors per 100,000 population; and it provided

[3] In fact, in such areas as steel, coal, petroleum and electricity the over-all American rate has been somewhat higher, while in light industry and transportation the American performance has been spectacularly more impressive.

[4] Cyril E. Black, "Soviet Society: A Comparative View," in A. Kasoff, *Prospects for Soviet Society* (1968), pp. 42–3.

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the highest per capita annual social security benefits.[5]

NONETHELESS, it is useful to recall that in many respects the Soviet Union is a relatively *average society* in so far as socio-economic development is concerned. Black's study provides useful rankings of the Soviet Union in comparison to other states in such fields as education (in the age bracket 5–19 the Soviet Union ranks 39th among 124 countries for which information was available in 1960); in the field of communications (in 1960 the Soviet Union ranked 26th in newspaper publication among 125 countries); in public health (in life expectancy the Soviet Union was 13th out of 79 countries); etc.

With such indicators of "modernity" as the availability of air communications, radios, telephones, cars, highways, or computers, the Soviet Union was again in the lower ranks of the more developed countries. Thus when compared with the more developed twenty-one countries (including the E.E.C., E.F.T.A., and Greece , Turkey, Finland, Spain, U.S.A., Canada and Japan), the Soviet Union ranked 20th of the 21 in the number of telephones, 7th in the number of radio receivers, and 20th in the number of passenger cars.

The Soviet lag in the more complex areas, such as computers, is equally striking. Thus it had been estimated that by 1968 the United States had approximately 50-to-70 thousand computers in use; the corresponding non-military Soviet figure was somewhere between 2,000–3,500, or approximately, as many as were then operating in Japan, or West Germany, or the United Kingdom.

Further support for the argument that Soviet development is part of a broader and rather uniform pattern has come also from a comparative study of growth in steel production as the key aspect of the industrialisation process. It should be noted that Soviet economists, as well as political leaders, have frequently relied on steel as the major indicator of Soviet industrial growth. The author of this study, Stefan Kurowski (writing in Communist Poland) has argued, on the basis of extraordinarily detailed comparisons, that Soviet steel production did *not* increase under Stalin at a significantly faster pace than during the more rapid phase of pre-World War I Russian industrialisation, and that these rates approximated those attained by other countries, particularly Japan, during their corresponding phases of rapid industrialisation.[6] More generally, relying on a more extensive comparative analysis which involves some dozen countries over the period 1780–1970, Kurowski argues that socio-political systems have relatively little to do with the acceleration in the production of steel and iron, and that there is a pattern of uniformity in the acceleration of production due to technical innovation. This conclusion, quite naturally, provoked official ire, for it touched upon the key issue involved in the Soviet past.

Imperial Pacification

THOUGH Stalinism may have been a needless tragedy both for the Russian people and for Communism as an ideal, there is the tantalising possibility that for the world at large it was a blessing in disguise. It is, after all, almost a certainty that Russia was destined to emerge as a great world power, with or without Stalin. The state possessing the largest and richest land mass, inhabited by pliant yet very creative people, the carrier of a strong imperial tradition, skilled in warfare and statecraft, was destined to emerge in the front ranks of world powers, with only another continental power, the U.S.A., its peer. It is thus highly unlikely, given Russia's traditions, and the ambitions that the availability of power inescapably stimulate, that post-World War I Russia would have long remained stagnant, mired in a miasma of inefficiency.

The question, therefore, arises as to what kind of a Russia might otherwise have emerged. A democratic Russia—either liberal or socialist —does not seem to have been a real alternative. It would have required an unprecedented leap from autocracy to democracy, without an intervening period of democratic gestation, and in a setting of enormous social deprivation, dislocation, and confusion. It is difficult to conceive how post-war Russia, torn by national dissension, class conflicts, competing ideological appeals, not to speak of its sheer misery, could have effectively institutionalised a democratic system. That system failed in other countries endowed with stronger libertarian traditions and under circumstances much more propitious to democratic growth.

[5] Statistical Office of the European Communities, *Basic Statistics* (Brussels, 1967), pp. 131, 153.

[6] Kurowski shows that by projecting forward the rates achieved from 1870, Russian steel production would have grown between 1914–1920 to 11 million tons. In 1929, Soviet steel production reached the level of 1914, and by 1935—after Stalin's first Five-Year Plan and the six-year equivalent to those that separate 1914 from 1920—it reached 12·6 million. (Stefan Kurowski, *Historyczny Proces Wzrostu Gospodarczego*, Warsaw, 1963, pp. 132–3.) Moreover, Kurowski compares in great detail Soviet and Japanese rates of growth, both during the 1928–1940 and the 1950–1962 periods. Again, he demonstrates striking regularities in rates of growth.

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Given at the same time the massive political awakening of the Russian people, stimulated by the industrialisation of the preceding several decades, by the beginnings of literacy, as well as by the experiences of the war, the only other alternative appears to have been that of an openly chauvinist and intensely imperialist dictatorial régime. Similar phases in the political development of other great nations—Germany, Japan, America—resulted, when linked with economic expansion, in aggressive, dynamic imperialisms. Expansive nationalism provided the basis for popular mobilisation and for a highly assertive, even aggressive, foreign policy. At the very least, Russia, in all probability aided economically by foreign investments (and economic investment in states that subsequently became political enemies was characteristic of the capitalist era),[7] led by a modernising, chauvinist dictatorship, might have experienced a burst of imperialist, nationalist energy that would have made it also a world power, but perhaps both at lower domestic cost and in a more threatening fashion.

THIS POINT deserves at least a few additional words of elaboration. Stalin consummated the marriage of Marxism-Leninism and Soviet (particularly Russian) nationalism. The increasing stress on Great Russia's state traditions, on frontiers, on national aspirations, and on a civilising mission *vis-à-vis* the non-Russian Soviet nations, went hand in hand with the physical transformation of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union from one dominated by a rather mixed lot of cosmopolitan and internationally oriented intellectuals of Russian, Jewish, Polish, Baltic and Caucasian origin, into a party dominated primarily by Russian (and, to some extent, Ukrainian) peasants turned into party *apparatchiki*. To these men, the Soviet political system represented simultaneously the source of their own social advancement and of their political power. Their loyalty to it was not unlike that to the Catholic Church in traditional societies of many peasant priests (usually the youngest sons, for whom no land was left). It was more institutional than intellectual. The ideology provided the integrative, intellectualistic perspective, but unlike their internationally minded predecessors in the intelligentsia, it was *not* the principal source of motivation and commitment.

The new Soviet élites have tended, accordingly, to be both conservative and nationalist, even while professing the universal elements of their ideology. They could thus act in a manner which was essentially dictated by their own interests, and simultaneously believe themselves to be truly internationalist. To them, Stalin's famous dictum that the test of a true internationalist is his loyalty to the Soviet Union was the ideal resolution of the tension that crept into the relationship between Soviet nationalism and Communist internationalism. Small wonder that the dictum was in effect revived by Brezhnev in 1968 after the occupation of Czechoslovakia.

The cumulative effect has been a mixed pattern of motivation and behaviour. It has been dominated since Stalin by state considerations, often cynically exploiting the ethical universalism of Marxism. But the latter has also had to be kept alive, if only because it mobilised foreign sympathy for the Soviet Union and it stimulated the idealism of the Soviet youth, whom the régime had to recruit. Though the Soviet Union did exploit its East European vassals, and its foreign aid for China was not politically disinterested, the Soviet people have genuinely believed (and occasionally, as I know, have grumbled to visitors about it) that the Soviet Union has been aiding both Eastern Europe and China because of the obligations of Communist solidarity.

Moreover, the internal violence applied by Stalin against his own country and the educational effect of the Communist ideology—even if initially not accepted by the masses—had a tempering effect on unbridled nationalism. At first, both the Stalinist terror and the ideologically inspired social changes perplexed and often alienated the people. The unprecedented massacre of the top Soviet political, economic, military and intellectual leadership, perpetrated in 1936–38, inescapably reduced the vitality of the Soviet society. Literally several hundred thousand of the most talented and best-trained people perished during these years. In addition, the principle of internationalism, even if often violated in practice, did restrain, if only by forcing more covert behaviour, the inclination towards Great Russian nationalist self-assertion. Domestically, it contributed to the preservation of the non-Russian nationalities, despite Stalin's purges of their intelligentsia. Internationally, it helped to shape a state of mind in the Soviet leadership, which worked against the incorporation into the Soviet Union of Poland, Finland,

[7] For impressive evidence of Western participation in the early phases of Soviet economic growth, see A. C. Sutton's *Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1917–1930* (Stanford, 1968), which argues that "Soviet economic development for 1917–1930 was essentially dependent on Western technological aid" (p. 283), and that "at least 95% of the industrial structure received this assistance" (p. 348).

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and perhaps even other East European states,[8] a temptation which more traditionally nationalist and Pan-Slav Russian leaders might have found difficult to resist.

PARADOXICALLY, THEREFORE, though subsequently (particularly since World War II) Soviet ideology has been reinforced and perhaps even increasingly dominated by the nationalism of the masses, the historical function of Stalinist Communism may have been to pacify and re-define the phase of the intense nationalistic—even imperialistic—awakening of the Russian people. It gave that new mass nationalism a broader, more international content, paying at least lip-service —but also often with a genuine commitment— to the notion of "international cooperation," "equality of all peoples," and the rejection of "racism." Marxism provided Russia not only with a global revolutionary doctrine; it also infused it with a universal perspective derived from ethical concerns not unlike those stimulated in the West by its religious and liberal traditions.

At the same time, despite its monumental achievements, Stalinism sapped both the human and the emotional resources of the Russians, and a post-Stalin Russia may eventually enter into the world community as a spent post-imperial power. Finally, by creating a particularly despotic model of Communism and by insisting that all other Communist parties be submissive to it, Stalin not only set in motion the process of fragmenting Communism but he also vitiated much of the appeal of Communism at a time when the susceptibility of the more advanced West—the area originally seen by Marx as ripest for the historical transformation—might have made Communism the truly dominant and vital force of our time.

Current Dilemmas

THE CRUCIAL QUESTION TODAY is: When will the Soviet Union break with the Stalinist legacy? Without such a break, it will remain difficult for the Soviet leaders to diagnose accurately the problems of their own society and to make the Soviet Union truly relevant to the intellectual and international challenges of our times. Such a break need not require the abandonment of socialism or of Marxism. It would require the transformation of a political system which today both reflects and is buttressed by an obsolescent and bureaucratised ideology of power into one more in keeping with the emerging humanist, universalist mood of our times. It is no exaggeration to say—though some anti-Communists may be loath to admit this—that the peace of mankind depends in large measure on the Soviet Union's return to the occidental Marxist tradition, from which the more oriental Leninism-Stalinism had diverted it; this need not necessarily involve the outright abandonment of Marxism.

Ideological change in the Soviet Union inevitably will be closely connected with socio-economic change, but it would be a mistake to view the latter as dictating the former. A Marxist framework of analysis is the one least suited for understanding Communist politics in which the political "superstructure" actually dominates the economic "base." Political change in the Soviet Union will necessarily be influenced by the emergence of a new social élite, more technological in orientation; but it will be even more affected by the changes in the internal character and outlook of the professional ruling party bureaucracy, and by the degree to which this élite succeeds in coping with internal Soviet problems.

These problems are likely to develop both on the level of economic-technological efficiency and political-ideological dissent. There can be little doubt that the Soviet economy will continue to grow in the years ahead, but it does appear likely—barring some major setback in either country—that the absolute gap between the United States and the Soviet Union will widen even further.[9] The growth will be hence probably insufficient to satisfy the ideological ambitions of the political élite and, to an even greater extent, rising social aspirations. These aspirations are certain to escalate as it becomes more and more apparent—by comparison with the West—that major sectors of Soviet society remain extraordinarily antiquated.

Soviet backwardness is particularly evident in agriculture. Agricultural productivity has leap-frogged during the last several decades in most developed countries and lately even in a number of the underdeveloped ones. Not so in the Soviet Union, where productivity steadily declined and only recently has somewhat risen. The Soviet rural population is under-employed,

[8] At one point the Yugoslavs themselves volunteered for membership in the Soviet Union, and some Slovak Communists, including Gustav Husak, proposed the same for Slovakia.

[9] It can be estimated that if the U.S. *GNP* grows at 3·5% per annum, by 1985 it will be over $1·5 trillion; if the rates of the 1960s continue, already by 1980 it will be $1·7 trillion. If the Soviet product grows at the higher rate of 5%, by 1985 its *GNP* will be just under $800 billion; if it grows at the even rate of 7%, by 1985 it will be approximately $1·1 trillion. Thus the absolute gap will not narrow and could even widen considerably between 1965 and 1985.

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under-compensated, and under-productive. Resolution of the Soviet agricultural problem is one of the more urgent—but also ideologically more sensitive—problems on the Soviet agenda.[10]

The Problem of Innovation

In the more advanced industrial sector, the impressive achievements of Soviet science in such areas as space and weapons technology have obscured a situation which is far from satisfactory from the standpoint of the needs of a modern, advanced society. It has been estimated that the Soviet Union (allowing for the differential in actual costs) has been spending in real terms for research and development approximately as much as the United States. Moreover, Soviet scientific manpower has been growing at an impressive rate, with the result that the Soviet Union and the United States have become matched. Soviet theoretical work in a number of fields, particularly physics, has been of the first order.

Yet the overall social-economic benefits of the Soviet scientific effort have been relatively meagre. Though Soviet leaders were quick to capitalise ideologically their initial space successes with the claim that they prove the superiority of Communism (an assertion allowed quietly to fade after the American landing on the moon), the fact remains that the Soviet Union has not been able to produce technologically advanced products capable of penetrating economically rewarding world markets in the face of Western competition; nor has it satisfied more than the rudimentary needs of domestic consumption. Even in such a relatively elementary field as automobile production, the Soviet Union has been compelled to rely on foreign help (currently Italian) to mass-produce workable and economically viable automobiles. The rigid compartmentalisation of secret-military research from the rest of the economy, as well as the concentration of Soviet scientific researchers in institutes remote from industry, has meant that research breakthroughs have been either simply not developed, or developed only for military purposes, or developed with considerable delay.[11] Whether it is a matter of computers, or transistors, or lasers, or pulsars, or plastics, or—equally important—management techniques, or the psychology of labour relations, or sociology, or economic theory, or systems analysis, the Soviet lag is unmistakable.[12]

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[10] The technological under-development of Soviet agriculture is reflected in a labour force distribution which places the Soviet Union considerably behind the more advanced sectors of the globe:

	Percentage Distribution by Sector		
Area	Agriculture	Industry	Services
U.S.A.	*8*	*39*	*53*
Western Europe	*14*	*45*	*41*
Oceania	*23*	*34*	*43*
Japan	*33*	*28*	*39*
U.S.S.R.	*45*	*28*	*27*
Latin America	*48*	*20*	*32*

(*International Labor Review*, January–February 1967)

[11] Soviet Academician V. Trapeznikov estimated that 98% of Soviet researchers work in institutes whereas 60% of the Americans do so directly in the relevant industries, and that approximately half of Soviet research discoveries are obsolescent by the time of their development. (*Pravda*, 19 January 1967.) See also the interview with Academician V. M. Glushkov, in *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, 15 May 1968, in which he calls for the rapid training of "systems managers," in which he feels the United States excels, and whom the Soviet Union simply lacks. He also urged the regular re-training of Soviet managers, again citing U.S. precedents.

[12] "Certain sectors, including of course space and some military R & D, and an important part of the iron and steel industry, are technically very advanced; but many industries, particularly in the consumer goods sector, are far less technically developed than in major Western countries. . . . The impression which emerges from both Soviet and Western studies is that the Soviet Union is less technically advanced than the United States in all but a few priority industries, and that in a number of major industries the Soviet Union is technologically behind the industrialised countries of Western Europe." (*Science Policy in the U.S.S.R.*, OECD, 1969, pp. 9, 476.)

According to a study of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Soviet Union, which was the first (in 1954) to adapt nuclear energy for peaceful uses, by 1969 had been surpassed by the United States and the United Kingdom; and by 1975 it will be behind the U.S., the United Kingdom, Japan, Canada, Sweden and Germany, with its megawattage approx. 14 times less than that of the U.S.A. (*Power and Research Reactors in Member States*, I.A.E.A., Vienna, 1969.)

As Burks put it: "The curve of technological development in the West is exponential. Synthetic fibres, plastics, nuclear energy, transistors, digital computers, xerography, lasers, succeed one another in seemingly endless succession. As Western technology becomes more complex, furthermore, the time lag involved in its reproduction by East Europeans becomes greater. Borrowing time runs anywhere from two to fifteen years with the odds at least 50-50 that the product will be, in Western terms, obsolescent when it first appears on the Eastern market. In computers, the time lag for Soviet (not to speak of East European) borrowing varies between two and ten years." (R. V. Burks, *Technological Innovation and Political Change in Communist Europe*, Santa Monica, California, August 1969, p. 8.)

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To correct this condition, the government initiated in 1968 a series of reforms, designed to spur scientific research and development and to improve the quality of management. The Party's Central Committee passed a special resolution in October 1968 ("On Measures to Raise the Efficiency of the Work of Scientific Organisations and to Accelerate the Utilisation of Scientific and Technical Achievements in the National Economy"), highly critical of Soviet research and development and instituting a series of reforms. Its essence: upgrading the status of researchers working directly in industry to that held by scientists in purely scientific institutes; creation of research laboratories directly in industrial enterprises; bonuses and awards for innovation. As Academician Trapeznikov put it: "An important item in the resolution is the establishment of competition in scientific-technical ideas and proposals."

IT IS FAR FROM CERTAIN that these reforms will suffice to generate a creative and socially felt burst of innovation and adaptation. Soviet scientists recognise that creativity requires—in the words of Academician Kapitsa—*"an atmosphere of free discussion, polemics and airing of ideas, even if some of them are radically wrong...."* This, in turn, is related to the ideological and institutional organisation of society as a whole, and cannot be corrected merely by a few organisational adjustments. The OECD study of *Science Policy in the U.S.S.R.* (1968), which has revealed in a detailed, statistically documented manner the extraordinary disproportion between the scale of the Soviet effort and its relatively meagre socio-economic consequences, reinforces the view that ideological-political centralisation results in, at best, a capricious and, at worst, in a catastrophic science policy.[13]

There can be no doubt that in the years to come the Soviet Union will accomplish many remarkable scientific feats, especially in the internationally prestigious realm of space investigations and in scientific areas related to defence research. Its military technology will also continue to match the American and in some areas, doubtless, it will also surpass it. This will be done by "crash programmes" which concentrate resources and scientific talent. For that end, the Soviet organisational structure is remarkably suited. But the crucial question is whether Soviet science, as well as industrial management, can assure Soviet society a broadly gauged pattern of scientific innovation, necessary both to assure internal progress and to advance the international position of the Soviet Union.

The forces opposing far-reaching scientific and economic reforms are formidable. They involve, in the first instance, the bureaucratic party élite, especially the ideological sectors, and some of the upper echelons of the Armed Forces who fear that decentralisation would also mean the transfer of some key research institutes to non-military uses. The upper echelons of the party officialdom are in the main still the products of the Stalinist era, with many having made their start during the Purges. The forces of reactionary resistance have included, paradoxically (and contrary to so much Western speculation!), the managerial élite as well. The present Soviet managerial generation, trained to operate in a highly confined, hierarchical setting, is not necessarily predisposed towards the assumption of greater personal hazards which a more decentralised, competitive system would necessarily involve. Characteristically, the proposals for economic reforms have come mostly from the theoretical economists.

Freedom & Dissent

THE PROBLEM of intellectual freedom prompts more directly political and ideological considerations. It is impossible to judge with confidence how widespread has become the more fundamental, unorthodox dissent in the Soviet Union of the late 1960s.[14] In late 1968, two successive issues of the magazine *Problems of Communism* were devoted to the

[13] An example of the latter is the notorious Lysenko affair and its disastrous effects on Soviet biology. An extraordinarily vivid and informative account of the affair is provided by the Soviet scientist Z. A. Medvedev, *The Rise and Fall of T. D. Lysenko* (New York, 1969). Medvedev's book was written in the Soviet Union but its publication there was not permitted.

[14] It is important to differentiate here between instrumental, orthodox dissent, and fundamental, unorthodox dissent. The two are sometimes confused by outside observers, with the result that instrumental dissenters are lionised for having run non-existent risks and the government's tolerance of them is interpreted as a sign of basic departure from the Leninist-Stalinist tradition. The classic contemporary example is Evgeni Evtushenko. His "dissent" has been primarily instrumental in content: it has aimed at making the relationship between the political system and society more compatible, without addressing itself to the question whether in fact the more basic, ideological underpinning of the system needed re-thinking and revision.

In contrast, precisely because Alexander Solzhenitsyn's or Pasternak's works have had the effect of questioning more searchingly the historical antecedents of the political system, they have been objects of more assertive and drastic official displeasure.

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underground writings, petitions, protests and appeals of dissenting Soviet intellectuals. They made for remarkable and profoundly moving reading, as did also some separately published documents by Ukrainian intellectuals, protesting at the repression in their country. They indicated the existence of an active and articulate group of intellectuals, concentrated in the main in Moscow and Leningrad, composed in some cases of the offspring of the Soviet political élite and more often of the children of prominent Communists who had perished at Stalin's hand. Though a number of them have now been tried in both private and public trials in Moscow and Leningrad, they have not been deterred from continuing their protests, and they did so again at grave personal risk following the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia.

In all probability, for the time being and for some time to come, the intellectual and orthodox dissenters will remain a relatively small, isolated group, Like their 19th-century predecessors, they do not appear (at the moment) able to attract broader popular support. The great mass of the Soviet urban population—only one generation removed from their rural setting—would appear to be characterised by social orthodoxy, based on a rather simplistic internalised ideology, and by a sense of satisfaction with their recent social advancement. The Party, moreover, in its social origins and ways of thinking is closer to the Masses than the Masses are to the Intellectuals.

A very special and particularly perplexing kind of dissent is posed by increasing restlessness among the Soviet Union's non-Russian nations. The political significance of this phenomenon has been largely ignored by Western scholars of Soviet affairs. Yet about one-half of the 240 million inhabitants of the Soviet Union are non-Russian, and many of them possess a distinctive sense of their own cultural heritage, their own language, territory, and history. Their intelligentsia, almost entirely Soviet-reared, tends to be increasingly assertive though not necessarily secessionist in attitude. It is beginning to demand a larger share in Soviet decision-making, a bigger part of the economic pie; and it is becoming increasingly disturbed by the dangers of Russification, some of which is deliberately fostered by Moscow and some of which follows normally from industrialisation and modernisation. Official Soviet discussion of this problem, as well as some attacks on the dangers of local nationalism, indicate that the Soviet leadership is becoming apprehensive; indeed, a number of nationality intellectuals have been tried and sentenced in recent years. Though for the moment, however, the Soviet government has succeeded in confining nationalist tendencies to a relatively few intellectuals (and evidence on the attitude of local nationality party cadres tends to be ambiguous), the very scale of this problem—as well as the fact that the nationalism tends to be infectious, and to grow either when suppressed or tolerated—would suggest that in the years to come the Soviet Union might be faced with a nationality problem on a scale greater than that posed by the racial crisis in the United States.

Probably more immediately disturbing to the Party have been the rumblings of ideological discontent within the scientific community. The now well-known manifesto by the prominent Soviet nuclear physicist, Andrei Sakharov, which had made its way to the West in mid-1968, had been apparently first circulated among Soviet scientists and revised by the author in the light of comments thereby received.[15] The fact that subsequent Soviet responses to Sakharov took an indirect form, never mentioning him by name, and that he was not denounced by the usual device of a public statement of condemnation, signed by his colleagues, seems to indicate that the government thought it preferable to avoid a direct confrontation and public discussion.

This document is remarkable in that it not only challenges the right of ideological orthodoxy to continue, but that it attempts to offer an alternative vision of the future. In so doing, it exposes Soviet reality to a scathing critique. Sakharov's principal underlying assumption is well summarised by his assertion that "any preaching of the incompatibility of world ideologies and nations is a madness and a crime." He categorically rejects any restraint whatsoever on intellectual freedom and condemns "the ossified dogmatism of a bureaucratic oligarchy and its favourite weapon, ideological censorship." In rejecting intellectual subordination to the will of "the party's central apparatus and its officials," he also asks

> who will guarantee that these officials always express the genuine interests of the working class as a whole and the genuine interests of progress rather than their own caste interests?[16]

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[15] Andrei Sakharov, *Progress, Co-existence & Intellectual Freedom* (André Deutsch, London, 1968).

[16] In criticising the persisting backwardness of the Soviet society, a condition which the offically idyllic view of Soviet society has ignored, Sakharov reveals the extraordinary statistic that some 45 per cent of the population, or approximately 110 million Soviet citizens, live in underprivileged conditions. He compares this to the United States where "about 25% of the population is on the verge of poverty. On the other hand, the 5% of

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SAKHAROV'S VIEWS are noteworthy because they reveal how some of the upper levels of the new Soviet intellectual-scientific élite view the world in contrast to the official perspective. However, their importance should not be exaggerated. His argument is simply inaccessible not only to the overwhelming majority of the literate Soviet people, but also to a majority of Soviet intellectuals. It may be assumed that in areas where there are large concentrations of intellectuals (Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, Akademgorodok, Obninsk), unorthodox viewpoints circulate somewhat more widely; but even there much depends on the degree to which at any particular moment the government is prepared to apply administrative pressure in order to assert at least formal orthodoxy. Given the complete monopoly by the Party of the means of communication, the extensive efforts to inculcate the official ideology, and the growing reliance on nationalism, for most of the Soviet people it is the government's view of the world and of their own society that is still the basic source of information and interpretation.

Alternative Paths

IT IS IN THE LIGHT OF the foregoing considerations that possible alternative paths of Soviet political development should be evaluated. For analytical purposes, these have to be reduced to a manageable number and, accordingly, the discussion that follows will concentrate on five rather broadly conceived variants, with our attention focused particularly on the role of Ideology and the Party. The five developmental variants can be capsuled, respectively, by the words *oligarchic petrification, pluralist evolution, technological adaptation, militant fundamentalism,* and *political disintegration.*

1. ***Petrification*** would involve the maintenance of the dominant role of the Party and the retention of the essentially dogmatic character of the ideology. In effect, "more of the same." Neither the party nor the ideology would be in a particularly revolutionary relationship to society; rather, the main thrust of the relationship would be to retain political control over society, but without attempting to impose major innovations. Particularly strong emphasis would be put on ideological indoctrination and confinement of ideological deviations. Political leadership could remain collective, for the absence of deliberately imposed change would not require major choices. The result, domestically, would be rule by an ossified bureaucracy, pursuing a conservative policy in the name of revolutionary slogans.

2. ***Evolution*** would involve the transformation of the party into a more pluralist body, somewhat like that of Yugoslavia, and ideological erosion of the dogmatic Leninist-Stalinist tradition. The party would become more willing to tolerate within its own ranks an open ideological dialogue, even ferment, and it would cease to view its own doctrinal pronouncements as endowed with infallibility. Its role would be more that of a moral-ideological stimulant than that of a ruler; the state, as well as society itself, would become the more important source of innovation and change. Paradoxically, because so much of the Party's history has been contrary to the above pattern, it would probably require—in addition to sustained social pressure from key economic and intellectual groups—either a strong leader (like Tito) or a very basic split within the Party leadership to condition the Party officialdom into acceptance of such political and ideological pluralism.

3. ***Adaptation*** would involve the transformation of the bureaucratic-dogmatic party into a technologically expert party. The emphasis would be put primarily on scientific expertise, efficiency, and discipline. Nationalism would replace ideological dogmas as the basic integrative principle linking society with the state. The main emphasis would be put—as already has happened in Ulbricht's East Germany—on the Party becoming a party of scientific experts, trained in the latest techniques, capable of relying on cybernetics and computers for social control and on scientific innovation to preserve Soviet security and industrial growth. The younger, more technologically oriented leaders of the military establishment would, in all probability, favour this pattern. Political leadership, as in the first case, could remain collective,

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the Soviet population that belongs to the managerial group is as privileged as its counterpart in the United States," implying a condition of considerable social inequality in the Soviet Union.

Sakharov's observation is important because it impinges on the question of social equality, the attainment of which has long been a major Soviet claim. In fact, Soviet statistics and, more recently, sociological studies, confirm the fact that in higher education the children of white-collar officials have considerably greater opportunities than do those of workers or of collective farmers (For example, in the late 1950s, 75% of Moscow University students were children of officials, with 20% and 5% in the respective other two categories, while the population distribution was approximately 20%, 48%, and 31%, respectively; cf. collective volume *Kulturnaya Revoliutsya,* Moscow, 1967, p. 151). Also, considerable disproportions continue to exist in levels of remuneration, with the Soviet minimum wage fixed as of 1968 at approximately $65 per month.

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though probably involving a wider coalition of Party-State-Military-Economic leaderships.

*4. **Fundamentalism*** would involve a revivalist effort to rekindle ideological fervour, which in turn would require a more revolutionary relationship between the political system and society. The notion of progression towards Communism would have to be given new programmatic content, and hence politically induced social changes would be necessary. That, in all probability, would necessitate the application of force to overcome not only actual resistance but sheer social inertia. Even if short of Stalinist methods, the effort would require highly centralised leadership, ideological militancy, perhaps also a more hostile attitude towards the outside world, and something along the lines of Mao Tse-tung's "Cultural Revolution" to shake up the rigidly bureaucratised structure of the Soviet system.

5. ***Disintegration*** would involve internal paralysis in the ruling élite, the rising self-assertiveness of various key groups within it, splits in the armed forces, restiveness among the youth and the intellectuals, and open disaffection among the nationalities. A crisis could arise in the wake of intensifying contradiction between the political system and society, made more acute by inadequate economic growth which is incapable of satisfying popular demands. The petrified ideology—no longer taken seriously by the élite—would be incapable of providing the system with a coherent set of values from which concerted action can be derived.

LOOKING AHEAD approximately a decade, and extracting guidance from the present distribution of power in Soviet society, from the nature of the more immediate political-economic problems facing the Soviet leadership, and from the general pattern of contemporary Soviet social development, it would appear to me that the combination of the first and the third variants seems most likely. The combination comes closest to satisfying élite interests, the imperatives of social orthodoxy, and the needs of the Soviet Union as a global rival of the United States.

In the short run, significant movement towards a pluralist, ideologically more tolerant system does not seem likely. The years 1964–69 have even seen trends in the opposite direction. The political system is not likely in the near future to elevate to a position of leadership a man with a will and a power to democratise, while society lacks the cohesion and the kind of group pressures necessary to effect democratisation "from below." As the experience of Czechoslovakia has shown, "democratisation from below" must be an organic process, which links the intellectuals, the workers, and the students with some segments of the leadership in a deliberate effort to reform not only the economic but also the political structure. Moreover, such a process must either draw on a democratic tradition (as was the case in Czechoslovakia) or create one, particularly by the acceptance of the priority of legal norms over political expediency. But this for Soviet Communism would be tantamount to a new concept of politics! As one Czech scholar observed, commenting on the Czech experience with Stalinism:

> One of the possible methods of preventing the recurrence of political trials in any form is a change in the concept of politics, with which is connected the birth of a new political system. I have in mind such a concept of politics as would not contain the elements of, or an assured basis for, displays of illegality of the kind that happened most frequently in the period of the political trials." (K. Kaplan, "Thoughts about the Political Trials," *Nova Mysl*, No. 8, 1968.)

Furthermore, the Soviet nationality problem imposes a special inhibition on democratisation. The Great Russian majority inescapably would fear that democratisation might stimulate first the desire for more autonomy and then for independence among the non-Russian peoples. Given the thrust of Soviet social development, and the interests of the present ruling élite, it is unlikely that an effective democratising coalition could emerge during the 1970s.

Militant fundamentalism under a one-man dictatorship, though perhaps somewhat more probable in the short run than a pluralist evolution, also would have to overcome enormous inertia and the collective stake of the Party oligarchs in preventing the reappearance of one-man rule. Pressures towards such a rule could develop in the face of domestic upheaval or a major foreign threat, but the fortuitous presence of a talented and effective political leader would also be required. The present Soviet bureaucracy is constituted in such a way as to weed out and snuff out individual talent; it is no longer a revolutionary party in which individual courage and resourcefulness make for advancement.

NONETHELESS, the fundamentalist alternative should not be dismissed out of hand, especially if it should become the only alternative to political disintegration, the latter prompted by the petrification of the system as a whole. Protracted internal decay as a result of the leadership's inability to come to grips with current dilemmas, further falling behind in the scienti-

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fic competition with the United States, internal dissension threatening the national unity of the country, combined with an international security threat—all occurring in the setting of growing ideological indifference—could spark a fundamentalist spasm from a section of the élite. Such spasms are characteristic of political faiths in the phase of their decline.

Given the conditions prevailing in the early 1970s, the first alternative would probably be the path that the majority of the ageing upper party bureaucracy (the average age of the ruling Central Committee was over 60 in 1969, making it probably the oldest political leadership in the world, save only the Vatican, and Mao and his Peking associates), of the old-time army marshals (some of whom have more party seniority than the top political rulers), and of the Party ideologues would prefer to follow. This coalition represents not only the political but also the top social élite of the Soviet Union in the sense that its power gives it prerogatives equivalent to those associated with wealth under capitalism: luxury, convenience, and prestige. Like any ruling class, it tends to become conservative and resistant to those changes which could threaten its position. Moreover—and this is a very important consideration—the Soviet middle class is highly bureaucratised, composed in effect almost entirely of state officials, rather conservative in its political and social mores, composed of individuals only one generation removed from poor proletarians or peasants. It does not want major political change, though it does desire more material goods. It provides the underpinning for the conservatism of the leadership.

However, the upper stratum of the Soviet professional and scientific élite has become too broad, too well educated, and too nationalistically ambitious to be satisfied with a pattern that merely preserves the status quo. Though concerned with political stability, it is also aware of the domestic and international imperatives for social and scientific innovation. In recent years, this stratum has gained increasing access to the decision-makers, and thus participates informally in a process of group-bargaining, especially in policy areas requiring expertise. The organ of the Soviet Academy of Sciences has noted that

> In recent times, the number of scientists called on to participate in the work of the governmental apparatus, even at the highest levels, has increased. They should be called on more often to organise production and to direct planning in the economic sphere.

Their innovative influence, added to the increasingly widespread political appreciation of the importance of scientific innovation, to the nationally felt rivalry with the United States, to the national and security aspirations of the younger more scientifically oriented military leaders is already stimulating pressures for a fusion of the first variant with the third, in an attempt to construct a novel kind of "technetronic Communism."[17]

THE EXAMPLE OF Ulbricht's East Germany may become particularly relevant. Unlike the parallel Rumanian explorations of the significance of the scientific revolution which have led some Rumanian Communists to suggest that this revolution requires a new theoretical framework based on the principle of "universality," Ulbricht has attempted to combine scientific innovation with strict adherence to the Leninist-Stalinist ideological tradition. Political leadership has remained highly centralised and ideological dissent has been firmly suppressed. At the same time, Ulbricht, perhaps more than any other Communist leader, has emphasised that

> The development of the socialist system, above all the implementation of the economic system as a whole, is to a growing extent a matter of scientific leadership. . . . We orient ourselves on the conscious scientific control of complex processes and systems by the people and for the people. We make use of cybernetics in this sense.

During the second half of the 1960s the East German leadership has made an intense effort to rationalise economic management in order to combine lower-level initiative with an effective system of controls and coordination. The 7th Party Congress (April 1967) had set itself the task of developing a general conception of the relations between the various part-systems with the economic system as a whole, utilising

[17] This process would provide the political expression for the simultaneous—and impressive—growth in the overall number of specialists engaged in scientific activity and services (including those with specialised secondary education), and in the number of those members of the political élite who have had extensive backgrounds in technical and scientific fields. Between the years 1950 and 1966, the former grew from 714,000 to 2,741,000. (OECD: *Science Policy in the U.S.S.R.*, Paris, 1969, p. 679.) George Fischer has gathered evidence showing that the latter are becoming the predominant group among the younger members of the Central Committee of the CPSU (*The Soviet System and Modern Society*, New York, 1968, esp. pp. 125–134). Technical competence is as widespread in the Soviet political élite as legal background is in the American.

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more than any other Communist country cybernetics, operational research and electronic data processing. Two years later, at the April 1969 Central Committee Plenum, Politburo member Kurt Hager proudly reported—and he repeatedly used this formula—that East Germany is not only ideologically sound but "is correctly programmed."

In line with this "correct programming," the Party has emphasised the importance of expertise among its members, and the educational system has been reformed in order to link closely science with industry. By the late '60s, East Germany had transformed itself from one of the most war-ravaged societies into economically the most advanced and ideologically the most science-oriented Communist state. After a fifty-year lapse, the combination of Prussian discipline, German scientific efficiency, and Leninist-Stalinist ideology has thus made German Communism again a model for its Eastern neighbours.

Unlike East Germany, however, other considerations in the Soviet Union will in all likelihood impede the pace of such "technologisation" of the Soviet political system. For one thing, the Soviet Union is a much bigger country, more difficult to integrate and with many more areas of socio-economic backwardness to overcome. Over the last fifty years the ruling party has developed its own traditions and ideological style, and—though it favours the acquisition of technical skills by its officials—it is likely to continue resisting the development of an essentially technical orientation among its members, since that would dilute the importance attached to ideology. The security problem, perhaps intensified in the years to come by the Sino-Soviet conflict, will further tend to increase the role of the security factor in policy-making and of the military in the political process. Indeed, if the security problem becomes more urgent, and the Soviet leadership remains collective, it will become increasingly difficult to deny the military direct access to participation in the political decision-making process. In that case the fusion of the first and the third variants (striving to combine *ideological rigidity* with *technological expertise*) would also involve during the '70s the transformation of the present Communist Party dictatorship into a Communist praetorian oligarchy.[18]

The Problem of Vitality

THE QUESTION NECESSARILY ARISES whether such a political development will facilitate the resolution of the economic and political dilemmas confronting the Soviet Union. The answer is bound to be even more speculative than the prognosis itself. On the whole, it would appear doubtful that an attempt to combine ideological orthodoxy with technological innovation, perhaps buttressed by increasing reliance on nationalism and the military, will create a setting propitious for intellectual and scientific creativity. Rather, it is more likely to produce internal contradictions, with the Ideologues and the Technocrats often pulling in opposite directions, especially in regard to the complex issue of economic decentralisation, a measure increasingly recognised as needed for economic reasons but feared for political ones. The result will be either temporary compromises (such as have been characteristic of the Brezhnev régime) or drastic policy shifts from one emphasis to the other. The consequent tension will contribute to a widening gap between the political system and society; the political system will appear unresponsive to internal dilemmas, thereby generating increasing social pressures for a more fundamental reassessment of the contemporary relevance of the ideological and institutional character of the Soviet state.

Accordingly, it may be expected that the decade of the 1970s will witness the spread to the Soviet Union of convulsions of the sort that Spain, Yugoslavia, Mexico and Poland began to undergo in the late '60s. The Soviet student generation will have doubled during the decade of the '60s (it increased by 77% between 1958 and 1965), and it is unlikely that the Soviet Union will altogether evade the experience of student unrest. The late '70s will probably see the spread to the more urban Soviet centres of the sexual revolution, and the party ideologues will not find it easy to accommodate it within the prevailing official mores. These manifestations could thus begin to create a broader social basis for the currently more isolated ideological dissenters; and, together with the likely growth in the self-assertiveness of the intellectuals in the various nationalities, it would make for more visible social and political tensions. However, a red flag raised spontaneously by the students of Moscow over their university, given the authoritarian political setting, will have

[18] This view is held also by some Yugoslav observers. Thus, V. Stanovcic, writing in the Yugoslav Central Committee weekly *Komunist* (26 September 1968), has argued that the present Soviet system has proven itself unable to liberalise gradually and that as a consequence, it is very likely that it will "logically develop into a Bonapartist form of rule, with managerial-militarist groups assuming the role of 'line prescribers' and 'organisers' of society."

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much graver political symbolism than the same flag fluttering over Columbia or the Sorbonne.

But it will not be, I feel, until the early 1980s that the first fully post-Stalin new political leadership will begin to enter into the political arena. An aspiring leader aged 45 in 1980 will have been only 18 at the time of Stalin's death, and 21 when de-Stalinisation actually began in the Soviet Union. Though that generation will probably find its access to power blocked by political leaders a decade or even two decades older (the Polyanskis, Shelepins, Semichastnys, Tolstikovs of today), it will press for influence from the echelons immediately below that of the Central Committee. Given the more volatile domestic as well as global setting in which it will have matured, given its higher education, given probably by then the more flexible character of the adjoining East European states, it is quite possible that the emerging political élite may be less committed to the notion that social development requires intense concentration of political power.

Nonetheless, even then evolution into a pluralist system is likely to be resisted by the entrenched political oligarchy. The introduction of political pluralism will require at some point a deliberate decision to open the Soviet Union to competitive ideas, to let each Soviet citizen read what he wants, to reduce the level of the party's ideological control, to decentralise decision-making and thus to share power with society: in effect, a major transformation of the system as a whole. Unintended consequences of economic-technological adjustments will not suffice to bring about significant political change. As in Yugoslavia or Czechoslovakia (prior to 1968), at some point the political élite must decide to embark on political reforms if there are to be significant political changes.

THUS, barring an upheaval resulting from internal paralysis—and causing either the dramatic appearance of Social Democracy, or, more likely, the seizure of power by a revivalist dictator in reaction to internal dissent—the more probable pattern for the 1980s is that of a marginal shift toward the combination of the second (pluralist evolution) and third (technological adaptation) variants: limited economic and political pluralism, intense emphasis on technological competence, within the context of a still authoritarian government representing a coalition of the upper echelons of the principal interest groups. This could be the beginning of the return to the Western Marxist tradition—but, at best, only a slow and cautious beginning.

In that context, precisely because it does not appear likely that domestically the Soviet Union will experience in the near future a phase of open intellectual creativity and experimentation, the attractiveness of the Soviet Union as the socio-economic model of contemporary Communism, capable of re-captivating intellectually and morally the imagination of mankind, is likely to continue its decline.

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James Wellard

Sinai and Saint Catherine's

A Desert Pilgrimage

PILGRIMS COULD, in the fifth and sixth centuries, wander right across Egypt and the Sinai Peninsula to Jerusalem, staying at the hermitages and monasteries all along the route. This ease of travel, which was typical of the Roman Empire, ceased with the First Crusade in the 11th century. Since that time, safe and easy travel has never been restored between the Nile and the Jordan, except for the 40 years of the British protectorate of the region between 1882 and 1922. Today, the traveller cannot even pass out of Sinai because of the disturbances, so that the great Christian and Moslem pilgrim roads, the former *via* Saint Catherine's Monastery to Jerusalem, the latter *via* Suez and the Red Sea to Mecca, are closed. As truth is said to be the first casualty of war, so the right to travel is a close second.

In short, a continuous pilgrimage from the monasteries of the Wadi Natrun across Egypt to those of Sinai is now impossible, since the Egyptians will not allow travellers to go east of the Nile to visit Saint Antony's in the Arabian Desert and the Israelis cannot guarantee the safety of tourists going to Saint Catherine's along the western side of the Sinai Peninsula.

However, in the spring of 1969, the shelling across the Suez Canal stopped long enough for a party of us to make the dash along the exposed part of the road to Suez and Port Tewfik to the safety of the coast road which runs south to El Tur and Sharm el Sheikh. On the first day of this trip, we passed through Gaza and El Arish whose ancient history is now overshadowed by the events of the Israeli-Egyptian wars. The ruins today of these two oases are Russian tanks and guns burnt out or toppled over beside the road and under the orange groves; the historical ruins of El Arish (ancient Egyptian, *Zaru*; Roman, *Rhinocolura*) seem to have disappeared altogether, though the 19th-century sailors, Irby and Mangles, who passed through the oasis in 1817 speak of "notable Roman remains."

We had no time to stop and look for these remains, notable or otherwise, and had to be content with a glimpse of "the palace of Jarvis, the last British governor of Sinai." The announcement recalled an echo of a period as remote now as the Roman occupation of this same troubled area. However, one saluted the memory of the last British governor, Major Claud Scudamore Jarvis, who so efficiently yet good-humouredly administered his little empire with 145 police on camels and 104 on foot. His "palace" is now a large, crumbling villa, missing its front wall, and it tells us little of El Arish, once renowned as the seat of a bishop, with two large churches whose high walls remained standing in the 11th century and whose marble columns were beautiful enough to have been looted by sultans and carried off to the mosques of Cairo.

THE TALK AMONG the party with whom I was travelling, however, was not of the ancient history of this region, but of the recent destruction of the Egyptian army whose equipment, bombed and burnt out, stretched along the roadside from El Arish to the Canal. The Mitla Pass, in fact, looked like Armageddon, with hundreds of heavy vehicles knocked out by the Israeli Air Force. With such dramatic events so spectacularly presented. the traveller has difficulty in visualising the old wars and the old armies which marched back and forth across this wilderness in the continuous tradition of conquest—Israelites, Hyskos, Syrians, Assyrians, Hittites, Babylonians, Persians, Greeks, Romans, Arabs, Crusaders, French, British, and so on

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until today. Nobody seems to have the slightest idea of how long the pattern will be repeated, and perhaps all we can predict, on the basis of past experience, is that what one generation builds up the next will knock down.

WHAT WE SEE VERY CLEARLY in the Sinai Peninsula, then, is the debris left by two currents of history: first, the castles, watch towers, highways, and devastation of the wars; secondly, the abandoned cities, monasteries, churches, farms, and orchards of two centuries or so of the Christian Commonwealth. Seeing these latter remains, one might surmise that if only the wars would cease in this part of the world, the wilderness of Sinai could become a fertile land as it had been twice before in its history. It had been prosperous during the period of the Nabataeans, a somewhat mysterious people who appear for a short time on the periphery of the classical world. It is not surprising that the Arab historian Makrizi confused them with the Magi, though Western scholars had a better idea of who they were from the writings of the ancient historians. But the Nabataeans were never wholly "real" until their capital city Petra was discovered by the Swiss explorer Johann Burckhardt in 1812. So, too, the Garamantes of Libya, first mentioned by Herodotus as the people of the Fezzan who chased the Negroes in four-horse chariots, were regarded as quasi-mythical until their capital Garama (modern Germa) was located by the Oudney-Denham-Clapperton expedition of 1822. Such were the breathtaking discoveries of the early 19th-century explorers.

Once Petra was found, historians and archaeologists were able to piece together, albeit slowly, the story of the rise and fall of this Near-Eastern empire whose kings held their own against the rival monarchs of Judaea from 200 B.C. to their conquest by Trajan in A.D. 105. The Nabataeans were primarily caravaners and as such controlled both the east–west and north–south routes to and from China, India, Arabia, and Egypt. Their wealth was in tribute exacted from the gold and spice caravans which grew to enormous size as the demands of the Roman world increased from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic. In fact, the Nabataeans employed camels in such numbers that the Greek geographer Strabo describes the caravans as resembling great armies on the move. One is reminded of the German explorer Heinrich Barth's account of 10,000 camels mustered at Agadez to cross the Ténéré desert to the salt pans of Bilma.

The vast commerce thus organised by the Nabataeans did bring a certain prosperity to the whole of the Middle East, including the Sinai Peninsula which the caravaners used for pasture land, seeking out the long Wadis where the camel thorn grew after the winter rains. Here along the ravines, the herdsmen left a record of themselves which we can still see, many thousands of inscriptions, drawings, and vague graffiti known as the "Sinaitic Inscriptions." These rock pictures are incised on boulders all along the valleys and consist of a great many crude depictions of camels, gazelles, and cattle. To anyone who has seen the great art galleries of the Acacus Mountains in Libya or the Tassili n'Ajjer in Algeria, these Sinaitic engravings are obviously fairly recent, if only because of their crudity, for it seems to be a first principle of rock art that the older the etching or drawing, the more skilful the execution. The first travellers to see them thought otherwise, however. The Spanish pilgrim, the lady Etheria, noted them first in A.D. 460 while on her way to visit the Christian monasteries; and a century later they attracted the attention of the 6th-century traveller Cosmas Indicopleustes, he who claimed that the sun retired behind a mountain to spend the night. Cosmas writes:

> In that wilderness of Mount Sinai one can see at all the halting places all the stones that have been broken off from the mountains, inscribed with Hebrew letters, as I myself can testify, having travelled in these places.

The Egyptian monk's description of the Sinaitic Inscriptions is not altogether accurate. Most of the writings are actually in Aramaic or other Semitic scripts, including Nabataean; few are in Greek or Latin. They do not tell us much more than the modern graffiti one finds on every monument all over the world, adding up to an announcement that "KILROY" (or his equivalent) WAS HERE." The character of the inscriptions is shown by such statements as *"Remember Zailu, son of Wailu, grandson of Bitasu"*; and *"Think of Sambu, son of Nasaigu."* But how does one think of Zailu and Sambu?

Major Jarvis, who browsed in his day among the graffiti of the Wadi Mukatteb, sums up the layman's view of these scrawls. One can imagine the difficulties and perplexities of historians two thousand years hence, he says,

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when, after weeks of labour, they decipher a present-day English inscription such as "Coronach, a snip for the Derby" or "Put your shirt on Dark Warrior for the Lincoln."

THE HISTORIANS, however, have learnt something about the early Christian period from these writings, which indicate that pilgrims were visiting the hermitages of the Sinai Fathers even before the lady Etheria travelled across the peninsula in A.D. 460. Egyptian monks, in other words, had settled around the holy mountains some time during the 3rd century, one of the first being St. Onophrius who dwelt in a grotto south of the Djebel Musa, surviving to the good old age of 90, as so many of his fellow ascetics managed to do, despite the extreme rigour of their life. In fact, these same hermits were described by an early traveller as being "naked and covered with bristles." Being naked on Mount Sinai on a winter's night is an ordeal which few men could survive today. But that they did survive, in great numbers, is proven by the cells still to be seen in the cliff faces all over southern Sinai and particularly in the oasis of Pharan (Feiran) which was the first great hermitage and monastery of the peninsula.

The visitor to the oasis of Feiran can still see the last ruins of this once famous cathedral city built in a long valley whose mountains of granite are said to be the oldest in the world. Millennia ago, the oasis was a large lake which burst through its limestone dam and rushed down the wadi to the sea. The springs which fed this lake still rise to the surface of the valley floor, however, and create a little green spot known in the guide books as "the Pearl of Sinai." Certainly the dates and vegetables grown here are delicious and must have made life a little more agreeable to the first hermits who arrived on the spot quite early in our era, attracted to Sinai as the country of Moses and the Ten Commandments. In fact, the earliest identification of the mountain on which the leader of the Israelites received the Tablets of the Law was Mount Serbal, which rises directly above the oasis of Feiran, and this huge granite mass is covered with the ruins of churches, hermitages, and the cells of solitaries. One can still enter these little caves, usually only big enough to enable a man to lie down. On the other side of the valley stands the ruin of the great cathedral-monastery, once the residence of an archbishop in the heyday of the Sinaitic church.

WHAT KIND OF LIFE was it for the monks and hermits of Feiran during the three centuries that they occupied the monasteries and hermitages throughout Sinai? Quite simply a life based on the literal interpretation of Christ's teaching—even to the extent of turning the other cheek to their enemies—the barbarians of the surrounding countryside who periodically took advantage of the Christian's pacifism. We have an eye-witness account of one such attack on the monastery of Feiran from the pen of an Egyptian monk who was visiting "the holy mountain called Sinai." (He meant Mount Serbal, not the mountain later called by the Christians the Mount of Moses.) The monk, Ammon, made his visit to Feiran about A.D. 380. He wrote his report in Coptic, which was later translated into Greek, Syriac, and Latin.

He says that as he sat one day in his little cell at the place called Canopus near Alexandria, he decided to go on a journey to the holy mountain called Sinai. While he was there, the Saracens came through the country in raiding parties, killing or wounding all the hermits who were not able to take refuge inside the stone towers which the monks had built to serve them as both churches and fortresses. Thirty-eight hermits were slain in the region of the Mount of Moses.

> For who [writes Ammon], even if his heart were of stone, would not weep for the holy martyrs who had grown old in the garb of Christians, flung upon the ground in merciless suffering; each one of them struck down, one with his head cut off and another [cleft in twain and another] with his head split in two. What can I say about the number of merciless blows which struck the saints who were killed limb by limb and were flung upon the ground?

In the meantime, other barbarian raiders had crossed the Gulf of Suez and attacked the settlement on the west coast of the Peninsula in the neighbourhood of the oasis of Feiran. Those hermits who lived alone in the mountains were killed in their cells; the monks of Feiran were besieged in their church-towers. The barbarians, encountering no resistance in the shape of missiles, scalding water, and hot lead poured from the embrasures of the fortress, heaped tree-trunks against the wall outside and so burnt down the great door through which they burst looking for loot. Inside the tower, the abbot Paul of Petra comforted his companions with a speech typical of his time.

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> Ye all know that we have dwelt in this place for the sake of our Lord and Master, Jesus the Christ, cut off, because of his love, from the habits of this vain world, in this rough and fearful desert, living in hunger, in thirst, in dire poverty and misery, despising certainly if I may say so, everything earthly and this vain world, that we may deserve to be His worthy companions in the kingdom of heaven.... O athletes of God, let not your souls be faint and do nothing unworthy of your cowl, but be clothed with strength and joy and manliness that you may endure with a pure heart, and may God receive you into his kingdom.[1]

Paul's words help us to understand a little better now how the holy men died with such a minimum of fear and even rancour. The abbot addresses his appeal to their belief in God and his kingdom; the modern equivalent of this, one assumes, is the statesman's appeal to the people's belief in king and country. The monks of Pharan, at all events, died bravely, one of them, Jeremiah by name, refusing to identify abbot Paul and in consequence being stripped of his clothes and used as a human target for the bowmen. When they found abbot Paul, the old man said quietly, "I assure you, my children, I own nothing but this old robe that I am wearing"; at which the barbarians knocked him about, but learning nothing, split his head open with their swords. Several score of the brothers were butchered to death, only three hermits escaping, Andrew who was wounded but later recovered, Domnus who died of his wounds, and Psoes who hid under a wood pile in the tower and lived to tell the tale to Ammon, his fellow-Egyptian.

It is apparent from this and many similar accounts of the killing of monks that these holy men refused to use arms to defend themselves, for they took Christ's commands in this matter as literally as they did in others. In the case of Sinai, they were so harassed by the Saracens that eventually they had to ask Justinian for protection and the emperor's response was to build fortresses to which the hermits could retire in times of danger. Eventually, as the holy men came under constant attack, their monasteries become fortresses proper, and such is the origin of St. Catherine's.[2]

[1] Ammon, *The Forty Martyrs of the Sinai Desert* (tr. Lewis) (Horae Semiticae, No. IX), pp. 3, 8.

[2] There were other fortress-monasteries at Clysma (Suez) and Raithou (Tur), but no trace of these buildings survives.

THE TASK OF FINDING any traces of ancient Tur is not made any easier today by the fact that the modern town has been utterly abandoned by the Egyptian population who were ordered to evacuate this important port on the Sinai side of the Gulf of Suez during the Six-Day War with Israel. And so one finds oneself gazing at a modern city with the same melancholy thoughts that one looks at the ruins of ancient places like Leptis Magna and Timgad, stepping carefully into deserted houses and public places and wondering what the people were like who lived in them. All this has happened to Tur within the last two years: before that, it was a great clearing centre for Mecca pilgrims coming from all over North Africa *via* Egypt. The beautiful old boats which brought these pilgrims—they were mostly the poor people who could not afford plane and train fares—lie all round the shore, quickly rotting in the manner of unused boats left out of the water. The caravanserai which housed the travellers are empty: their shutters bang back and forth in the wind. The shops, souks, and modern apartment buildings are all abandoned, lock, stock, and barrel. The Lazaretto, or quarantine station, which looks like an enormous cattle market, houses not a single pilgrim. One enters the police station. The records lie scattered about the floor and one picks them up mindful of booby-traps. They say there is now only one resident left in Tur, the priest of the Greek Orthodox church which is an outpost of Saint Catherine's monastery. But a few Bedouin arrive with sea shells for which Tur was always noted and these men sit on the pavements with their gew-gaws on display for the tourists who arrive by the weekly bus. Otherwise Tur which has the best harbour along this important coast is a dead city.

Evidently the same fate befell the port after the Arab occupation of the Sinai Peninsula, for the Christian population—mostly monks in the monastery and hermits in the nearby caves—were killed, fled into the mountains, or sought sanctuary in the fortress-convent of Saint Catherine. Such castles, built by Byzantine architects, were to be the only centres of the Western faith to survive during the next thousand years of practically continuous religious wars between Christendom and Islam; and it was only due to the foresight of the emperor Justinian and his consort Theodora that we can visit an outpost of Christianity in Sinai today.

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THE ACTUAL BUILDING of St. Catherine's began in A.D. 535 and was ordered by Justinian probably at the instigation of his wife Theodora who was occupying herself with that fierce controversy over the one *versus* the two natures of Christ. It is strange to think of an actress-harlot who became an empress worrying her pretty head with doctrinal questions which are today almost incomprehensible even to the learned: the arguments concerning whether the nature of Christ was single or double, and if double then "neither mixed, transmuted, divided, nor separated." But obviously Theodora had made up her mind, or had it made up for her, and having opted for the "single nature" of Christ, joined with her husband in strengthening the monophysite faction whose exponents dwelt in Sinai and were, at the time, being harassed by the Saracens, as the local Bedouin were then called.

By great good fortune, we have an account of the transactions between Justinian and the monks of Sinai written by the emperor's secretary, Procopius—he who kept two sets of books, one for public and one for private consumption. In his book, *The Buildings of the Lord Justinian*, this cynical and perhaps pagan writer describes the activities of Christian monks as "a life devoted to a careful study of death"—an extraordinarily equivocal statement. "They therefore sought the solitude that was dear to them," he continues, "and persuaded the Emperor to send architects and stone-masons out to Sinai to build three fortified monasteries."

The convent built at the foot of the Mountain of Moses up which the pilgrims have toiled their way since the 6th century is a magnificent example of Byzantine military architecture. The massive fortress, 280 feet by 250, is constructed in its lower courses of blocks of granite five feet square, and neither sieges nor conflagrations have managed to overthrow this part of the original building.

IN ORDER TO SAFEGUARD the splendid new castle, Justinian wisely despatched a detachment of 100 Bulgarian slaves, with their wives and children, to act as the defenders and servants of the monks and hermits in the local caves. The descendants of these Europeans are now a tribe called the Djebeliya, and it is indeed true that these people are different in appearance from the other Bedouin tribes who inhabit Sinai. Their features, apart from their dark skins, are more European than Arab, which is understandable since the amount of intermarrying between these Djebeliya and the other tribes is negligible: the former are still tarnished with the disgrace of being the "slaves" of Christians. At the same time, even while one can, with the aid of the imagination perhaps, discern a special look to the Djebeliya, the official guide's explanation that blood-tests have shown them to be "of Norwegian stock" takes a bit of swallowing, though it will no doubt become part of the mythology which surrounds St. Catherine's, the Mount of Moses, the Burning Bush (called by the guide "the bruning bush" and corrected by a visitor to "the burning brush"), and the rock where one sees the footprint of Mohammed's camel. One's impression of all these fairy tales is that the Christians laugh at the Moslems' legends, the Moslems laugh at the Christians', and the Jews laugh at both.

WHEREAS all the monasteries in Egypt proper, even those of the Wadi Natrun, were attacked, looted, and burnt so often that little remains of the original buildings, St. Catherine's has been rather more fortunate, though there have been short periods in the 1,400 years of history when it has been abandoned. There were no monks inside the convent, for instance, when a party of German pilgrims arrived there in 1565, and parties arriving after 1570 found the gates walled up. From that time until the British occupation, entrance into the monastery was by basket hauled up by sturdy monks working a pulley on the rampart above.

Still, St. Catherine's did manage not only to survive the rage and hatred of Islam for the Christians, but even to grow more prosperous. There were two main reasons for this: first, the Bedouin in whose country it stood themselves reverenced the whole region as the country of Moses, one of the principal prophets of the Moslem religion; and secondly, the monastery

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had close ties with European convents, particularly those in France. In addition, a cult of Saint Catherine swept across Europe during the 11th and 12th centuries, and the oil which was supposed to exude from her bones became the most prized of all relics. To us today, and even to churchmen, the extraordinary fervour of this saint's cult is puzzling and the tendency of the Catholic authorities is to dismiss her legend as practically worthless.[3]

The legend claims that Catherine was of royal birth and one of the most learned women of her time. At the age of 18, she presented herself to the Emperor Maximianus who, in 306, was violently persecuting the Christians. Catherine upbraided him for this cruelty and undertook to confute any pagan philosopher the emperor might like to pit against her. The result was that everyone of her opponents was not only conquered by her eloquence, but converted to the true faith, for which they were at once put to death. Even the emperor's wife, yielding to Catherine's exhortations, was baptised, and she, too, "immediately received the martyr's crown." Thereupon Maximianus ordered Catherine to be broken on the wheel and beheaded. Her body was carried by angels to Mount Sinai where it was kept in a casket in the Church of the Virgin and exuded the holy oil, a small phial of which was given to visiting pilgrims, until the flow was reduced to three drops a week in 1489, after which date it ceased altogether.

[3] In May 1969 dismissed as *wholly* worthless and entirely legendary.

For some reason or other, the young saint was invested from the 11th to the 16th centuries with a halo of profound veneration, miraculous power, and charming poetry. Not only was she the patroness of young maidens, female students, philosophers, preachers, apologists, wheelwrights, millers, and others, but she was regarded as one of the fourteen most helpful saints in heaven. Together with Saint Margaret, she was Joan of Arc's close adviser; and many theologians, philosophers, and scholars, before beginning their work, implored Saint Catherine to purify their thoughts. One asks, "And why not?"

IT IS NOT SURPRISING, therefore, that her cult brought thousands of pilgrims throughout the Middle Ages to Mount Sinai, so that the monastery grew rich from gifts and was able to feed hundreds of visitors as well as the local nomads every day of the year. Thus it escaped the fate of so many monasteries in Egypt proper and was never really lost to the Western world. On the other hand, as relations between Europe and the Ottoman Empire deteriorated during the 16th century, the monks periodically abandoned the convent altogether, though where they went is not clear; apparently to the seaport, Tur. In fact, by 1600, the monastery had become a colony of quasi-exiles, their number dwindling to thirty where once there had been hundreds, not counting the hermits and brothers in outlying cells and settlements. The archbishops of the convent, once the resident stewards of the shrine, preferred to serve God in more civilised places, making only an occasional visit to Sinai. From 1782 to 1872, no archbishop visited the monastery at all; and the few monks who occupied the convent were either old men who had nowhere else to go, or young men who longed to escape. The golden era of the Christian Desert Commonwealth was ended; and the era itself, the religion it avowed, and the men who practised it are almost as remote and alien to modern Christians as the Homeric age itself.



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THUS IT IS that a visit to the monastery of St. Catherine's today only emphasises the remoteness of that primitive Christian world which the priest Antoninus described in A.D. 570 as

> the abode of a multitude of monks and hermits who came to meet us bearing crosses and singing psalms and falling upon the ground to reverence us. And we did likewise, shedding tears.

No such welcome can be expected from the seven overworked monks of St. Catherine's today, since four of the seven are old and ill and the other three must manage the multifarious affairs of the monastery, which include the daily tours for the tourists. It is not surprising that there are no longer, as in Antoninus' time, "abbots learned in tongues—that is to say, Latin, Greek, Syriac, Egyptian, and Persian."[4] The youngest of the seven, who acts as the guide, speaks only his native Greek and some Hebrew, the latter a useful accomplishment since the majority of the visitors today are Jews. But not all Jews speak Hebrew, and very few indeed, one imagines, understand modern Greek, so a great many of those going round the monastery to see its ancient relics and treasures receive very little information about what they are looking at.

Because of this, but much more because of the unmonastic atmosphere of St. Catherine's—the constant coming and going of tourists, the absence of monks, the disuse of the various churches, and the general air of neglect—one comes away from the great convent with the presentiment that its active spiritual life is over and that it will never be anything more than a tourist attraction. Tourism is no doubt commendable, even if it is reducing a once-variegated and amusing world into a dull, standardised replica of Main Street; but no one would presumably argue that tourists visit St. Catherine's in a spirit of reverence. The great shrine is only too obviously another "sight," like the pyramids. But how different the spirit in which the early pilgrims visited the monastery, travelling overland from Spain like the nun Etheria in A.D. 460 or journeying by sea from Genoa or Venice in the manner of the medieval voyagers! In those days the visitors, innocent of cameras, knelt reverently before the shrine of St. Catherine whose head (writes Sir John Maundeville) "was rolled in a blood-stained cloth which I looked at carefully and often with unworthy eyes...." Were our forefathers incredibly naïve? Or did they believe that miraculous events were simply a manifestation of holiness? In either case, they were delighted to receive the gift of a small phial of the oil which oozed from the ends of the saint's fingers, which, however, fell off some time in the 11th century and were taken as holy relics to the abbey which was being built at Rouen. The holy oil was considered an adequate souvenir of the long, arduous, and expensive journey.

In those days, in 1384 for instance, when a party of Italian pilgrims arrived at the monastery, there were 200 monks in residence, of whom 150 served the convent chapels and 50 the outlying chapels on the Mount of the Law. Food was cooked in the convent kitchen every day for 400 persons in huge cauldrons. Bread and alms were distributed every day to a thousand Bedouin of the desert, and nobody who passed the convent ever went away unfed.

That was St. Catherine's in the 14th century. Today the seven monks in residence are not enough to serve either the convent chapels or the outlying churches; no food is cooked in the monastery kitchens; bread and alms are no longer distributed; and passers-by must bring their own food. One could say that St. Catherine's, one of the greatest shrines of Christendom, resembles today a rather ill-run motel to which few travellers come as pilgrims and devotees of the girl who defied an emperor. And, as if ashamed of Catherine and of her relics, the young monk who acts as guide never refers to his patron-saint at all and certainly not to her severed head "rolled in a blood-stained cloth." And during the visit to the charnel house, one sees from his irritable face that he is as sceptical about the piles of skulls and thigh bones which represent the mortal remains of his predecessors as the tourists who fiddle with their light meters preparatory to getting a shot of this strange and gruesome necropolis.

[4] *Of the Holy Places Visited by Antoninus Martyr*. Palestine Pilgrims Text Society, Vol. II, p. 29.

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Frank Tuohy

A War of Liberation

MISS FEATHERSTONE, renowned in my childhood for the children's parties she gave, was the retired headmistress of a public school for girls. A small energetic woman, with a face that seemed sometimes as intimidating as a clenched fist, she was nevertheless known to be the soul of kindness.

A great many of the parties we attended were given by old ladies, members of a small colony of the professional classes existing on the edges of a mainly working-class village. The old ladies lived in Victorian and Edwardian villas, whose original plantations of conifers and other evergreens had in thirty or forty years grown so tall that they already blotted out the sunlight. These houses were usually half empty: apart from the old lady and her servants, there might be a maiden daughter, who would slam her library book and flee upstairs when visitors arrived, or a bachelor son who, while showing off his collection of coins or butterflies, would tickle you to distraction. In many cases married sons and daughters were living abroad, usually in India; it was for their children, spending the school holidays with their grandmothers, that parties were given. In spring and summer the large gardens, the shrubberies, the greenhouses and the disused stables seemed purposely intended for Easter egg hunts, for hide and seek and sardines, or for complicated games with clues in doggerel rhyme.

The surrounding country was park land, interspersed with shabby, run-down farms. The country mansions were owned by Jews and Greeks. The Jews went in for fox-hunting, while the Greeks preferred otter-hunting—perhaps, descended from islanders (I have been told that many of the Greeks in Surrey and Sussex came from Syros), they had no racial memory of being looked down on by superiors on horse-back, and no need to assert themselves in the same way. In any case, we never went to their houses. The Picton-Dotterels, a mine-owning family from Yorkshire, were also established in the neighbourhood, and old Miss Dotterel gave parties for the local children to meet her niece. Pauline was four foot tall, wore a "page-boy bob" and red taffeta dresses and, like the rest of us, she had a nanny, though this woman was referred to as "Moggy" (she was perhaps a Miss Mogridge). The only difference was that while we were six or eight Pauline was twenty-four. We were told that "she had never grown up" and that "the Specialists considered it good for her to be with children." Some of the children protested loudly and were never invited again, but I can't remember their parents objecting to their being made use of in this way. Perhaps Miss Dotterel's condescension was considered to be a reward in itself.

From the other end of the social hierarchy some unexplained child, most often a ferret-like little girl "from the cottages," might be conscripted to some of the parties. She would be expected to help and be grateful, and in return she could carry home for her smaller brothers and sisters a box of battered cakes and uneaten sandwiches with the cucumber slipping out of them.

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HEATHER AND OLIVE WILLOCK, the twin sisters whom Miss Featherstone had adopted before coming to live at Furzecroft, did not belong to this last category. Yet there was always something pleading and unprivileged about them. They overflowed to an unusual extent with that extraordinary goodness, clear and pure as spring-water, which affects little girls immediately before adolescence. But to us, several years younger, the twins were not little girls at all but big girls. Surely nobody could be more mature than Heather, who pushed you higher and higher on the swings at the Victoria Pleasure Ground, until the Jubilee plantation of pines and poplar trees hung upside down, and the sky lay under your feet like a lake; or Olive, who was both bossy and gentle as she dealt with a dreadful performance of my own when, at the age of four, I had been lent to the girls for the day without being provided with the formula for asking the way to the lavatory. Both Heather and Olive were natural leaders and in picking up sides they vied with each other in giving preference to unpopular snivelling children. They were full of moralistic sayings: "Talking to yourself, first sign of madness!" "Writing backhand, first sign of madness!" The twins both wrote a rounded hand, using brilliant blue ink. They had been given autograph albums, in which everybody contrived, by hook or by crook, to be first or last, the middle pages remaining almost empty.

In due season, they became Girl Guides and talked mysteriously but with hot affection of "Captain" and "Leffie." Heather was Captain's upholder, but Olive devoted herself to extolling the merits of Leffie. In this she showed her translucent kindness still more clearly, for the role of Lieutenant was held by a forbidding female, the unmarried sister of an Indian Army colonel. Later a kind of *coup d'état* occurred in the Guide Troop, with Captain, always nervous and delicate, retiring to have some sort of a breakdown and Leffie emerging as Captain.

For Olive and Heather these had to be transient passions, their greatest loyalty being dutifully given to dear "Feather." Miss Featherstone provided them with a home at Furzecroft and paid for their education, on special terms, at the school to which her own life had been devoted. With her encouragement, their futures were already planned: on leaving school, a training college for teachers, to be followed by careers as much as possible like her own. Armed with the capacity to give girls a good grounding in general subjects, they would have no difficulty in finding employment. Sharing digs with a sympathetic friend, one could save enough money to enjoy the long holidays which are the privilege of school-teachers, with trips to the Black Forest, the Engadine or the Tyrol. (Farther south, Miss Featherstone indicated, was inadvisable for women travelling on their own.) Heather and Olive had already shown that they could take responsibility and there was no reason why they should not get headships in the end, as Miss Featherstone herself had done. They would have the respect of their colleagues and get a very good screw. Like many old ladies, Miss Featherstone had an unfortunate way with idiomatic English.

CAREERS LIKE THESE could be mapped out with confidence because, for the past century or so, the reasonable expectation of reasonable people had usually come true. The people I knew in my childhood were not perhaps happy, but they dosed their unhappiness with little nips of self-esteem. They had been through the War; they had served their country in the Empire; they gave employment to gardeners and indoor servants in this agricultural slum, and got very little gratitude (when they left India, they told you, the native servants had wept.)

Even so, beyond the rambler roses and the macrocarpa hedges, leisured lives sometimes threatened to disintegrate. Then the wives came to our house in the afternoons, for my mother radiated a sort of generalised sympathy and benevolence. From time to time, walking past the drawing-room window I would catch sight of a female face that looked as if it had been rained on all night, and hurriedly turn away. My mother was

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told of the ingratitude of husbands, a number of whom, to make up for real or imagined sufferings in the War, lived comfortably off their wives' private incomes. She might be the first to be informed when "something inside" proved inoperable, or of the trouble people had with children, so often sulking, difficult or impossible. Sons could manage to get away, but daughters at this date found escape much harder. Pretty girls especially, growing up, felt increasingly trapped. They clumped around in tweeds and brogues, exercising Sealyhams in the empty woodlands of winter, and thinking how much they disliked their mothers.

The Willock twins were never, I am sure, like this. My difficulty is that I cannot remember them at all at this time. I have a vague recollection of their appearance at the Drill Hall in amateur theatricals produced by a throbbing woman in a cloak, Miss de Saumarez. Then they vanish again and for several years I do not think I would have recognised either of them in the street.

BY THIS TIME I already realised that, except in the eye of God, none of these people was very interesting. After I had gone to school they merely belonged to a casual comedy, a series of interrupted scenes played out in the holidays, while my own life as well as the life of the world went on elsewhere. Even the outbreak of the Second War left local people very much as they were. When "the gale of the world" blew, it was to find them comparatively well wrapped up.

Soon, however, the presence of troops in the neighbourhood tightened the atmosphere, so that even middle-aged spinsters stopped having dyspepsia and headaches. One night, after her bicycle had punctured, Olive's former friend, the Captain of the Guide Troop, was attacked by a French Canadian private. She knocked him out. In the part of the village known as "the cottages" the forces found a more friendly welcome. During the summer the local doctor, who was my father, was to encounter nine cases of parthenogenesis, all personally vouched for by the mothers of the virgins in question.

By this time several of the old ladies had died, and others went away to live with married daughters or in what were known as "safe hotels." Their houses were taken over. From a turreted villa close by, now a sergeants' mess, radio programmes of a rather desperate cheerfulness resounded all day. The conservatories and greenhouses were smashed and then used for firewood, and a treasure hunt in the shrubbery would have produced only a hoard of empty Spam tins and the white, deflated balloons from the private celebrations of grown up people.

IN THE SECOND WINTER of the war, it was learned that Heather Willock had become engaged to a soldier and that she had, in another of Miss Featherstone's unhappy phrases, "thrown up everything." She was merely protesting at Heather giving up the prospect of a teaching career. Now there was only Olive to reward Miss Featherstone for all she had done for the girls. Luckily Olive had always been the more sensible of the twins.

During the Easter holidays, Heather brought her fiancé to meet my mother. He was a Canadian Army dentist called Bob, though he himself pronounced it "Barb," which held the suggestion that, like a spearhead or fish-hook, he could not be removed without causing injury. He was quiet and polite, speaking out of a cloud of professionally disinfected breath. His clipped hair was orange-red and his complexion had the shade that, many years later, was to be known as "shocking pink." These two colours were to show up well in the Kodachrome snaps which Heather sent from Vancouver every Christmas after the war. Bob's hair and features were echoed in the row of children, their grins all decorated with the golden proofs of his skill, posing first of all in front of the station wagon, and in later years on the deck of a sailing yacht. By that time Heather had travelled, having accompanied her husband to Dental Congresses in nearly all the big cities of the United States. In

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her letters, though filled with good news, there lingered something of the pleading unprivileged note which had marked her as a child. But by now there was nobody to plead to.

TODAY WHEN I remember the Willock twins it is only in the bright enclosed aquarium of childhood, where the thick air is like clear water holding everything in its place. I remember lying on the grass of the lawn, looking at the sunlit sky and watching the tear bubbles trickle slowly across my eyes (I thought them to be a special private vision, like angels) while nearby the big girls are climbing higher and higher inside the dark-green cone of the sycamore tree which I'm too young to attempt.

My memory of Miss Featherstone, on the other hand, is of a much later date, a wartime summer when I am sixteen, about a year after Heather and Bob came to visit us.

The house is open to the August afternoon, the high Victorian rooms reflecting light from the garden outside. I am alone in the drawing-room and am, I suppose, dangerously detached from everything that is going on. At school we are unconcerned with the war, which still seems to take place at a great distance from our lives. My friends and I have just discovered that a previous generation of writers have made bourgeois life interesting by turning facts into symptoms. "The Game is up, for you and for the Old Gang!" I recite, bicycling past the Picton-Dotterel estate, with its befouled rhododendron thickets and its greensward torn up by Bren carriers. At the end of each term, we sing "*Lord, dismiss us with Thy Blessing*," and I come home to dismiss everyone else. Yet at the same time I am dumb with a shyness from which there is no escape, for when I try out the words I have to read and use, people at home say "Oh God" under their breath, and if I consciously make things simple they think me a fool. Shyness and boredom, feeding on each other, turn me back to my proper task: climbing the interminable ladder of books which leads to the next examination I must take. This activity seems to immobilise an entire lobe of my brain as it stores the facts from the pages I race through, with the intention, never to be fulfilled, of returning to them later.

Whoever it is who is ringing the doorbell, then, will find me completely the wrong person to answer it. I cannot really face anyone.

The opening of the door lets in a flood of light, a view of the laurestinus and the gravel drive. Miss Featherstone is standing there (for once the awkwardness of the historic present seems justifiable, because to me she is standing there for ever). She wears a black straw hat and a striped summer dress, of the type then worn by schoolteachers but now only seen on women in the Soviet Union. She has walked some distance, for her house is on the other side of the village.

Of course, in spite of my adolescence, she knows who I am because of where I am. I can remember her rather vaguely: for some years she has been spoken of, rather than seen.

"Is your mother at home?"

"I'm afraid not. She is taking someone to hospital in her car."

I tell her I don't know when my mother will return. I am cautious about this, because there is a great atmosphere of strain in the house at this time. My father, recently released from the Army because of his senior partner's death, is overworked. My mother is out for a large part of the day, doing voluntary service of various kinds. There are no more of the pre-war parlour-maids; a daily help comes in for the mornings, bringing her illegitimate child. My instructions are to keep importunate visitors at bay. When I fail to do this, there is usually a scene, and I am too inexperienced to reconcile the acrimony with which my parents refer to such people with the extraordinary generosity with which in fact they treat them. (In later years, when people no longer ask for help, neither of my parents will find any further reason for living.)

Miss Featherstone peers past me into the long dark hall, to the table with its bowl of

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calling cards, the grandfather clock and the carved chest containing motoring rugs.

"There is nobody at home?"

From her point of view, nobody. To Miss Featherstone I must possess all the conceivable disadvantages of my age and sex except that, by some oversight of the universal architect, I don't suffer from acne.

Perhaps some emotion shows on her face, but the spectacles, the wrinkles and the pursed lips of age make this impossible to identify. She has hardly altered since I first knew her. Even for Heather and Olive, it must always have been difficult to tell what she is feeling.

Miss Featherstone looks once more past me, as though in the hope that the green baize door at the end of the hall will suddenly open and one of the servants of long ago reappear.

I could ask her to wait in the drawing-room, but then shyness and boredom would agonise me, and I should risk my mother's displeasure.

"I'll tell them you called."

She sighs, but does not speak again. She turns away from me and stumps off down the drive.

TO ME AT THIS MOMENT she was part of the casual comedy, like one of those "old maids biking to Holy Communion in the mists of the autumn mornings" in George Orwell's new pamphlet, *The Lion and the Unicorn*, which we had read delightedly at school. When I told my mother that Miss Featherstone had called, she said: "You should have let her wait. An old lady like that, walking a long way on a hot afternoon."

"But you told me not to let people in."

"I wonder what she wanted."

A week or two later, it was learned that Olive Willock was engaged to be married. Like her sister, she had chosen a Canadian officer, called Bill, a friend of Bob's and in peace time a solicitor in Edmonton, Alberta. Whether this was the news that had brought Miss Featherstone to our house on that August afternoon was no longer to be discovered, because by that time she had been found dead.

Later my mother would sometimes say: "I wish I had been at home that afternoon when Miss Featherstone called. I might have helped her." Equally, if it had been anyone else who had answered the door, a chain of cause and effect might have been severed. Possibly I am present in this story only as a small punctuation mark in a sentence that was already hurrying towards the full stop. And, possibly again, if I had been able to speak to her she would not have died. But like everyone else, I too was a symptom, a part of the evidence: we classify in order to deal with one another, and then we die. At that date many others were dying by categories and by classes.

For years afterwards this generalising habit would prevent me thinking of my childhood, of Heather and Olive, and of Miss Featherstone herself. In the face of proletarian necessity, such lives were of no interest at all: they were "unreal." Wherever I went in Europe after the War, the English were to be classified in the same way, by people who had grown to be connoisseurs of their own suffering. The end of this process occurred for me in communist Shanghai, where a woman guide indicated, almost unintentionally, that a fountain pen, a wrist watch and a camera were caste-marks for which one was to be dismissed out of hand. I realised that I had become a sort of coolie in reverse: I was free. Before that, however, I had begun to suspect that the idea of God is the only escape from the categories and the classifications.

This is all I can derive from the memory of that unlucky afternoon, almost three decades ago.

BUT WHAT ABOUT Heather and Olive, so kind and so grateful to their dear "Feather"? If the war had not taken place, would they ever have snapped the emotional bonds by which she had bound them to her? Trying not to disappoint her, their careers would have progressed from term to term, from

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scholastic year to scholastic year, while they hoped always that the next holidays would break the pattern. Life would have been over while they waited for it to begin. For the Willock twins, this war had certainly been a war of liberation. Bob and Bill had caused their escape, but this death was to set them free always.

A year or so after the war, the Nuremberg Trials took place. The subsequent executions were bungled disastrously; only Goering escaped, by biting a capsule of potassium cyanide, and people considered him lucky.

"He didn't have much luck," my father told me. "It is a horrible way to die. It is what Miss Featherstone did, and I had to go and see her. It was an appalling sight."

And so I have another image to add to the one of the figure in the doorway on that summer afternoon: the small body in the upstairs room at Furzecroft, clenched and distorted with the final pain.

At Lochgoilhead

A waterlogged worn-out boat
Slumped to the gunwhale
In the shallow clear water:
A useful diving station
For the little belly-flopping
Water fledgling boys.

They do not know they are diving
Into themselves, into earth,
Deep deeper bottomless.
The sunny silky watery
Moments run free
Over their sweet skins

Naked save to conform
To the old adam-hiding
Of sex they havent yet
A notion of. They plant
In wet and heat and air
This vague seed of their flesh

So beautifully and exactly
No more than they are.
The past is as otherwise
And not more traceable
Than a fish's track—
Nor are they much more solid.

The earth flows for them
And if they knew of death
They'd use it like this old boat
Serving a still purpose
Though made and used to move.

Patric Dickinson

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Melvin J. Lasky

The Birth of a Metaphor

On the Origins of Utopia & Revolution (II)

> *"... there is no such way to gain admittance or give defence to strange and absurd doctrines as to guard them round about with legions of obscure, doubtful, and undefined words. Which yet make these retreats more like the dens of robbers or holes of foxes than the fortresses of fair warriors; which if it be hard to get them out of, it is not for the strength that is in them, but the briars and thorns and the obscurity of the thickets they are beset with. For untruth being unacceptable to the mind of man, there is no other defence left for absurdity but obscurity."*
>
> JOHN LOCKE

REVOLUTION in the 17th century rarely went under its own name; and when it did, it suggested, at least in England, regress rather than progress, a restoration, a "turning backe to its first place." It is perhaps a sign of the genius of the English language and character that revolution, even at a time of violence and rebellion, should have gone by the name of reform. In a sermon preached before the House of Commons in 1641, the exhortation was:

> Reformation must be Universall.... I beseech you, reform all places, all persons and callings; reform the Benches of Judgment, the inferiour Magistrates.... Reform the Church.... Reform the Universities, reform the Cities, reform the Countries, reform the inferiour Schools of Learning; reform the Sabbath, reform the Ordinances, the worship of God....

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"You have more work to do than I can speak," the preacher (Thomas Case) concluded. "Every plant which my heavenly father hath not planted shall be rooted up."

> ...*Not broken off*, then it may grow, and sprout again; but *pull'd up by the very roots.* If it be not a plant of God's planting, what do's it in the Garden? Out with it, *root and branch, every plant, and every whit of every plant.*

Although this is the most familiar garden variety of revolutionary metaphor, it is not at all the usual language of reformers; they do not generally identify themselves with uprooting, nor with "a great Reformation" which would be "zealous... resolute... speedy...." But this was a rare and unusual historic occasion: as John Milton sensed, the time was now "to begin some new and great period," and as he phrased the extreme prospect, "even to the reforming of Reformation itself."[1]

Was it merely that the word—revolution—was missing or, rather, not readily available for political usage? There was to be in this vocabulary of dramatic historical change a fateful transvaluation of values. The word "Reformation" was to lose its general political pointedness and become confined to a technical term for a religious alteration; while "Revolution" would slowly begin to arrogate to itself an unprecedented range of drastic human sentiments. The dramatic bifurcation of meaning can be detected in the plosive phrase with which Clarendon's son introduced the first edition of

[1] Thomas Case, *Two Sermons Lately Preached at Westminster, before Sundry of Honourable House of Commons* (1641), pp. 4–22. John Milton, *Areopagitica* (1644) in *Works* (ed. Patterson), vol. IV (1931), p. 340.

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his father's great work on *The Rebellion and Civil Wars*: this was, he wrote (in 1702), "an age when a revolution hath been thought necessary to make a reformation...."[2] The new word will, in point of fact, be henceforth recurring with such astronomical regularity and inevitability that its extraordinary historical début must be looked at more closely.

The Coming of Masaniello

IT HAS BEEN CLAIMED by one student of historical etymology that "among the first, if not *the* first" to employ the word in its modern political connotation was Montaigne (in one of his essays, 1595); and he claims, too, that an Italian historian, writing of the Neapolitan revolt against the Spaniards, popularised the notion of *rivolutioni*.[3] Other research, however, has antedated this by several centuries. Matteo Villani, chronicling a popular revolt in Siena, used the word *revoluzione* in 1355.[4]

It was often used by a number of other Italian historians (including Guicciardini) in their reports of Florentine unrest in the 15th and 16th centuries. I also note the following in Savonarola: "...Believe me, Florence, that much blood was to have been shed in this revolution (*revoluzione*), but God tempered his hand...."[5] Apparently the term is rarely employed by Machiavelli, although many modern translators use it anachronistically as a rendering of *mutazione di stato*. Indeed in the Anglo-Italian dictionary which John Florio prepared (*A World of Wordes*, 1598) there is this entry:

> ***Rivolgiménto***, a revolving, a revolution, a turning and tossing up and downe. Also a winding or cranking in and out. Also a cunning tricke or winding shift. Also a revolt, a revolting or rebellion.

The function of the modern revolutionary concept was patently carried by the use of *Ribellione*—"rebellion, rising against authoritie, or right, law and Prince." The word *Riformatione* is defined as: "a reformation, a repairing, a renewing of anything to its old state again" (although a second edition adds, "Also a law or ordinance made by the people without the Senate"). And the word *Riuolatione* appears as "a revolution, a revolving, a turning backe to the first place or point, a revolution of celestial bodies or spheres." It is of special interest that among the names of the authors and books that Florio lists as having consulted for his dictionary there are the London works of Giordano Bruno as well as writings by Machiavelli, Tansillo and Guicciardini.[6] In any event, it would seem to be clear that "revolution" came to Northern Europe from Italian political turbulence, and not—as R. G. Collingwood once tried to maintain—from 17th-century French literary criticism.[7]

ENGLISH WRITERS may well have been peculiarly slow to adapt to a political vocabulary which for at least two centuries had marked the pages of various Italian chroniclers of rebels and their insurrectionary efforts. The brilliant Howell translations into English of contemporary Italian historical accounts are, in my view, the central texts to be considered; and the Naples

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[2] Edward, Earl of Clarendon, *The History of the Rebellion and Civil Wars in England* (1702–1704; ed. Macray, with original prefaces by Laurence Hyde, Earl of Rochester, 1888), vol. I, p. xxvi.

[3] Alessandro Giraffi, *Le Rivolutioni di Napoli* (Venice, 1647). In contrast to James Howell's invaluable translation of this work (1650–52), the five-act drama written and published in the same year by an English "Gentleman who was an eye-witnes where this was really Acted upon that bloudy Stage, the streets of Naples" is of little historical or literary interest: *The Rebellion of Naples, or the Tragedy of Massaniello (commonly so called: But Rightly Tomaso Aniello di Malfa, Generall of the Neopolitans)* (1647; in the British Museum's Thomason collection, E.1358). The anonymous playwright does, however, manage in places to rise above his conventional authoritarian hostility and to give his protagonist credit for more than the low vices of an "incendiary." It may have been only "madnesse," but the rebel leader did want to strike a blow for "a brave world" (p. 45); he did seek "to be like one of these thundering gods" and to "begin a new world" (p. 68); he longed for "the golden age the Poets prophesied of" (p. 73). There is, incidentally, no mention of "revolution," only of "Tumults... stirs... discontents... commotions... insurrections...."

[4] Vernon F. Snow, "The Concept of Revolution in Seventeenth-Century England," *Historical Journal* (1962, no. 2), pp. 167–74. Arthur Hatto, "'Revolution': an Enquiry into the Usefulness of an Historical Term," *Mind* (1949), pp. 495–517.

[5] Roberto Ridolfi, *Vita de Girolamo Savonarola* (1952), p. 129; (tr. 1959), p. 86.

[6] John Florio, *A World of Wordes, or Most copious and exact Dictionary in Italian and English* (1598); *New World of Words* (rev. ed., 1611).

[7] R. G. Collingwood, *The New Leviathan* (1942), pp. 199–201.

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revolts of 1647–48—led in their extraordinary first episodes by Masaniello, a young barefooted fisherman in blue shirt and red bonnet, who seized power with the support of enthusiastic Neapolitan masses—are the major linking event between the Mediterranean and the modern ideological idiom. For European minds to whom "revolution" was essentially still a concept associated with the Copernican paths of planetary progress, a dimension of different destiny was about to be added. We have reached that decisive moment in Western history and thought when the old politics of paradise takes to itself a new secular abstraction, original and powerful enough to be capable of translating heavenly hope into celestial certitude and of relating the movement of the skies into a great and special human drama. This is the moment which was registered by James Howell and makes him so important for us.

"Now in this prodigious Revolution," Howell writes in his preface to *Parthenopoeia* (1654), a history of the Kingdom of Naples which paid pointed attention to Masaniello's great uprising, "there were many things of extraordinary remark that are considerable...." He noted "the heat of the Air" and "the sulphurous quality and heat" of the Italian soil which caused "Incendiums and Earthquakes," and he went on to correlate the geology with the politics. "Indeed the Napolitan, according to the quality of the Soyl," he supposed, "is of a fiery boyling Nature, which makes the Spaniard ride him with a Bitt and a Martingall; he hath as many Whirlwinds in his Brain and quicksands in his Breast, as the *French* or any other Nation...." Hence their "sundry Innovations," and more than that: for "I have not read of any Politicall Instrument so often out of tune, having had forty popular *Revolutions* in less than four hundred years...." The most recent of these, and Howell knew it well from his translation of Giraffi's historical narrative, was Masaniello's rebellious explosion against Spanish exploitation and injustice.

> Touching this last Revolution in the year 1647, it was the violent'st of *all*, it was like a Candle burning at both ends, the common people were all as mad as they had bin hit by a worse thing then the *Tarantola*: In which Revolution there were so many prodigious things happened, that were they not *recent*, and done as it were but t'other day, they would be held for meer *Romances*... that this Tumult from a small spark should come to be so huge a fire, from a little source should come to be such a rapid Torrent, that from a weak blast it should so suddenly come to such an impetuous Whirlwind....[8]

Thus: Revolution was born in metaphor, and the literary marks of its birth have been ineradicable. Indeed its whole political evolution as one of mankind's archetypal concepts and mythological symbols has, through changing circumstances over turbulent centuries, been dominated by what we may think of as a metaphorical imperative. It has, now as then, always been close to the spark and the fire, the river and the torrent, the storm and the whirlwind, the volcano and the earthquake, and above all the circles of time and the progressions of the very heavens.

Towards a New Vocabulary

HOW LONG would it be before yet another language would absorb the new terminology? John Milton underscored the stylistic caution and verbal restraint of English linguistic conservatism when he wrote: "...if in dealing with an outlandish name they thought it best not to screw the English mouth to a harsh forreigne termination, so they kept the radicall word, they did no more then the elegantest Authors among the Greeks, Romans, and at this day the Italians in scorne of such a servility use to do. Remember how they mangle our British names abroad; what trespasse were it, if wee in requitall should as much neglect theirs?..."[9] Words struggle, language resists.

But the times were especially propitious for a new vocabulary, as the year 1648 marked the outbreak all over Europe of social conflict, political hope, and the inflamed enthusiasms of rebellious men. The rhetoric and the wrath advanced together. A contemporary student of words and language—Henry More, one of the most admired philosophers of the age—sketched the "strong temptation" which overtakes the enthusiastic spirit:

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[8] James Howell, *Parthenopoeia, or the History of the Most Noble and Renowned Kingdom of Naples* (1654). The first part is "by that Famous Antiquary Scipio Mazzella," and the second part which takes "the Thread of the Story to these present Times" was compiled by Howell.

[9] *Animadversions upon the Remonstrants Defense* (1641), in Milton, *Works*, vol. III, pp. 110–11.

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> He feels a storm of devotion or zeal come upon him like a mighty wind, his heart being full of affection, his head pregnant with clear and sensible representations, and his mouth flowing and streaming with fit and powerful expressions, such as would astonish an ordinary Auditorie to hear. . . .

Henry More, to be sure, was critical, and he considered "all that excesse of zeal and affection and fluencie of words" to be "a kind of *naturall inebriation*." Although his remarks were intended essentially to describe the "Poeticall fits" of "the more highly pretending Enthusiasts," they apply with equal cogency to the political fits of the great first wave of revolutionary enthusiasm which we will be describing. Dr. More's perspicacious critique of eloquence may well be taken to illuminate the very emergence of the word Revolution around which so many recurring outbursts of human enthusiasm would in the next centuries cluster.

> . . . the imagination is so extravagant that it is farre easier for her to ramble abroad and fetch in some odde skue conceit from a remote obscure corner, then to think of what is nearer and more ordinarily intelligible.[10]

This explains much, but cannot explain away that "mighty wind" which swept up so many of his contemporaries. What was "nearer" and most extra-ordinary was the storm, the convulsion, the earthquake. Young Thomas Sprat, only a boy when the land was rocked with civil war and rebellion, followed on with a somewhat cooler correlation of language and politics:

> In the [Civil] Wars themselves (which is a time, wherein all Languages use, if ever, to increase by extraordinary degrees; for in such busie, and active times, there arise more new thoughts of men, which must be signifi'd, and varied by new expressions) then I say, it receiv'd many fantastical terms, which were introduced by our *Religious Sects*; and many outlandish phrases, which several *Writers* and *Translators*, in that great hurry, brought in, and made free as they pleas'd, with all it was inlarg'd by many sounds, and necessary Forms, and Idioms, which it before wanted.[11]

Revolution was such a varied new expression, a difficult word being re-fashioned in busy, active, warring times, to signify that men were beginning to consider a wanting new thought.

This element of contemporary self-consciousness—a remarkable awareness of the whole process by which words and things, or names for realities, are formed and re-formed—is as surprising as it is systematic. Thomas Blount who, with Milton's nephew, Edward Phillips, and James Howell, was one of the outstanding lexicographers of the day, exhibits an uncanny insight into the historic emergence we are trying to trace. "A Metaphor," Blount writes in his *Academie of Eloquence* (1653),

> is the friendly and neighbourly borrowing of a word, to express a thing with more light and better note, though not so directly and properly as the naturall name of the thing meant, would signifie. . . .
>
> The rule of a Metaphor is, that it be not too bold nor too far fetch'd; and though all Metaphors go beyond the true signification of things, yet are they requisite to express the roving fancies of men's minds. . . .

In his illustrative material he outlines the literary techniques of "amplification" by the accumulation of synonymous words. The example is "a Sedition."

> . . . a sedition; tumults; mutinies, uproars, desperate conspiracies, wicked confederacies, furious commotions, trayterous rebellions, associations in villany, distractions from allegiance, bloody garboyles, intestine Massacres of Citizens.[12]

One amplifying synonym is conspicuous by its absence; the roving fancy of men's minds had still a little way to go.

To DESCRIBE a sudden and radical political change, Hobbes—like Bacon, Coke, Greville, Selden—was content to use such words as "revolt," "rebellion," and "overturning." Others indeed preferred "tumult," "sedition," "civil war." Here the classical usages of the ancient writers were being followed, for if revolutions can be found in the pages of Herodotus, Thucy-

[10] Henry More, *Enthusiasmus Triumphatus, or a Discourse of the Nature, Causes, Kinds, and Cure of Enthusiasme* (1656), pp. 16, 57.

[11] Thomas Sprat, *History of the Royal-Society* (1667), p. 42.

[12] Thomas Blount, *Academie of Eloquence* (1653), pp. 1–2, 19. On the usage of the word "garboyle," the *O.E.D.* registers: "*Garboil* (*obs.* exc. *arch.*) . . . confusion, disturbance, tumult . . . a brawl, hubbub, hurlyburly . . . 1548: 'When ye shal heare all the worlde to bee in a garboile of sedicions' . . . 1600: 'The citie of Lisbon, as also all the rest, were in great garboile' . . . 1610: 'Whiles Commodus was Emperour, Britannie was all of a Garboile' . . ." *Oxford English Dictionary* (1933), vol. IV, p. 52.

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dides, Plato and Aristotle, there was no single Greek word for them. One Latin lexicon has this entry:

> REVOLUTION: *conversio ... mutatio ... vicissitudo ... res novae ... rerum mutatio.*

A French lexicographer, with a special national feeling for the echoes of 1789, notes:

> CHANGEMENT BRUSQUEMENT ET VIOLENT DANS UN ETAT: *rerum mutatio* ou *commutatio permutatio civilis* (Cic.), *magna rerum perturbatione;*
>
> FAIRE UNE RÉVOLUTION: *res commutare* (Suet.), *turbata respublica...seditiosus ... turbulentus....*

Finally, a glossary of later Latin records:

> CONVERSIO: *revolution (of the heavens), turning of sinful man in repentance, conversion....*
>
> REVOLUTIO: *rolling back, return, revolution (of Time)* [Aug.]....[13]

It is indeed with these lingering implications of change and sin, revolt and repentance, and the vicissitudes of violent mutations that John Milton refers in his Latin writings to the great Cromwellian overturnings; and it is, for the most part, only the anachronistic slips of modern translators which have him appear to speak of social revolution at all.[14]

What also persisted was Polybius' notion of the cyclical change of "Fortune's wheel"—"... Such is the cycle of political revolution, the course appointed by nature in which constitutions change, disappear and finally return to the point from which they started" (*History*, VI, 5, i). And, in point of fact, in Cotgrave's *Dictionarie* of 1611, the following definition was given:

> REVOLUTION: f. a revolution; a full compassing; rounding, turning backe to its first place or point, the accomplishment of a circular course.[15]

This was part Polybius, part Copernicus. Not until after the "glorious Revolution" did English lexicographers (*e.g.*, Samuel Johnson's *Dictionary*, 1755) assign the term a new, political meaning.

That it was increasingly being used in a general context of both history and politics has become abundantly clear. After the trial and execution of Charles I, Matthew Wren wrote a study of "those strange revolutions we have seen"; and Anthony Ascham's Civil War pamphlet (1649) was entitled *Of the Confusions and Revolutions of Governments*. In each of King Charles II's basic messages to General Monk, to the Lord Mayor of London, and to the House of Peers and the Commons, dispatched from the court at Breda just before his return to the throne, there was a reference to "these great revolutions which of late have happened...."[16] In *Oceana* James Harrington spoke of "Natural Revolution" (which "happens from within") and "Violent Revolution" (which "happens from without"). I would in general agree with Dr. Hatto's surmise that the events of 1648–49 failed to be given the definitive name of revolution in their own epoch because they were not a return to a previous régime. A revolution was an aspect of the principal of circularity, not of linear progress; and this was forcefully illustrated by Hobbes, writing rather gleefully on the last page of his *Behemoth*:

> ... I have seen in this Revolution a circular motion of the Sovereign Power, through two Usurpers, from the late King, to this his Son; for ... it moved from King Charles the First, to the Long-Parliament, from thence to the Rump, from the Rump to Oliver Cromwell, and then back again from Richard Cromwell to the Rump, thence to the Long-Parliament, and thence to King Charles the Second, where long may it remain.[17]

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[13] C. D. Yonge, *An English-Greek Lexicon* (1869), p. 423, entries on "revolution" and "to revolutionise"; and also his *Phraseological English-Latin Dictionary* (1855), p. 383. L. Quicherat, *Dictionnaire Français-Latin* (1891), p. 1255. *Glossary of Later Latin* (ed. Souter, 1949), pp. 78, 335.

[14] See the various renderings by S. L. Wolff, George Burnett, Moses Hadas, among others, in the Columbia edition of *The Works of John Milton* (1931–38): vol. VII, pp. 40–1, 248–9, 398–9; vol. IX, pp. 172–3; vol. XIII, pp. 468–9. Thus, in such phrases as "our revolution" and "this revolution in England" Milton had actually written *conversione* and *Anglos mutatione*, etc. "Revolution" is rendered occasionally by Milton's 17th-century translators; and he himself, of course, used the term a number of times in the general Shakespearean sense, *e.g.*, "the sad and ceasles revolution of our swift and thick-coming sorrowes" (vol. III, p. 77), "a new and fatal revolution of calamity on this Land" (vol. X, p. 187).

[15] Randle Cotgrave, *A Dictionarie of the French and English Tongues* (1611). The word *"Rebellion"* is given as: "... a publike revolt; resistance of a lawful authoritie; stubborness, disobedience, willfulnesse."

[16] Clarendon, *History of the Rebellion*, pp. 203–9.

[17] Thomas Hobbes, *Behemoth: or an Epitome of the Civil Wars of England, from 1640 to 1660* (1679), p. 214.

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Milton, Nedham, Locke

NOWHERE, so far as I can make out, in the historical and political texts of either John Milton or John Locke—and both were deeply involved in the revolutionary upsets of the century—is there any distinctively modern usage. From Milton's English works and, in places, from the contemporary translations of his Latin writings, there still emerges the earlier Shakespearean atmosphere of "forms, figures, shapes, ideas, apprehensions, motions, revolutions...." It is curious that Milton's nephew, Edward Phillips, made in 1694 an English version of his uncle's State Papers and in one of them (a 1659 letter to the King of Denmark) the phrase is used, "a Revolution of this government"; curious, since in Phillips' own dictionary of about the same time (*The New World of Words*, 1696) no such association is registered. Another 17th-century translation documents the imaginative expansion of the revolutionary metaphor into general historical (and even sociological) denotation. Thus, a passage in Milton's *Declaration against Spain* reads very much in the spirit of latter-day interpretive language: "The Reformation of Religion and the Discovery of the West Indies, which two great Revolutions [*conversiones*], happening near about the same time, did very much alter the State of Affairs in the World, ..."[18] But essentially Milton's vocabulary was in this respect traditional, if in places transitional. So very much like the historians who were to come, there is "revolution" on the first and on the last page of Milton's *History of Britain* (1670).[19] He opens with a speculation on the fate of nations: "... were it the violence of barbarous inundations, or they themselves at certain revolutions of time, fatally decaying, and degenerating into Sloth and Ignorance...." And he closes with the remark: "...If these were the Causes of such misery and thraldom to those our Ancestors, with what better close can be concluded, then here in fit season to remember this Age in the midst of her security, to fear from like Vices without amendment the Revolution of like Calamities."

But for all its large philosophical implications (and subsequent theoretical pretensions), the term *revolution* needs to be sought less in such high and abstract efforts to come to grips with events than in the low texts, in the *agit-prop* of the day where it begins to find its own proper future. In Marchamont Nedham's pamphlets, which were often semi-official in their polemical thrust (many had first been originally licensed by John Milton on behalf of the Cromwellian régime), I find the word employed more often than in any other single place. As the political concept of "revolution" bursts for the first time into the events of the 1650s, a conservative like James Howell, who could almost be said to have coined its ideological usage in English, employs it continuously in terms of a monstrous calamity; a radical like Nedham reponds to the verbal opportunity with dozens of usages, all glowingly positive.

"It is incredible," a hostile critic remarked of Nedham's Cromwellian writings, "what influence they had upon numbers of unconsidering persons who have a strange presumption that all must needs be true that is in print. . . ." Then the revolution was true, for Nedham had put the new proposition more originally than it had ever been put and with greater clarity than it was to have for almost another century, an historic achievement for which both American and French revolutionaries were to be suitably grateful. *The Excellencie of a Free State* (1656) was Nedham's most considerable work and in it he emerged as literally the first "revolutionary" ideologue.[20]

> Necessity and Extremity opening the people's Eyes [he wrote], so that (as the only Remedy)

[18] *Works*, vol. XIII (1937), pp. 516–17.

[19] *Works*, vol. X (1933), pp. 1, 316.

[20] Marchamont Nedham, *The Excellencie of a Free-State: or, the Right Constitution of a Common-Wealth. Wherein All Objections are answered, and the best way to secure the Peoples Liberties, discovered: With Some Errors of Government, and Rules of Policie. Published by a Well-wisher to Posterity* (1656), pp. 80, 154.

The attack on Nedham (also spelled Needham) is in *A Rope for Pol.* [*i.e.*, "Politicus"], *or, A Hue and Cry after Marchemont Nedham* (1660). This monarchist critique is a curious collection of the "scurrilous News-writer's... horrid Blasphemies and Revilings," and the editor apologises for their re-publication for "they deserve rather to be burn'd than read." It is a moot question, however, who is more culpable: Nedham or Gutenberg. Nedham was "the Goliath of the Philistines," and "had the Devil himself" (the Father of Lies) been in this man's office, he could not have exceeded him." Yet the fault apparently was less in him than in "the mischief occasioned by the Invention of Typography." The indictment was of Journalism. For if the old régime had been "traduc'd and profan'd by the Writings of zealous Incendiaries... Fanaticks and Enthusiasts," it was all "the issue of trayterous and pestilent minds... brought into the world and propagated by the existence of the Presse."

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> they dislodged the Power out of those hands, putting it into their own, and placing it in a constant orderly Revolution of persons Elective by the Community....

Again, in an even more drastic formulation (and it demonstrably shaped the spirit of '76 and '89), he announced that

> a revolution of Government in the Peoples hands hath ever been the only means to make Governours accountable, and prevent the inconveniences of Tyranny, Distraction, and Misery....

One can sense why John Adams resented his influence on the radicals in the American colonial rebellion, and why Condorcet saluted his memory during the Revolution in France.

SOME OF THIS LITERATURE was known to John Locke, but we can only guess how much of it the young scholar of Westminster School and Christ Church, Oxford, had been exposed to in the early years of his intellectual development, so marked by conservative, monarchist and Hobbesian views. We know that he had read "Mr. Ascham's book" on *Revolutions of Government* (1649), and I have seen a copy of a work entitled *Notable Revolutions* (1653) which had been in the Earl of Shaftesbury's collection (of which Locke had been librarian for many years). Yet Locke was evidently taken neither by the word nor the concept, not even as he made his ideologue's progress from the conservative right to the liberal left. Was it because he was a sensitive and finicky stylist who had an aversion to the "evil sounds" of certain words, "as though with some spectre"?[21]

In his theory of language Locke allowed, of course, for the emergence of what he called "mixed modes"—"He that hath new notions will, perhaps, venture sometimes on the coining new terms to express them...." Yet he remained very wary of alterations in the significations of words. There was enough absurd wrangling as it was, as "men fill one another's heads with noise and sounds." Given the inevitability of men's *"inconstancy"* in the use of words, it is (as Locke sharply warns) "plain cheat and abuse when I make them stand sometimes for one thing and sometimes for another, the wilful doing whereof can be imputed to nothing but great folly or greater dishonesty...." Worst of all was the danger of *"affected obscurity"*—as a consequence of "either applying old words to new and unusual significations, or introducing new and ambiguous terms without defining either, or else putting them so together as may confound their ordinary meaning...." For Locke the ordinary meaning of the word revolution, as it appears in his philosophical pages on time and duration, was a precisely astronomical reference to "the annual revolutions of the sun," the "regular and apparently equidistant revolutions" in the universe, etc., etc.[22]

Once, in a youthful political tract, he uses the word in a conventional reference to "all those tragical revolutions which have exercised Christendom these many years," and the usage has more in common with the general sense of mutability in Shakespeare and Milton than with the agitated new political formulations of Howell and Nedham. In the major work of his mature period, the *Two Treatises of Government* (1690), there are in all only two additional places where the term occurs, and both are to be found in the final chapter treating "Of the Dissolution of Government." Neither is, for the philosopher who for so long has been taken to be the exemplary defender of the right of revolution, especially revolutionary. The first appears to describe the political cycle in which a people returns, or is "brought back again," to a previous point of departure: the "many Revolutions," Locke observes, "never carried the People so far, as to place it in another Line." The second emphasises the rare seriousness of an ill-treated people rousing itself, justifiably, against "a long train of Abuses, Prevarications, and Artifices": "such Revolutions happen," Locke notes, in order to "put the rule into such hands, which may secure to them the ends for which Government was at first erected...."[23]

"He was never a candid man," Locke's biographer has written. "He had an almost Gothic fondness of mystery for the sake of mystery: he used all kinds of little cyphers, he modified a shorthand system for the purposes of concealment, and on at least one occasion he employed

[21] John Locke, *Two Tracts on Government* (ed. Abrams, 1967), pp. 235, 248. Lion Aitzema, *Notable Revolutions: Beeing a True Relation of what Hap'ned in the United Provinces of the Netherlands* (1653); at Quaritch's in London. See, generally, *The Library of John Locke* (ed. Harrison & Laslett, 1965).

[22] Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (1690–1706; ed. Yolton, 1965), vol. I, pp. 155–58; vol. II, pp. 71–92.

[23] Locke, *Two Tracts*, p. 160. Locke, *Two Treatises of Government* (rev. ed. Laslett, 1965), pp. 462–64.

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invisible ink. . . ." Perhaps this vignette by Professor Cranston goes part of the way towards an explanation of the curious spectacle of a radical philosophy in which sudden and violent political change was not even presented with assured confidence as rebellion. No, ran the devious argument, it could not truly be called rebellion, for was it not rather the best defence against rebellion? Was not the tyrant the real rebel? A revolution, presumably, only takes society back to the original point of the constitutional cycle. Whatever its increasingly diverse political connotations—and it could now mean everything from providential destiny to terrestrial mutiny, from dynastic displacement to social transformation—it signified for most contemporaries some form of a completed circular movement.

Locke, incidentally, owned in his library several copies of 17th-century editions of More's *Utopia*, and a remark in the first *Treatise* (Sec. 147) suggests that he saw in Utopian thinking—to "make out what Model of an Eutopia will best suit with his Fancy or Interest"—a novel solvent of the empire of authority and government. It is characteristic and indicative that although he began in his Paris journal of the 1670s to make notes for an "Atlantis," the desultory remarks were never worked up to a full and final picture of his ideal society. Both utopia and revolution appear to be a shade too drastic—too total and too uncontrollable—for Locke's cautious disposition. Even as a young man, as he confessed in a letter to his father, he felt little but antipathy for those who had preached "nothing but fire, sword and ruin." The incendiary image is worth underscoring here again: for it has been one of my main themes throughout these articles that the metaphor of fire in all its Promethean ramifications proves itself to be one of the most reliable and revealing indicators of the utopian revolutionary temperament. Over a long literary life Locke argued the case against the enthusiasm of perfection through violent change, and his language as well as his logic offers decisive evidence of his true temper:

> . . . And if perchance there is in us a small flame of divine origin, yet by that flickering and restless motion whereby it strives perpetually towards its original dwelling-place, it gives us more trouble and anxiety than light, and it bestows on this clay of ours merely the awareness that it is ablaze and is both consumed and tormented with the silent torture of an imprisoned fire. Hence Prometheus' theft must be deplored by us no less than by him who committed it. . . .

Breathes there a revolutionary with soul so dead as not to be inflamed by a Promethean inspiration? One may well ask. The fiery rebels of subsequent American and French revolt took great heart from the so-called philosopher of England's Glorious Revolution whose ideas seemed to offer such powerful sanction for a new world of reason and reform. "But is there not a danger," as Dr. Snow has written (rephrasing Locke's argument in somewhat anachronistic modern terms),

> that rebels will become enamoured of political novelties and that a revolt will open Pandora's box of political evils? On the contrary, claims Locke, a revolution does just the opposite. A revolution is a reactionary movement, a backward-looking movement in which the people revert to previous experience to reconstruct a government along traditional lines for future generations. . . . There is little need to fear that they will turn to Utopian schemes. . . .[24]

How can this be? Can Utopia be both revolutionary and counter-revolutionary? There is a point at which historical etymology can confuse as well as clarify. In this particular case the confusion may well be constructive, for it can lead to a more self-conscious awareness of the deceptive relationship between word, metaphor, and reality. There are times, as C. S. Lewis used to say,[25] when even a momentary aphasia is to be welcomed.

Between Pragmatism & Romance

THE WORD, then, in major areas of political discourse was, to all intents and purposes, missing. But the substance was there. It was

[24] Maurice Cranston, *Locke* (1961), p. 17 and, generally, his *John Locke: a Biography* (1957). *Two Treatises* (ed. Laslett), p. 289. *Two Tracts*, p. 53. Locke, "Oratio Censoria Funebris" (1664), in *Essays on the Law of Nature* (ed. von Leyden, 1954), p. 221. V. F. Snow, "The Concept of Revolution," *Historical Journal* (1962), p. 174. *Library of Locke*, p. 142. Locke's notes are in the British Museum (Add. Ms. 15,642) and the Bodleian Library; I am grateful to Professors W. von Leyden and John Lough for help in the location of these still unpublished fragments.

[25] C. S. Lewis, *Studies in Words* (1960), p. 6: "Prolonged thought *about* the words which we ordinarily use to think *with* can produce a momentary aphasia. I think it is to be welcomed. It is well we should become aware of what we are doing when we speak, of the ancient, fragile and (well used) immensely potent instrument that words are. . . ."

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surely in a mood of recognisably revolutionary assurance that the House of Commons was told (by John Arrowsmith in 1643), "I am confident you never dreamt of reforming a church and state with ease...." Whatever the dream was it undoubtedly had elements of what was effectively constituting itself into a modern ideology.

1. Utopian hope. "Paradise is our native country" (Richard Greenham).

2. A will to systematic change. "Take heed of building upon an old frame, that must be all plucked down to the ground, take heed of plastering when you should be pulling down..." (Henry Wilkinson in the Commons, 1643).

3. A penchant for the painful extreme "You are physicians to the state and these are purging times; let all malignant humours be purged out of the ecclesiastical and political body..." (Francis Cheynell in the Commons, 1643).

Small wonder, then, that Marxist historians, ever since Eduard Bernstein and Karl Kautsky, have been feeling increasingly at home in the English 17th century.[26] Christopher Hill reads Sir Francis Bacon in terms of Marx and Lenin, and although he concedes that the complexity of the tasks these prophets were setting humanity was always underestimated, he insists (with rather more sincerity than logic) that "in all three cases the apocalyptic vision acted as a stimulant to action which was its own justification." Michael Walzer, studying "the origins of radical politics" in *The Revolution of the Saints*, is captivated by that moment in the historic process "when large numbers of men, suddenly masterless, seek a rigid self-control; when they discover new purposes, dream of a new order, organise their lives for disciplined and methodical activity...." These men, he feels, are "prospective saints and citizens; for them Puritanism, Jacobinism, and Bolshevism are appropriate options...."

Yet what I have already risked referring to as a more characteristic English note was always there. The temper of those men whom John Knox had denounced as "neither hot nor cold" was to prevail; they were not persuaded, as he had been, that "all which our adversaries do is diabolical"; nor did they find gratification in the prospect of "fearful shakings and desolations."

> There must be a leisurely and advised proceeding in every alteration. Nature hath left us a pattern... we must let it grow by degrees.
> (Edward Forset, 1606)

> Now all stirring changes are dangerous, especially when the body of the commonwealth is full of diseases. (Calybute Downing, 1634)

John Pym himself, rebel and libertarian, pointed out in a famous speech of 1628:

> If this mutual relation and intercourse be broken, the whole frame will quickly be dissolved and fall in pieces, and instead of this concord and interchange of support, whilst one part seeks to uphold the old form of government, and the other part to introduce a new, they will miserably consume and devour one another. Histories are full of the calamities of whole states and nations in such cases. It is true that time must needs bring some alterations, and every alteration is a step and a degree towards a dissolution... therefore it is observed by the best writers on this subject, that those commonwealths have been most durable and perpetual which have often reformed and recomposed themselves according to their first institution and ordinance; for by this means they repair the breaches and counterwork the ordinary and natural effects of time.[27]

Here, then, were the beginnings of that pragmatism in social affairs which practitioners of English politics over several centuries were to elevate into an absolute principle of history. Revolutionary ideology was to be left to others, or so the reigning fancy of Anglo-Saxon attitudes liked to have it. And in point of fact, except for relatively minor episodes in the general course of English political thought, the vast possibilities and tempting opportunities of utopian revolutionism were to be harmlessly by-passed.

IN NONE OF THIS have I been asking (or answering) which came first, the word or the thing. Each historical episode begins somewhere in the middle of another, and either point of departure can be taken to record the sinuous course of political rhetoric. Men and events pro-

[26] E. Bernstein & K. Kautsky, *Die Geschichte des Sozialismus* (1895), vol. I; Eduard Bernstein, *Cromwell & Communism* (tr. Stenning, 1930); Karl Kautsky, *Thomas More & his Utopia* (tr. Stenning, 1959).

[27] Michael Walzer, *The Revolution of the Saints* (1966), pp. 10–12, 21, 130, 175–7, 315. Christopher Hill, *Intellectual Origins of the English Revolution* (1965), pp. 111, 202. *The Good Old Cause* (ed. Hill and Dell, 1949), p. 259.

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duce images, and the images fashioned out of old words and new conceits begin to interanimate each other and often to emancipate themselves from their social and semantic origins. Noting the "peculiarities of imagery and sense," F. R. Leavis observes "a general tendency of the images to forget the status of metaphor or simile that introduced them and to assume an autonomy and a right to propagate, so that we lose in confused generations and perspectives the perception or thought that was the ostensible *raison d'être* of imagery...."[28] But a loss of clarity or vitality is not necessarily involved. Vague concepts take on vivid content and ageing metaphors recover a fresh lease of life; the course can run from confusion and casualness to a heightened relevance. Thus, it is only an antique Promethean inspiration which makes Sir Philip Sidney, with "fire in the mind," greet the flames of Dutch rebellion: for "without all this conflagration" there could be no triumphant liberation. Harrington, who dedicated his *Oceana* to General Cromwell, a living engineer of victory, gave the conceit a melodramatic up-dating which marked the transition of the metaphor to a new context of more modern violence. When Oceana mourned the passing of Lord Archon, *"Pater Patriae ... Inviolable in his Faith ... The Happiest of Legislators,"* it was recorded that it was he "Who setting the Kingdoms of the Earth at Liberty, Tooke the Kingdome of the Heav'ns by Violence." In a striking passage which Sidney would have recognised (to use his own phrase) as a new composition of conceits, Harrington writes:

> ... Your Gothick Polititians seem unto me to have invented some ammunition, or Gunpowder, in their King and Parliament (*duo fulmina belli*) then Government. For what is become of the Princes (a kind of people) in Germany? blown up. Where are the Estates, or the Power of the people in France? blown up. Where is that of the people in Aragon, and the rest of the Spanish Kingdoms? blown up. On the other side, where is the King of Spain's power in Holland? blown up. Where is that of the Austrian Princes in Switz? blown up. This perpetual peevishnesse and jealousie, under the alternate Empire of the Prince and of the People, is obnoxious [liable] unto every Spark. Nor shall any man shew a reason that will be holding in prudence, why the people of Oceana have blown up their King, but that their Kings did not first blow up them: The rest is discourse for Ladies. Wherefore your Parliaments are not henceforth to come out of the bag of Aeolus ["he did enfold ... all th' airy blasts that were of stormy kinds," Homer, *Odyssey* X, tr. Chapman], but by your Gallaxy's, to be perpetual food of the fire of Vesta.

Given this special interest in the movement from storm to fire, or from spark to explosion on the "Gothick" scene of European political conflict, Harrington could only dissociate himself from those "Historians, whose custome it hath been of old, to be as diligent Observers of Forraigne Actions, as carelesse of those Domestique Revolutions, which (lesse pleasant it may be, as not partaking so much of the Romance) are unto Statesmen of far greater profit; and this fault if it is not mine, is so much more frequent with Modern Writers, as hath caused me to undertake this work...."[29]

More modern writers would avoid the fault: the romance of domestic revolutions was yet to come.

The Mythological Scenario

I CAN ONLY WONDER what students of Lovejoy's "philosophical semantics"—or of what Ernst Robert Curtius used to call *Metaphorik*[30]—will make of such explorations into the origins of Europe's new political imagery.

As we have already noted in Locke and the literature of 1688, revolution was at first synonymous with restoration. Both were celestial references and could be taken to signify the movement of change and balance; but the Copernican metaphor was capable of so much more. Open, secular, and outward looking, it could assimilate the new vitalities of the idea of science and, later, the prospect of progress. As Rudolph Bultmann has pointed out, the usage of the Greek word ἀποκατάστασις (restoration) referred in astrological literature to "the periodical return of a star to its starting-point, and consequently the Stoic philosophers use the word for the return of the Cosmos at the end of a world-year to the origin from which a new world-year starts. But in the Acts of the Apostles (iii. 21) and in later Christian lan-

[28] F. R. Leavis, *Revaluation: Tradition and Development in English Poetry* (1936), p. 206.

[29] James Harrington, *Oceana* (1656; ed. Liljegren, 1924), pp. 124–5, 223–4, 226, 322.

[30] E. R. Curtius, *Europäische Literatur und Lateinisches Mittelalter* (1948), ch. 7; rendered as "metaphorics" in Willard Trask's translation, *European Literature and the Latin Middle Ages* (1953), p. 128.

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guage, following Origen, *ἀποκατάστασις* became a technical term of eschatology. . . ."[31] In this sense, the revolutionary metaphor represents a victory of astronomy over astrology.

Its fundamental themes are like the governing lines of force which Mircea Eliade has discovered in the earliest history of man's beliefs, and what he has called *"archétypes et répétition"*[32] has been abundantly disclosing itself in these pages. I do not wish to press the cyclical thesis, although I realise that I may already be well beyond my original intention which was only historical illustration rather than philosophical demonstration. Yet the point is a persistent intruder, and both author and reader may well be plagued at this stage by puzzling questions. For my own part I have often been tempted to search for a measure of deeper satisfaction in the scope of anthropology (even with the Parisian playfulness of one contemporary master who has told us that if there are questions to which there are no answers, there are also answers for which there are no questions).[33]

THE TROUBLE with the anthropologists has been their studied indifference to the comparative peculiarities of European customs and mores and their tidy preference for aboriginal forms which are always held to be purer and more self-sufficient than the real course of interfused historical events allows. In many peripheral sectors of the Western experience it has been precisely the special Christian note of eschatological drama which has added a unique element to older modes of human hope and social despair. All too often this is disguised, overlooked, or underplayed: as in the analysis of the millennial outburst among the American Indians, in the last days of their tragic decline.

The desperate outbreaks of tribal revolt and the fervent and often crazed belief in an impending millennial event—accompanied by storms, whirlwinds, and earthquakes—were based on a mélange of traditional Indian views of a World Renewal Cycle and an added doctrinal element deriving from their fitful exposure to Judaeo-Christian notions.[34] One contemporary chronicler of the so-called Ghost-Dance Religion and the Sioux Outbreak of 1890 noted the deep changes in tribal ritual and mythic belief; he was elated by the surprising turn to a new ethic (as exemplified in the words of one messianic message to the Prairie Tribes: "You must not hurt anybody or do harm to anyone. You must not fight. Do right always. . . ."), and he was moved to observe: "It is such a revolution as comes but once in the life of a race." But it was a "revolution" which recapitulated both the activism and the passivism of ambivalent Christian attitudes —could one *do something* for the regeneration of the earth, or should one *wait* for the imminent end and the establishment, amid universal peace, of the good and free and supremely happy life?

Some Indians fought, some Indians danced. All felt certain that the Messiah was en route, for they sensed that a great wheel was turning. The glorious promise was of a final release from death, disease, and misery. Warriors went into battle as if invulnerable, and cataleptic prophets led their dancing flock (now with the participation, for the first time, of the women and children) in a new circular "ghost-dance" movement, away from the old stationary up-and-down rhythms. "Give us back our arrows!" some chanted. Others sang of the prophet who had said, "I bring the whirlwind with me. . . . It is I who make the loud thunder as I circle about. . . . Look! the earth is about to move. . . ."

The father will descend.
The earth will tremble.
Everybody will arise. . . .

A sacred message had come down from the mountains: the white enemies would be exterminated by a great flood or by "a wall of fire"—the buffalo would return—the dead braves would live again—the aboriginal people would reign supreme—and the whole earth would become new.

As the Indian messiah Wovoka said, touching upon so many of the central conceits of the revolutionary imagination: ". . . the earth was getting old and worn out and the people getting

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[31] Rudolph Bultmann, *History and Eschatology* (1957), p. 26.

[32] Mircea Eliade, *Le Mythe de l'éternel retour: archétypes et répétition* (1949).

[33] Claude Lévi-Strauss, *The Scope of Anthropology* (tr. Paul, 1967), pp. 27–37: "It is not contradictory that a history of symbols and signs engenders unforeseeable developments, even though it brings into play a limited number of structural combinations. In a kaleidoscope, each recombination of identical elements yields new results. . . ."

[34] Kenelm Burridge, *New Heaven, New Earth: A Study of Millenarian Activities* (1969), pp. 76–83. Robert H. Lowie, *Indians of the Plains* (1963), pp. 199–204. Philip Drucker, *Indians of the Northwest Coast* (1963), p. 169.

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bad. . . . I was to renew everything as it used to be and make it better." It would be a time of fraternal justice for the injured and the oppressed:

Because I am poor,
I pray for every living creature. . . .
In my poverty I hold out my hands towards him and cry. . . .

And as the ritual songs in the various Arapaho, Shoshuni, Paiute, Cheyenne and Sioux dances had it:

There is dust from the whirlwind,
The whirlwind on the mountain. . . .
The mountain,
The mountain,
It is circling around,
It is circling around. . . .
The sun's yellow rays are running out. . . .
Lightning! Lightning!
Whirlwind! Whirlwind!
I circle around
The boundaries of the earth. . . .[35]

IN ANY CASE there are indeed open issues which the impression of historical human experience among the Prometheans, the Doomsday metaphysicians, and the Sweet Dreamers which I have been trying to record does raise most insistently. What is the meaning of the masked words, or the patterns of the communicated symbols? Can we make out the hard outline of the semantic framework, or a universal formula for the permutations and combinations? Is there an explanation for the reappearance of the same or similar motifs, and are these all fragments of a meaningful whole? Do we, in Lévi-Strauss' sense, have here to do with some kind of *structure*, ruled by an internal cohesiveness, or perhaps some pattern of transformation in which the similar properties in apparently different systems are brought to light? In the absence of inaccessible factual truths, can we arrive at "a truth of reason"? Lévi-Strauss, hard-pressed by puzzlement, turned to a poet:

All forms are similar, and none are the same,
So that the chorus points the way to a hidden law.

For now let us, similarly, leave the tentative answer here with Goethe.

To be sure, the way will often be pointed even if the hidden laws are never found. Of course, no one can authentically know whether society follows certain basic structures or prove whether history does or does not truly move in cycles (or indeed in any other form of pattern). I am only suggesting that men's beliefs about such cycles seem themselves to have such cyclical turns. As the scholarly translator of the Dead Sea Scriptures has recorded, the ancient writers of the Scrolls and the men of Qumran were inspired by

> a widespread and well-attested contemporary belief that the great cycle of the ages was about to complete its revolution. This belief was based on a conception, which can in fact be traced to remote Indian antiquity, that existence consists not in linear progressive development—that is, in "history"—but in a constant cyclic repetition of primordial and archetypal events. When major upheavals occurred, it was promptly supposed that the cycle was nearing its end, that the Great Year was at hand, and that cosmos was about to revert to chaos. The primal elements, restrained and regulated at the beginning of the world, would again be unleashed; all things would dissolve in an overwhelming deluge or be burned in that everlasting fire which rages in the depths of the earth. Then the cycle would begin again; a new world would be brought to birth. . . .[36]

MORE THAN THAT: the tentacular hold of the metaphor of revolution over the imagination of modern man raises far-reaching questions about its deep mythic character. To what extent does it have its basic roots in the great primitive tradition of celestial archetypes for terrestrial realities? Surely it is tantalising that no other word for radical social change—rebellion, uprising, overturn—has so captivated, so dominated the modern vocabulary. Born in the mysteries and certitudes of the heavens, only the astronomical *revolution* could, as a figure of speech and a figure of thought, satisfy in a special, sanctifying way.

When I behold this goodly frame, this World,
Of Heaven and Earth consisting, and compute
Their Magnitudes—this Earth, a spot, a grain,
An atom, with the firmament compared
And all her numbered stars, that seem to roll
Spaces incomprehensible (for such
Their distance argues, and their swift return
Diurnal) . . . . . and on their orbs impose
Such restless revolution day by day. . . .

(*Paradise Lost*, VIII, 15–31)

[35] James Mooney, *The Ghost-Dance Religion and the Sioux Outbreak of 1890* (1896; ed. Wallace 1965), pp. 23–28, 181, 201 ff.

[36] Theodore H. Gaster, *The Dead Sea Scriptures* (1956), p. 98. For a recent discussion of linear and cyclical theories, see Frank E. Manuel, *Shapes of Philosophical History* (1965).

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In the more political context of modern revolutionary history ("those climacteric catastrophes which devastate and revivify civilisations"), Victor Hugo—writing shortly after the Paris Commune of 1871 of the climacteric year 1793—puzzled over

> . . . those vertiginous words which sometimes, unknown even to the man who has uttered them, have the fateful accent of revolutions, and after which material facts suddenly seem to have a kind of dissatisfaction and passion, as though they had taken umbrage at the things that have just been heard; what happens seems angered by what is said; catastrophes occur, furious and as though exasperated by the words of men. Thus a voice on a mountainside is enough to set off an avalanche. One word too many may be followed by a landslide.

When Hugo contemplated the greatness of the revolutionary Convention, he conceded that "everything that is great has a sacred horror," and he reminded himself of the President's place above the rostrum, underneath a black-framed copy of the Declaration of the Rights of Man, surrounded by colossal statues of Lycurgus and Solon, Plato and Montaigne, the chair itself round and gilded and the table supported by four one-foot winged monsters who "looked as though they might have come out of the Apocalypse to witness the Revolution." His sense of the *horreur sacrée* was acute:

> Revolutions have two slopes, ascending and descending, and on these slopes they bear all seasons, from ice to flowers. Each segment of these slopes produces men adapted to its climate, from those who live in sunlight to those who live in lightning.[37]

Sacred mountains, as Mircea Eliade has often pointed out,[38] had ideal prototypes in the sky; temples and cities had divine or extra-terrestrial counterparts in the constellations. Nothing less would serve. Thus revolution, on this kind of anthropological reading, might be taken as an episode in the ancient and familiar sacred dramas of the cosmos, as a part of an inescapable ritualistic process of legitimising human acts through an extra-human model. The sky sets the scene, with its old dwelling-places of the gods and its world-shaking signs of thunder, lightning, and storm.

> *At certain revolutions all the damn'd*
> *Are brought, and feel by turns the bitter change*
> *Of fierce extreams, extreams by change more fierce,*
> *From Beds of raging fire to starve in Ice*
> *Their soft Ethereal warmth, and there to pine*
> *Immovable, infixed, and frozen round*
> *Periods of time, thence hurried back to fire.*
>
> (*Paradise Lost, II, 597–603*)

In this great mythological scenario, with its ritual role for hostilities, its states of sacred fury, its hopes of human redemption, its planetary certainty, and the coming of the Great and Golden Time, Revolution belongs in its way to the paradigmatic gestures of archaic humanity, to the archetypes of the primordial world.

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[37] Victor Hugo, *Ninety-Three* (tr. Bair, 1962), pp. 121–39; *Quatrevingt-treize* (1874; ed. Garnier Flammarion, 1965), p. 163: *"Les révolutions ont deux versants, montée et descente, et portent étagées sur ces versants toutes les saisons, depuis la glace jusqu'aux fleurs. Chaque zone de ces versants produit les hommes qui conviennent à son climat, depuis ceux qui vivent dans le soleil jusqu'à ceux qui vivent dans la foudre. . . ."*

[38] Mircea Eliade. *The Myth of the Eternal Return* (1954), pp. ix–x, 6–7, 27; *The Sacred and the Profane* (1961), pp. 59–60, 121. See, also, his *Myths, Dreams and Mysteries* (1960) and *Images and Symbols* (1961).

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Column

I HAVE LONG regarded Professor J. H. Plumb as one of the most distinguished and accomplished of contemporary historians, all the more so because he combines erudition with a precise and elegant prose style which, alas! very few of his professional colleagues can command. I await the third volume of his admirable life of Sir Robert Walpole with the assurance that it will be the completion of a masterpiece and will give me the same rare intellectual pleasure as the two volumes which have already been published.

But it was not only my admiration for Professor Plumb which made me read the three lectures delivered by him in 1969 at City College, New York, and now published here by Macmillan at 35s.; it was their title also. *The Death of the Past* has an enigmatic, almost a sinister ring; it would have served admirably as the title of one of Henry James' grimmer stories, but is perhaps even more intriguing when used by an historian. It would indeed be interesting to know whether it has ever been employed before in some other context; for myself, I am doubtful whether the phrase could have been used meaningfully and significantly in any age except our own.

For in the literal sense, of course, the past always has been dead; that is its nature. It is the part of our life in time which has been washed away so irretrievably that by no effort of imagination or understanding can it ever be recovered. But this was as true in any other age as it is in our own, and this is not at all what Professor Plumb wishes to indicate by his title; what he wishes to say is that in our own time the past is dead or dying in some quite other way than in any previous period of history.

What concerns Professor Plumb is the *uses* which men have made of the past during any period of which we have any record, their efforts to adapt it to their own purposes and to derive from it powers which can shake their own lives and the life of the society which they compose. Against the sudden death, the total oblivion with which it is always threatened, men have tried to protect the past and rescue from it, or impose upon it, whatever they think may be of use to them in influencing the present.

Of course, in doing so, they have been motivated by their own interests; or rather, as Professor Plumb thinks, by the interests of whatever group in any age forms the ruling class or caste in a particular society. In support of such interests, they have used the past as a means of giving sanctity to religion, legitimacy to authority, or justification to the objectives of national or imperial policy, and this aim is as clear in the king-lists by which ancient dynasties have traced their descent from a divine origin as in the efforts of British historians to enlist Alfred the Great or even King Arthur among the founders of British democracy—so much superior of course, and so unique, precisely because of such ancient lineage.

Men have also found in the past the means to influence and determine the present and the future, whether, for instance, by the elaborate calculations of astrology, based upon the revolutions of the heavenly bodies, or the no less elaborate calculations of Marxism-Leninism, derived from the revolutions in human society; both have a remote connection with scientific truth, but neither is any the less fallible because of it.

IT WOULD BE impossible here to follow Professor Plumb in his account, which covers an immense expanse both of time and space, of the variety of ways in which men have sought to enlist the past in their service. Over the centuries they have treated it like some immense armoury from which to draw magical weapons with which to fight their immediate battles, against each other, against the vicissitudes of time and change, against the evils and calamities by which they have constantly been threatened. By *The Death of the Past* he means the process by which, in modern times, and particularly in Western society, men have been deprived, or have deprived themselves, of this traditional source of divine approval, stability and confidence, so that what was once an inexhaustible treasury of arms against fate now looks rather more like some dusty museum of discarded weapons which have no possible utility in the scientific and technological world of today; a world in which the past has become increasingly inapplicable, that is to say, useless, either as a source of authority, or as a guide to knowledge, or as a means of controlling events.

It would be fascinating to explore the implications, for our own modern Western society, of so great a change in men's relation to their past. Certainly I myself believe that it is one of the greatest changes in human history and that it contains the key to the understanding of many of our present discontents. But Professor Plumb, as befits an historian, is less interested in the consequences of the change, which one can safely leave to sociologists and mystagogues,

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than with the process by which it came about. And in describing it, he has, as himself an historian, either the right to claim a part in what may be regarded as a victory of light and reason over darkness and superstition or the duty to cry *Mea culpa!* as a collaborator in the work of destroying what has hitherto been one of the indispensable bulwarks of human society. It seems to me a weakness of these lectures that they leave one in doubt whether Professor Plumb should claim the right or recognise the duty.

For it is history itself which Professor Plumb holds responsible for the death of the past, paradoxical as that may seem at first sight. The uses which men made of the past in the service of their own interests contained the seeds of their own destruction. For the significance they attributed to the past provoked a respect for, and an interest in, the study, collection and examination of its remains which, after long centuries, and especially in Western society, developed into an independent and autonomous branch of knowledge, characterised most of all by its search for objective truth and approximating more and more in its skills and techniques to the status of a science, an imperfect one, no doubt, but in no way different from any other science in the objectives which it sets itself.

But, whether or not such objectives are in fact attainable, the attitudes and techniques of the modern historian are quite incompatible with those myth-making images of the past which men have fashioned in order to make it serve their own purposes; in aiming at truth, the modern historian has deprived it of its usefulness. Our vision of it is not of some great shining construction, temple, cathedral or palace, but rather of some shapeless assemblage of ruins, from which we can draw neither faith nor wisdom nor guidance, unless perhaps a heightened sense of the limitation of our own capabilities. It cannot be used to buttress thrones or states, or to bestow sanctity on religion or to confirm us in a sense of our own destiny; for such purposes it has become utterly unserviceable and at the moment it is a matter of the purest conjecture whether as a result we have become the stronger or the weaker.

IN THIS WORK of destroying the past as a vital and creative element in the living present, Professor Plumb attributes a crucial influence to our highly developed and highly sophisticated attitude to history, so alien to that of our forefathers. He compares the modern historian to the woodworm which makes itself at home in the timbers of some ancient building, invisible to the naked eye yet incessantly at work on its task of erosion and destruction which does not become apparent until the entire edifice is on the point of total collapse. His work is none the less effective because the historian himself, so often content to regard himself merely as a professional and specialist working for the benefit of his academic colleagues and students, is for the most part unconscious of the final result towards which his efforts tend. And so far at least we have not discovered any vermin-destroyer, some form of intellectual Rentokil, which will protect us against the result of his labours nor indeed would we apply it if it fell into our hands; though it is significant that the two great totalitarian systems of our time, both equally dependent on an imaginary past for their legitimacy, have both unerringly recognised an arch-enemy in the objective historian and have made him one of the first of their victims.

In these lectures I feel that Professor Plumb has approached a subject which is in many ways central to the problems of our time. I myself find his hypothesis of modern man brought face to face with his present and future without any of the resources, except the purely material ones, which he has been accustomed to derive from the past a profoundly depressing one; in particular, I shrink from the consequences which it must imply in any form of artistic activity. Professor Plumb takes a less discouraged view and ends his lectures on an optimistic note, which at least leaves to the historian some more positive function than that of a woodworm or, alternatively, a mere antiquarian. For at the end of his lectures he suggests that history, having dismissed the past as we have hitherto known it, "compounded of bigotry, of national vanity, of class domination," to the oblivion which it deserves, should now create for us "a new past, as true, as exact as we can make it, that will help us achieve our identity, not as Americans, or Russians, Chinese or Britons, black or white, rich or poor, but as men."

I must confess that I find this peroration, elevating as it may be, a somewhat surprising conclusion to his otherwise admirable lectures; indeed, it seems to me to be in flat contradiction with the entire trend of his argument. For in this case is not the historian, though with all due deference to accuracy and truth, attempting to foist upon the poor dead past, so often mutilated and deformed already, yet one more transmutation which coincides with what he believes to be mankind's best interests? And what guarantee can there be that this new effort of reconstructing the past from its ruins is any more compatible than those that have gone before with making history "as true, as exact" as we can?

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I WAS RECENTLY asked by a French publisher for permission to reprint, in an anthology of contemporary English writing, an extract from an article I contributed to a special issue of ENCOUNTER which was later published by Hutchinson under the title of *Suicide of a Nation?* Of course I was flattered by the request; but at the same time it made me wonder how relevant anything written in *Suicide of a Nation?* could still be to conditions in Britain today.

Seven years ago, when it was published, there were many critics who said that ENCOUNTER was simply conducting an exercise in national self-denigration, in what Mr. Wilson used to call "knocking Britain," and that its indubitably pessimistic tone was quite unjustified by the real state of affairs. It was easy to dismiss *Suicide of a Nation?* as an unnecessary attempt to make the blood freeze and the flesh creep and to condemn its authors for their failure to realise that, just as Britain had always successfully muddled through in the past, so she would continue to do in the future.

And on the other hand, the prophecies of doom which echoed through the pages of *Suicide of a Nation?* have not, in the intervening seven years, been realised. Whatever we may think of the condition of Britain today she has quite evidently not committed that final act of self-destruction which was announced to be at hand, unless there was some really Herculean cleansing of her Augean stables.

Should we therefore now dismiss *Suicide of a Nation?* as a wholly mistaken enterprise, which conjured up spectres where none existed and foresaw catastrophes on the basis merely of a totally false analysis of things as they really were? I myself would say that this was certainly too harsh a condemnation, and that if catastrophes were avoided it was not because the possibility of them did not exist. If we did not commit suicide, I believe we came very near to it; and I even believe that if we survived it may have been because there were enough people around who took seriously the kind of prognosis of Britain's social and industrial future which was attempted in *Suicide of a Nation?*

TO WHAT THEN should one attribute, if not Britain's salvation, at least the reprieve which has been granted her, as a nation on a kind of ticket-of-leave from disaster? One plausible answer which immediately suggests itself (to people like myself at least) is that the period which has elapsed since *Suicide of a Nation?* was published coincides very closely with the life of Mr. Wilson's two socialist governments. Could it be said that it was due to them that the ship of state, battered and leaky as it is, is at least still afloat, if not yet exactly under full sail?

To judge by public opinion polls, a large majority of the people of this country are not yet ready to accept such an explanation, and are only too anxious to escape from the straitjacket in which Mr. Wilson has imprisoned them, and, at the moment, it still seems unlikely that anything Mr. Wilson can do will induce them to think otherwise.

There are of course good reasons why this should be so. As Mr. Reginald Paget said from the Labour back benches last month, if a record rate of unemployment, a record rate of interest, and a record in bankruptcies, combined with a minimum rate of growth, are symptoms of a healthy economy, there are many who look back with nostalgia to the good old days of a sick one.

As a statement of fact, this is no doubt true; and no doubt there are many who, when they are given the chance, will rush to register their nostalgia at the polls, though one can't help wondering what exactly Mr. Paget himself will do. Yet also one cannot help wondering whether in doing so they (and Mr. Paget?) will merely be exhibiting the electorate's notorious capacity for ingratitude. For despite the Labour Government's many errors in the last six years, they have undertaken an almost unprecedented burden of legislation and reform in the fields of economics and finance, of taxation, of the social services, of local government, of education; not least, in the field of legal reform, in which, almost unnoticed, Lord Gardiner has made advances of a scope and character which this country has not witnessed for a hundred years.

Again, there are many who regard so ambitious a programme as self-condemned because of a certain Utopian quality in it, who regard legislation as a drug which should only be taken in very small quantities when absolutely necessary and Mr. Wilson as a hopeless addict to it who has become an urgent case for treatment. But the government's programme, in my belief, has had at least the merit of being directed at the genuine problems that afflict this country and has forced people to realise that they cannot be evaded. We may not like the solutions we have been offered, but at least we should know by now the real issues that have to be faced.

This seems to me the one great achievement of Mr. Wilson's two governments, and I think that as a result public opinion has achieved a far greater realism and sobriety than in the days when *Suicide of a Nation?* was written. If sobriety has, as usual, been accompanied by a large measure of disillusion, that was perhaps the first step towards a correct appraisal of Britain's position in the world today. One only hopes that its benefits will not be lost in the electioneering months that lie before us.

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Karl Barth

"The Last Great Protestant" — By W. W. Bartley, III

Karl Barth, who died in his sleep in Basel (9 December 1968), aged 82, was the last great Protestant. Paul Tillich, the only Protestant amongst Barth's contemporaries whose thought Barth himself took seriously, died in 1965. Rudolf Bultmann and Reinhold Niebuhr, both now aged and living in retirement, never enjoyed either the scope or influence of Barth and Tillich. Barth became famous shortly after World War I, and Tillich, Niebuhr, and Bultmann acquired fame in the 1920s. Not one figure who even approaches comparable stature has arisen since: none remains alive and active today.

Bankrupt spiritually, the Protestant churches —except in some parts of provincial American suburbia—tend to be physically empty. Throughout northern Europe attendance at church services has dwindled and continues to decline at what appears to be an accelerating pace. Indeed, institutional Protestantism is now so weak that, for the first time since the Reformation, the Roman Catholic Church can *afford* to tolerate Protest. And the Protestants have not failed to notice that the liberalisation of Catholicism, however slow and cautious, does not serve to strengthen the *raison d'être* of a separate Protestantism.

Karl Barth lived to see all this. In his later works he wrote increasingly of the solitude and isolation of the theologian. Yet if he ever wavered in his own absolute commitment to what he called the Word of God, he did not—unlike Tillich—parade his doubting. "There is no justification for doubt itself," he insisted. "No one should flirt with his unbelief or with his doubt. The theologian should only be sincerely *ashamed* of it."[1] The italics are Barth's.

Yet it is not the familiar irrationally committed neo-Calvinist "dogmatist" that I wish to commemorate here. I wish to recall a side of Karl Barth that is almost never mentioned. As a matter of fact, Barth was one of the most brilliant strategists of theological survival in the history of the Christian church. Far from being dogmatic in the ordinary sense of that word, he was remarkably flexible, a most rational irrationalist, one who was—reputation notwithstanding—not one whit more an irrationalist than, to pick arbitrarily on two well-known "rationalists," A. J. Ayer and Sir Karl Popper. Such praise—for it will be taken to be such—will be suspect. So let me record that I am an atheist, and no member of any religious sect. I wish to help explain and to appreciate Karl Barth, not to praise or criticise him.

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A man of regular habits, Barth listened to the music of Mozart for one half hour each morning. Writing of Mozart, he characterised himself:

> This man was creative, even and precisely while he was imitating. Verily, he did not only imitate. From the beginning he moved freely within the frame of the rules of the art of his time, and later more and more freely. But he did not revolt against these rules, nor break them. He sought and found his greatness in remaining himself precisely while binding himself to these rules. One must see both his freedom and his restraint, side by side, and seek his singular quality behind this very riddle.[2]

Moving creatively within the rules was the problem, and the riddle, of Barth's own life.

His own solution to this riddle set the strategy for religious defence and renewal within Protestantism from the early 1920s until the late 1950s. The key to his solution is contained in two insights. First, *only* one of the rules was after all fundamental: namely, that the Christian theologian be committed to the "Word of God," as revealed in Jesus. Second, as a corollary, the theologian ought not to commit himself to any particular interpretation of the Word of God, to any particular cultural ideology; the church

[1] Karl Barth: *Evangelical Theology* (1963), p. 131.
[2] Karl Barth: "Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart," in *Religion and Culture* (ed. Walter Leibrecht, 1959), pp. 72–3.

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must not be permitted to become a mere reflection of social and cultural conditions.

Since these expressions often bewilder people, it may be helpful to try to explain them by mapping them approximately into perfectly ordinary secular language. Take the case of the natural scientist: he is presumably committed to the truth about the natural world, but is not committed to the truth of any particular hypothesis about the nature of that natural world. Substitute "theologian" for "natural scientist," "Word of God" for "natural world," and "interpretation" for "hypothesis," and you have the crux of Barth's position.

But what is this "Word of God"? That is indeed the question. Unlike the fundamentalists, Barth does not identify the Word of God with the Bible. Rather, even the Bible is taken by him to be one more interpretation or witness—a fallible witness—to the *revelatory* historical event which it is *assumed* that it reports. If this is so of the Bible, it is all the more so, in Barth's view, of all other theological statements, such as those in the Creeds, those made in Sermons, those embodied in theological systems, those of the traditions and councils of the church. *All* are to be considered conjectural, subject to constant revision and testing against the Word of God itself. Thus the locus of religious authority is removed from the documents and utterances of the church to the historical event to which they bear witness.

If the Word of God is to be treated thus, the job of the theologian is redefined accordingly. If by definition any theologian is committed to the Word of God, *argument on behalf of* it, *e.g.*, traditional apologetic theology, is forbidden to him as useless and irreverent. The task of the theologian is restricted to: (1) description or exposition of the Word of God, and (2) criticism and testing of his own and other descriptions, past and current. Thus *argument, creative discussion and disagreement, about the content* of the Word of God is required, even to be expected. *Argument about the truth* of the Word of God is, however, forbidden. Thus Barth bound himself, and yet remained creative.

THE PRACTICAL STRATEGICAL significance of Barth's position can be appreciated by contrasting his approach (often dubbed "neo-orthodoxy") with "Protestant liberalism," the dominant theological position which it replaced.

Protestant liberalism—which was a paradigm of both the strengths and weaknesses of apologetic theology—aimed to show that the essence of Christian doctrine, here construed as its moral teaching, was in harmony with modern progressive cultural thinking, and that hence nothing prevented a reasonable modern man from affiliating himself with it. In this approach Protestant liberalism followed an old tradition. Throughout Protestant intellectual history it had been widely though not consistently assumed that the results of independent scientific inquiry would tally, when properly interpreted, with Protestant teaching. The alliance was, to be sure, an on-again, off-again affair, but sufficed to permit scientists and Protestant theologians to mount a common front against Roman Catholic obscurantism, on the one hand, and the fundamentalism of some of the working-class Protestant sects, on the other.

In practice, the dominance of the scientific side of this alliance led to a steady erosion of Protestant teaching. The importance of the celebrated controversies about geological discoveries and about Darwin has been much exaggerated. In fact, Protestant theologians discarded the Bible's cosmological and scientific statements relatively painlessly. And they were even readier to discard other, non-Biblical features of traditional Christianity, such as "natural theology" depending on discredited "proofs" for the existence of God. Such, it was insisted, were transient, accidental accretions on Christian doctrine; the essence of Jesus' teaching was the so-called Christian ethic, as exemplified in the Sermon on the Mount.

In the decade prior to the publication of Barth's first book, however, the Protestant liberals suffered a most extraordinary and ironical reverse. Although the liberals themselves had sponsored the ambitious programme of Biblical exegesis conducted during the 19th century, and in particular the "quest for the historical Jesus," their own historical researches proved to discredit their own image of the historical Jesus. Indeed, Jesus turned out to have preached anything but a liberal ethical creed. Albert Schweitzer and other Biblical scholars argued that when set in its historical context the Sermon on the Mount had to be read as an interim ethic, not designed for a practical politics of love but for a very brief period between the crucifixion and an imminent Last Judgment. Jesus himself loomed as a forbidding, world-denying personality, hardly a 19th-century-style social reformer with whom Protestants could easily identify.

In short, what had been called the Christian ethic during the 19th century was not Christian. The "Christian ethic" was no more essential to Christianity than the "Christian cosmology"!

What rational core then remained to sustain the union of Protestantism and scientific liberalism? Virtually nothing. Barth perceived this, and proceeded to develop a minimal but absolute concession to irrationalism that was to form the basis for neo-orthodoxy. Asking not: "What is the essence of Christianity?" but "What is essential to being a Christian?", Barth demanded

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of Christians nothing more, or less, than absolute commitment to the Word of God as revealed by Jesus. The required commitment proved, in Barth's exposition, to be vague in a rather precise and quite convenient way. It was sufficiently vague to allow a flexibility among Protestant theologians surpassing even that of many of the old liberals. Never again was any identification of Christian doctrine with a fixed cultural viewpoint or ideology, whether liberal or Calvinist, to be permitted. On the other hand, the limits of this flexibility were defined, in that commitment to the Word of God was not itself subject to reconsideration.

THE FLEXIBILITY OF BARTH'S FORMULA enabled the ecumenical movement for union amongst Protestant churches to minimise the importance of the denominations' differing interpretations of Christian doctrine and to emphasise their common commitment to the Word of God. Since even the formula was open to differing interpretations, the resulting flexibility was wide. In any case, Barth's formula was written into the constitutions of the new ecumenical organisations as the price of admission: and at the same time, by exacting this price, Protestants gained at least the illusion of taking a new tough-minded line. Their formula might indeed be so vague as to be virtually empty; but it was not susceptible to erosion by the latest findings of science or cultural fads.

Moreover, Barth's emphasis on *searching* for the Word of God propped psychologically the Protestants' sagging morale by explaining the collapse of earlier statements about the true essence of Christianity, and providing explicitly for the possibility that even more radical revisions would take place in the future.

Barth's formula was of course not without its own dangers, and they were ones with which he never satisfactorily dealt. If the character of the Jesus or the Word of God to whom assent was required was indefinite, and if such commitment was required *no matter what* Jesus was and did, at best the subjective commitment would be definite. Its object would be an "I know not what and I care not what"—perhaps a less than satisfactory object of worship.

IN VIEW OF Barth's critique of Protestant liberalism and his religious conservatism, one might expect him to have been politically reactionary. On the contrary, he was a socialist, and had once seriously contemplated devoting his life to the trade-union movement. A vociferous anti-Nazi, Barth was expelled by Hitler from his chair in Bonn, and forced in 1935 to return to his native Switzerland. By contrast, he never showed any particular hostility to communist forms of totalitarianism, and even refused—despite hundreds of indignant protests—to condemn such acts as the Russian invasion of Hungary of 1956. He did, however, sharply scold Western cold-war ideologists who advocated that Christianity be championed as a spiritual alternative to communism.

Barth wrote from his home in Basel:

> If there is such a thing as hostility towards Christ, it does not exist in the Communist East alone. There the evil spirit manifests itself as open totalitarianism backed by an all-powerful political party, whereas in the West it takes the form of creeping totalitarianism, backed by powerful institutions, such as press, private enterprise, public opinion and arrogant wealth.

Two of the institutions of "creeping totalitarianism" that Barth cites, the Western press and public opinion, put his protest against the *status quo* into banner headlines and cover-stories (*e.g., Der Spiegel*). Is it unfair to mention that this arrogant statement could hardly have been published within the "open totalitarianism" of the East, and that it was contained in a letter that had to be addressed to an *anonymous* East-German pastor?

That Barth's political positions would arouse disagreement is easy to understand; that they caused bewilderment I find puzzling, for Barth's politics connect directly with his theological position.

Barth never would have *sympathised* with Hitler, any more than he sympathised with America or NATO. He wrote that Germany had "thoughtlessly joined NATO," and scornfully spoke of the "Egyptian fleshpots which symbolise the American way of life." But one rather doubts that Barth would have gained any notoriety as an anti-*Nazi* had Hitler not attempted to interfere with the doctrine of the Protestant churches in Germany. Indeed, had Hitler left the churches to go their own way, at least doctrinally, it is not inconceivable that Barth would have behaved in a way which would have even permitted him to retain his chair. But toying with the pre-Nazi intellectual tradition of de Lagarde, Langbehn, and Moeller van den Bruck, Hitler attempted for a time to use the churches as vehicles of a "German-Christian" Nazi ideology. It was principally *this* Nazi policy that Barth opposed, and for essentially the *same* reasons that he opposed Protestant liberalism in 1918 and the idea of the "Christian West" after World War II. According to Barth, it is contrary to the basic commitment of the theologian to the Word of God to allow *any* cultural ideology, *good or bad*, to be incorporated into, or blended with, Christian doctrine. Christianity is autonomous and stands alone. The Communists, unlike the Nazis, did

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not attempt to commit this particular sin: frankly atheistic, they were ready to destroy the churches if opportune but were rarely disposed to create a "Marxist Christianity." Indeed, when Communist régimes did mount direct attacks on the Christian churches, Barth sometimes gave the impression that he almost approved. In particular, he suggested that the Communist régime of East Germany be regarded as "a tool of God which fulfills a definite function according to the Lord's plans: the function of a punishing rod." Yet Barth anticipated that eventually, through skilful diplomacy and tact, the churches could achieve a viable "live and let live" accommodation with the Communists. In this he may well have been politically naive, but he was utterly consistent—even if one may sense a kind of madness or, to quote Niebuhr's outraged response to Barth, a "moral irrelevance" about that very consistent order of priorities.

HOWEVER RATIONAL AND CONSISTENT Barth may have been, it remains true that he was at heart an irrationalist. He *was* committed dogmatically to the assumption that revelation occurred, that the Word of God had been given to man through Jesus, that the Bible was a testimony and report of this Word of God. Yet (as I have already remarked), even here Barth was no more of an irrationalist—even if his irrationality was of a different sort—than are many well-known contemporary rationalists. I mentioned Ayer and Popper, and will support my statement briefly, not to defend Barth or to criticise Ayer or Popper, but to indicate the abiding importance of the problem of rationality.

There is a way of thinking, sometimes called "fideism," sometimes scepticism, that maintains that everyone must—for *logical* reasons—make an irrational commitment to his basic principles. To attempt to justify or to apologise for them leads, it is said, to logical paradox. To escape such difficulties, Popper proposed to adopt a "minimum concession to irrationalism." Characterising himself as a "critical rationalist," Popper wrote that

> whoever adopts the rationalist attitude does so because he has adopted, without reasoning, some proposal or decision, or belief, or habit, or behaviour, which therefore in its turn must be called irrational. Whatever it may be, we can describe it as an irrational *faith in reason*, . . . the fundamental rationalist attitude is based upon an irrational decision, or upon faith in reason. Accordingly, our choice is open. We are free to choose some form of irrationalism, even some radical or comprehensive form. But we are also free to choose a critical form of rationalism, one which frankly admits its limitations, and its basis in an irrational decision (and to that extent, a certain priority of irrationalism).[3]

In *The Problem of Knowledge* (1956), perhaps his best book, Ayer too argues himself into an irrational commitment. There he calmly asserts that our standards of rationality need no rational justification because any such standard

> could be irrational only if there were a standard of rationality which it failed to meet; whereas in fact it goes to set the standard: arguments are judged to be rational or irrational by reference to it.

This is a monumental begging of the question, a logical howler which only someone with the acumen of an Ayer could make so elegantly and nonchalantly. Of course, *if* some particular standards and procedures of rationality, such as Ayer's, *are* the correct ones, then there can exist no other rational standards which are also correct but which can nevertheless invalidate the former as irrational. This "if," however, marks a great assumption: *for this is precisely what is at issue*—and something that Barth would have challenged. Structurally speaking, Ayer's position is *identical* with that of Barth. Barth argued that apologetic defence or assessment of theology was to be outlawed *since* the Word of God *is* itself the standard or criterion which any such assessment would have to use—surely an assumption that Ayer would challenge. Both Ayer and Barth abandon *apologetics*, the sort of procedure which in theology tries to justify commitment rationally, and replace it with *kerygmatics*, which is devoted to the exposition and description of the fundamental message. Unable to justify his basic position, the logical empiricist, like the neo-orthodox theologian, begins to describe it. While Barth begs the question of the existence and righteousness of God and his Word, Ayer begs the question of the legitimacy of scientific induction.

Whoever then wishes to condemn Karl Barth for his stubborn Christian dogmatism in an "era of scientific enlightenment" ought first to ask whether he himself can escape the quandaries of irrationalism and dogmatism into which even great rationalists like Popper and Ayer have been led. I believe that there is an escape, but that it lies in a reconsideration of our entire theory of rationality, a theory that is sadly neglected by theologian and philosopher alike.

Karl Barth was the last of the great Protestants, but he was no intellectual oddity; he was a man of his time.

[3] K. R. Popper: *The Open Society and Its Enemies* (1945), Chapter 24. For a similar statement by Popper see his paper "Utopia and Violence," in *Conjectures and Refutations* (1962). In the fourth edition (1962) of *The Open Society* Popper began to modify his position somewhat; but I do not believe that his attempts to rectify his system have as yet been successful.

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NOTES & TOPICS

Can Psychiatrists be Trusted?

By Arthur Koestler

THERE ARE facts so obvious that one tends to overlook them. One of these facts is that the practice of medicine pre-dates the systematic study of physiology, and the practice of psychiatry pre-dates the systematic study of psychology. If we look back at the past, the physician appears as a figure levitating in mid-air, like an Indian Yogi, without any solid ground under his feet. The psychiatrist found himself in the same embarrassing situation, floating, as it were, on his fallible intuitions. At the somatic end of the psychosomatic spectrum—call it the infra-red end—the situation has been rapidly improving since biology started turning into an exact science; about infectious diseases at least we can do wonders. But at the ultra-violet end, where the psychiatric profession is operating, no comparable development is as yet in sight: academic psychology has failed to provide a solid foundation on which the levitating psychiatrist could rest his feet. He is faced with the responsibility of treating disorders of the mind without precise and reliable information about the processes which determine order in the mind. Pavlov's dogs, Skinner's rats and pigeons, Konrad Lorenz' geese have provided valuable analogies for certain simple aspects of human behaviour. But these analogies are of little use, and sometimes even an obstacle, to the understanding of the complex phenomena of language and language disorders; or of the storage and retrieval of memories and the pathology thereof.

Psycho-linguistics, in the sense in which Chomsky and his school use this term, is a new branch of psychology which for the first time tries to come to grips with the problem how a child by the age of four has been able to acquire the immensely complex rules and strategies of language, how it can produce sentences it has never uttered before, understand sentences it has never heard before, and manipulate a syntactic and semantic machinery whose working is completely unknown to the child—as it is to the adult. For a century and more, academic psychology has not only failed to tackle this problem, but even to see the problem. But the neuro-surgeon and psychiatrist has had his nose rubbed into it; and he had to try to make sense of the various bizarre types of aphasias and related disorders without getting any help from the psychologist. On the contrary, one might say with only a little exaggeration that it was neuro-surgery that taught the psychologist what little real knowledge the latter has of the mechanisms of language and memory. Frederic Bartlett,[1] that great psychologist, got his immensely fruitful concept of the "schema" from the neurologist, Henry Head; and the rather futile discussions whether thinking consists of nothing but "inner speech," *i.e.*, subliminal innervations of the vocal chords, or whether there is something more to it, would have continued *ad infinitum* had not clinical evidence of nominal or phonemic aphasia proved the existence of non-verbal types of mental activity. Penfield's electrode which made the patient mentally compare the drawing of a butterfly to a moth, without being able to recall either of the two words, has contributed more to the understanding of language than all the discussions of the introspectionists, behaviourists, and Gestalt psychologists.[2] But it has been essentially a one-way traffic, and it still is.

NOT ONLY HAS academic psychology little help to offer to psychiatry, but its offerings have sometimes made confusion worse confounded, as in the case of certain test procedures based on

THIS ARTICLE *is based on a version of a paper read in London recently at a World Psychiatric Association Symposium on the "Uses and Abuses of Psychiatry."*

[1] F. C. Bartlett, *Remembering* (Cambridge, 1961).
[2] W. Penfield and L. Roberts, *Speech and Brain Mechanisms* (Princeton, 1959).

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specific models of memory—models which may give a distorted picture of the patient's condition. Two years ago, the late George Talland of the Harvard Medical School organised an international symposium on "The Pathology of Memory" in which I had the honour to participate—writers are supposed to have a very peculiar sort of memory. While the proceedings of the Symposium were being printed, George Talland died. But the book has just come out,[3] and I would like to quote a few passages from the memorable paper that Talland read:

> Every psychologist who studies patients with memory defects tests them on one version or another of the immediate recall span. [However] we keep on rediscovering that men and women who barely remember an important incident that occurred last week can perform within normal limits on the standard digit span.... Is the immediate retention span for unconnected items in fact at all relevant to normal memory function?... Patients with severe memory disorders do not perform much worse than healthy and normal people on these tests.... A distinguished experimental psychologist... has on record the opinion that "rote verbal learning is central to all human learning." All the lessons I have learnt from a study of disturbed memory function force me to disagree with that opinion.... Performance, the objective evidence that our behaviourist psychology relies on, often just skims the surface of a memory derangement and is apt to mislead us if it alone is admitted as evidence.

Talland then cites several cases of such misleading test-results, and comments: "These examples and others could be listed to illustrate the inadequacy of the concepts employed to evaluate acquisition and retention in verbal and other experiments for the analysis of pathological disorders of memory." He ends by demanding a programme for experimental research on a more complex level, for designing tests set up "to test the accuracy of a clinical hunch" and for designing "psychological models that fit the available models of brain-function more closely than do most of those currently in use."

IT IS NOT difficult to detect behind these restrained formulations the anguish of the psychiatrist out on a limb. This predicament is, of course, most drastically reflected in the field of diagnosis and classification. As I seem to be the only outsider at this Congress of Psychiatrists, we must assume that I have been invited to represent that infernal nuisance in the psychiatrist's life, the patient. As a rule, of

[3] Ed. Talland & Waugh, *The Pathology of Memory* (Academic Press, 1969).

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

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course, there are too many patients to one psychiatrist, whereas here the situation is reversed. But at the same time it reflects a different aspect of reality, for the single patient is potentially liable to be diagnosed and categorised in a great many different ways, depending to some extent on the psychiatric school, the ethnic background, and apparently even the age-group to which the diagnostician belongs. Thus, should I have the misfortune to be admitted to a mental hospital in England with a somewhat complex symptom-picture, I would have a ten-times higher chance of being classified as a manic-depressive than if I were admitted to hospital in the United States; and taking my specific age-group into account, the ratio of United Kingdom to United States of patients diagnosed as manic depressives becomes 21 to 1. On the other hand, if I were to go off my head in America, I would stand a ten-times higher chance of being classified as a case of cerebral arterio-sclerosis than in England; and a 33% higher chance of being classified as a schizo. In the States I might also be found to show a "psychotic-depressive reaction," a category non-existent in England and Wales. I am quoting, of course, Morton Kramer's remarkable paper on "A Cross-National Study of Diagnosis."[4]

Nor could I, the patient, be more sure of what is wrong with me if you repeated on me the experiments of Martin Katz and associates —*i.e.*, if you were to administer a psychiatric interview, which would be filmed and then shown to a number of experienced clinicians, asking them to arrive at a diagnosis based on a standard symptom-rating scale. Although I am sure you are familiar with the results, I may perhaps briefly refer to the figures:[5]

In the first reported experiment, out of 35 American psychiatrists—"all seasoned veterans," as Zubin[6] commented—14 diagnosed the patient as neurotic and 21 as psychotic. In another study, in which 42 American psychiatrists participated, the patient, described as "an attractive woman in her middle-twenties," was classified by one-third of the diagnosticians as schizophrenic, by another third as neurotic, and by the third third as suffering from personality disorders. But when the same patient was diagnosed by British diagnosticians, *not a single one* diagnosed her as schizophrenic, and 75% diagnosed "personality disorders." On comparing the symptom rating by the British and American groups, it was discovered that the main cause of the contrast in diagnosis was that the Americans found in the patient very marked symptoms of apathy, while their British colleagues did not.

I REPEAT THAT I am sorry to go over this well-ploughed acre, not in order to rake up the dust, but because it suggests to one a simple and perhaps naïve hypothesis: could it be that psychiatrists, immersed in the bustling American world, are inclined to see apathy where their colleagues from this country only see placidity or British phlegm? The Americans also found considerable "paranoid projection" and "perceptual distortion" in the same patient in which the British found none of these symptoms. Could it be that psychiatrists in a highly conformist country read paranoid traits where the British see only idiosyncrasy or mild eccentricity?

However that may be, as Katz and his co-workers pointed out in their paper, these quantitative differences on the rating-scale lead to qualitatively different diagnoses—*e.g.*, schizophrenia *versus* neurotic disorder—with all that this implies in terms of prognosis, hospitalisation, and therapy. If one remembers that one-third of the American psychiatrists, *but not a single British psychiatrist*, pronounced the same patient schizophrenic, one is struck by another curious discrepancy. It is a well-known fact that in the United States a much higher proportion of well-to-do people keep what is called "a tame analyst" than do their opposite numbers in this country. Is there a connection here with the cavalier attitude of American psychiatrists in diagnosing schizophrenia? Has the meaning of the term neurosis been so widely stretched, or so watered-down, in the United States that if a patient shows signs of real trouble, as distinct from mere couch-addiction, nothing less than a diagnosis of psychosis will do?

THESE ARE SPECULATIONS of a layman, but they make him feel fairly uncomfortable. In a recent paper, Joseph Zubin compared the clinical method of diagnosis, which he calls "a creative act belonging to the realm of discovery" with the biometric approach, which

> takes as its point of departure the objective measurement of the behaviour of the patient, applies taxonomic principles for classifying such behaviour, and finally appeals to statistical evaluation for determining the reliability and validity

[4] *American Journal of Psychiatry* (vol. 125, no. 10), April 1969, Supp.

[5] "Studies of the Diagnostic Process." *American Journal of Psychiatry* (vol. 125, no. 7), January 1969.

[6] "Biometric Assessment of Mental Patients" in *The Role and Methodology of Classification in Psychiatry and Psychopathology* (U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Public Health Service).

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> of a diagnostic label placed on the patient. Both approaches are essential since, without the clinician, there would be nothing to measure, and without measurements the clinician would soon become a prey to whatever wind of fashion blows.

The layman, of course, nods with solemn approval, yet with a touch of scepticism. The ambitious project which has recently got under way under the name of "A Cross National Study of Diagnosis of the Mental Disorders" will perhaps succeed in eliminating such drastic discrepancies in symptom-rating as those discovered by Katz, Kramer and others; but it seems a Utopian hope that we shall ever be able to measure symptoms like "apathy," "hostile belligerence" or "anxious intropunitiveness" with anything approaching the precision of measuring electrostatic charges. Biometrics strike one as a noble effort, but one wonders whether too much reliance on it cannot become self-defeating—and even whether it is not a contradiction in terms.

Which, in conclusion, brings me back to my starting-point, and to George Talland's criticism of tests based on performance in rote-learning and similar tasks. There seems to be no getting away from the conclusion that, for the time being, the psychiatrist's best friend is his intuition; and that he will only feel solid earth under his feet when psychology grows out of its obsession with rats in a maze and becomes a real science of the human mind. But psychiatrists can continue to work towards this goal by teaching their academic colleagues a few of the facts of life.

A Neglected Historical Novel

FOR THOSE OF US who live in the provinces, perhaps even for megalopolitans too, the most civilised and civilising institution in London is the London Library. Not the least among its amenities is the half-shelf in the entrance hall of newly acquired or recently returned novels. It introduces into one's reading, all too likely to be disciplined by the demands of one's "subject," an agreeable element of chance. It was there that I picked up *The Witnesses*.[1] It had been published a year or two back, and absence abroad must have made me miss the original reviews, since its title awakened no echo in my mind. Indeed I am in retrospect a little surprised that I added it to my load, since on the whole I dislike "historical novels" finding the real past sufficiently difficult to penetrate without having to worry about imaginary ones. And here clearly was an historical novel—a long and elaborate work spanning the history of Russia between 1903 and 1917—and making precisely the demands upon the reader which theoretically I most dislike. However for some reason I allowed myself to borrow it and to begin it, and since then it has become for me one of those books which form a reference point in one's thinking. It would be absurd to say that it has altered my view of the Russian Revolution; but it has provided some concrete symbols for what would otherwise be a mere abstract set of convictions. I feel now that I know better —just as I knew better after reading *Dr. Zhivago*—why it is that despite all the cruelties, injustices, and even cynicism of Tsardom, despite the horrors and futilities of the long-drawn-out agony of the war, the Bolshevik Revolution (Lenin's *putsch* in October, so often confounded with the earlier democratic revolution of 1917) remains for me the major catastrophe of our century, the breach in the walls of civilisation through which so many other bands of barbarians have poured or are pouring.

For as *The Witnesses* makes plain not by argument but by the selection and narration of incident, what was defeated in the Revolution was not the old régime which had already collapsed but the ordinary instincts of decent humanity expressing themselves in rating human relations and human loyalties higher than ideological conviction and in an affection for the beauties and decencies of ordinary material life which meant nothing to the revolutionaries and which their victory manifestly destroyed. And it is significant that the pseudonymous author—it seems to be accepted that it is a woman writing—passed her childhood in St. Petersburg, that always beautiful and now sad city, which is the background, lovingly and carefully delineated, for much of the narrative.

WE ARE TOLD that twenty years of research including interviews with the "witnesses" of the title have gone into the making of this book; and one can well believe that if the final outcome haunts the reader the writing of it must have been a painful if cathartic experience. To spend twenty years in the company of Lenin and his friends even if only in imagination, to see them take power amid the orgy of brutality

[1] *The Witnesses*. By M. W. WARING. Collins (1967), 30s.

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and contempt even for their own associates and accomplices that marked the initiation of Bolshevik rule—this cannot be anything but a spiritual ordeal. To some Miss Waring's prose style might seem formal and mannered; but one feels that something like it was necessary if the horror of the subject-matter so gently introduced with its scenes of rural Russia and high spirits among political exiles was not to overwhelm the writer and her readers with the pity of it all.

Miss Waring is explicit about the way in which she has treated the technical as opposed to the emotional problems of writing a novel of this kind. There is always the question of whether dealing with great events one should bring in, and therefore add a fictional dimension to, personages known to us from the history books themselves. Miss Waring assures us that all her characters whether "historical" or not are drawn from life, and that what is told about them could be documented. But in the case of principal figures, the members of a Russian aristocratic family seen through the eyes of a young American woman who marries the heir, and the illegitimate son of another such family who forms the link with the revolutionary movements with whom he is implicated through sympathy, and involved through his relationship with Lenin's putative mistress Inessa Armand,[2] but who can never sink his identity in the cause and is ultimately its unknowing victim, the actual prototypes have been concealed. Lenin himself and others of the revolutionary circles—Trotsky, Plekhanov, Martov, Bonch-Bruevich, Kerensky, and Inessa herself—appear under the names they used in the underground or in emigration. Other historical figures appear under different names from those they bore, or must be regarded as merely convenient inventions for the purpose of the narrative.

This device enables the author to enjoy a freedom which she would not otherwise possess; incidents of the biographies of the real historical personages are altered or transmuted or ascribed to dates which do not accord with those of formal biographical record. And this naturally provided a handle for those for whom the whole purport and meaning of the book was an offence. It was easy for the *Sunday Times* reviewer (himself coyly using initials) to point out that the character who stands for Trotsky is not the historian's Trotsky. But the criticism itself is beside the point.

If one wants to know what people actually did and said, the circumstances of their lives, then the biographer and the historian reign supreme. And even here one needs to take care when the Russian Revolution is the subject. Was it not that eminent scholar, the present Master of Balliol, who contrived to write a life of Lenin in which the Bolsheviks manage to win the Civil War without the help of Trotsky?

WHAT THE NOVELIST CAN OFFER—and perhaps only through the novelist's techniques—is some sense of what the instruments of the historical process were like as men, and what the historical process felt like to its victims. Perhaps the former is the more important; and perhaps the historian is driven to accept the views of which Mr. E. H. Carr has been so vigorous an exponent, that history deals only with success, with the movements that proved on the right side in the historical dialectic, and that the defeated, the victims belong to "the dust-bin of history" (to use a favourite Leninist phrase). The novelist is not bound by such a view and for Miss Waring the weaknesses that led to defeat are as worthy of interpretation as the qualities that made for victory—the humourless self-dedication, the utter repudiation of ordinary moral values, and the commitment to total violence and total duplicity that were the key elements in Bolshevik tactics.

[2] See Bertram D. Wolfe, "Lenin & Inessa Armand, ENCOUNTER, February 1964.

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It may be that no one was duped by Inessa's use of her sexual attractiveness to provide financial assistance for the underground in exactly the way in which it happens to the central figure in the novel; but the willingness to manipulate human beings and cast them aside once their task had been performed was an element—and an important element—in the revolutionary mentality. And it was not only human instinct and emotion that was manipulated; it was idealism as well. The true idealists of Revolution, all those who could not subject themselves totally to the will of Lenin and his clique—the favourite Soviet term of abuse is in order here—were cast aside and eventually in most cases "eliminated."

But of course, the main reason why the book angered several reviewers has nothing to do with the liberties taken with historical data. There is after all a deeply seated view (and one not restricted to "the Left"—the *New Statesman*'s review was actually one of the most perceptive—that the Russian Revolution was "a good thing," or (in the Master of Balliol's words) "a movement of the poor and oppressed of the earth who have successfully risen against the great and the powerful." And any other vision —even in fiction—must be stamped upon.

The writer in the *Times Literary Supplement* is, as one might expect, the most vocal on this score. Unblushingly asserting that the Bolsheviks got no money from the Germans (for the purity of Lenin is not to be called into question), he goes on to accuse Miss Waring quite untruly of minimising Russia's war-time losses —one suspects some skipping of the text—and then comes to the heart of the matter. Although Miss Waring can be praised for her portraits of members of the old society—"their devotion to the regiment, their worship of the Tsar, their ludicrous [*sic*] patriotism"—she ignores the masses. She seems to believe that "the revolution was brought off by a handful of unscrupulous enigmatic conspirators." And this is intolerable. In the words of Mr. Irving Wardle (writing in the *Observer*), Miss Waring "conveys practically nothing of the undercurrents of the Revolution." Or as the *Methodist Recorder* observes: "Scant reference is made to the poor. Who suffered under the Tsarist régime? Why was revolution inevitable? . . ."

I HAVE A FEELING as I read comment of this kind (and even some of the more favourable reviews are disquieting in their unwillingness to accept the book not just as a novel but as an historical novel) that critics are tempted to question not Miss Waring's handling of the literary problem but the function and fate of historical research itself.

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
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> The strikes, the 1905 revolution, the creation of the Douma are almost ignored and it is strange that when an authentic prime minister was assassinated in 1911, M. W. Waring should invent the murder of a Minister of the Interior at about the same time.

So the *Oxford Mail*. In fact, there are good reasons in a novel both for the transposition of the assassination and for not dwelling on historical events, well known in themselves and unrelated to the novel's theme. What is wrong is the obvious failure to grasp the light which both increasing distance and the fruits of scholarship have now thrown on the Revolution, its causes and consequences. Professor Leonard Schapiro, Professor Hugh Seton-Watson, Mr. George Katkov, not to speak of the many American scholars in the field, might just as well not have written for all their impact on Miss Waring's critics.

Clemenceau's demand that the French Revolution should be taken *en bloc* has always been regarded as a political statement, not as an historical assessment. The French Revolution was a multiple event and so also was the Russian Revolution. To say that it was "inevitable" is to say nothing, unless one means that it would have been an almost unimaginable anomaly if the structure of the Tsarist régime, even in its post-1905 version, could have remained unchanged into the last third of the 20th century. It could also be argued that changes were more likely to take a revolutionary than an evolutionary form. But to say that this means that it was inevitable in some sense other than the sense in which all history is inevitable because it has happened—that the outcome of Revolution could only be the seizure of power by the kind of man Lenin was, and the establishment of the kind of régime Lenin established—is to make the kind of judgment that makes historical writing quite otiose.

Could one seriously imagine that Miss Waring, brought up in Tsarist Russia and devoting herself to its study, was ignorant of the fact that there was much poverty and oppression? If one did the text itself would disabuse one; the sketches of domestic servants and their role—particularly that of the female domestic servants—would be enough to disabuse one about social relations being of some wholly idyllic kind. (*Pace* the *Times Literary Supplement*, Miss Waring's peasants are not just "a contented bunch who dress up exotically on St. Vladimir's day.") She has not found it necessary to dwell on the social background any more than on the political or military background because for her purpose it can be taken for granted.

Her question is—as the historian's should be—granted a revolution, why *this* kind of revolution? And that is important. Mr. E. H. Carr is right. The victors survive; the vanquished disappear. What has happened in Russia and the rest of the world has followed from that fact. We suffer in our perspectives from the shadow that Stalin casts across the earlier history of Soviet Russia. Yet is there anything that Stalin did, any element of cruelty or treachery in his behaviour (or in that of his successors) that could not be paralleled from Lenin's own behaviour or deduced from Lenin's own morality? Miss Waring's creatures of the old society, good or evil—and her half-hearted perplexed anxious foredoomed hero—are not just victims of an abstract historical process. The murder of the defeated officer cadets, the last defenders not of Tsardom but of the Republican Provisional Government be it noted, was not just part of "the dialectic"; and Miss Waring is right to evoke the physical nausea induced by these events if only to de-glamorise the Che Guevaras and the other progeny of Leninism.

Men (and even some women, like Inessa Armand) consciously let loose upon the world once more an alternative method of settling political debate—terror. In so doing they did not give a new heaven to the poor and oppressed but postponed their emancipation. Having no moral sensibility, the Russian Bolsheviks cauterised the sensibility of others. The world has been a poorer and bleaker and more dangerous place because Lenin lived. Historians have given the material for forming our judgment on this man; but perhaps only fiction can help us to understand the history. Pasternak is a finer writer than Miss Waring; but those whom *Dr. Zhivago* made uncomfortable are uncomfortable with *The Witnesses*, and that too is praise.

Max Beloff

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A Special Book Section

Aspects of Sociology

The Tyranny of Tradition

Some Prefatory Remarks — By EDWARD SHILS

MUCH HAS CHANGED since Maitland upbraided sociologists for their reluctance to adduce "anything so unscientific as a precise date." Sociologists are invading the past as they have taken possession of the present and the invasion consists in dealing as exactly with the past as they have dealt with the present. "Hard facts" attained by scrupulous labour are the hallmark of contemporary sociology. Their factuality may be contestable but they have not been frivolously fabricated. Much labour, much intellectual self-discipline has gone into eliciting them. British academic sociology has continued the British empirical tradition which grew up outside the universities (and which Professor Gould points out was omitted by Professor Nisbet in *The Sociological Tradition*). British sociology, academic and non-academic, is now the chief producer—after American sociology—of orderly empirical studies of society.[1]

The whole impressive affair is a testimonial to assiduity, intelligence, and sober devotion. But what does it all amount to? Mr. Runciman asks "... just what, if any, significant discoveries have been made by British social science ... exactly what has been discovered (or conversely, exposed as false) in the work of the researchers" reported by Mr. Krausz. He asks further: "What has been achieved ... in the explanation of human behaviour and institutions." Mr. Runciman also implies an absence of coherence or intellectual unity among all the numerous "specialisms" generated in the course of the past few decades.

I fully agree with Mr. Runciman's objections to circumscribing sociology with precisely drawn boundaries which separate it from other social and natural sciences. I also agree with his implication that one should not worry unduly about the unconnectedness of the various fields of specialisation within a very broadly conceived sociology. But if one asks for explanations one is asking at the same time for generalisations, for a more general or comprehensive theory which permits a precise subsumption of the specific results of particular investigations. Explanations in sociology at present are very *ad hoc* or they are drawn from a body of theory which permits much arbitrariness of interpretation. This is not a satisfactory situation and most sociologists in Britain and elsewhere are aware of this. There is a hunger for theory among sociologists, even the most empirical and the most specialised. Indeed this yearning for theory cuts across the boundaries of specialisations and the desire to gratify it permits me to make a number of observations.

ONE OBSERVATION is that there are marked limitations on the degree of specialisation among sociologists. It is true that there are some sociologists who concentrate largely on the family, others on crime and delinquency (sociologised under the name of "deviancy"), others on stratification, others on education, others on science, others on voting behaviour,

[1] It should be mentioned in passing that this proliferation of works of research has been done at relatively small financial cost and owes much to the energy of a few individuals like Dr. Michael Young, Dr. A. H. Halsey, Professor T. S. Simey and Professor D. V. Glass in stimulating research, to Professor Ilya Neustadt in forming a department at Leicester which has become a seedbed of so many vigorous and productive sociologists, to editors of series like those guided by Professor W. J. H. Sprott, Professor Donald MacRae, Dr. Halsey and Dr. Young and to publishers like Routledge & Kegan Paul, Faber & Faber, and Heinemann who have taken the risk of producing monographs without the captive market of post-graduate students who are the support of American publishing in sociology.

A word might also be said in appreciation of the initiative of the late Karl Mannheim and Herbert Read in launching the first of these series, the International Library of Sociology and Social Reconstruction, during World War II when the muses were relatively silent and when the subject was scarcely established in British universities.

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etc. Around each of these topics, there forms within each country (and increasingly between countries) an intellectual community, the members of which read each other's works, some of them even before publication. They read more or less the same body of literature: many of them are in contact with each other not only through reading each other's writings but also through correspondence and through personal meetings at conferences and on visits. There are of course disagreements within these specialised communities regarding techniques, findings, and interpretation but they try to iron out differences and to avoid them in the future through the standardisation of categories and techniques, Nonetheless, these specialised fields do not wholly isolate their members from those of other specialised fields.[2] No field fails to impinge on another equally specialised field. Thus, for example, a sociologist studying the aged cannot avoid the necessity for studying the literature on the family, on urbanisation and demography, on geriatric medicine and medical sociology, etc.; and the same holds for every other field of sociological specialisation. As a result, the consensus with regard to techniques of research, findings and lines of interpretation extends beyond the boundaries of any community of specialists into adjacent communities of specialists. In this way a series of overlaps links the entire profession of sociology. Specialisation in sociology has not yet progressed to the point, nor is it likely to do so in the foreseeable future, where one field cuts itself off entirely from its intellectual neighbours or from the sociological family as a whole.

Furthermore (to proceed with my second observation), sociological training is much less specialised than sociological research. A student must cover a much wider body of literature than that directly pertinent to the field in which he will do his research. Sociology now being an academic subject, the leading research workers tend also to be teachers of sociology: and this means that they have often to teach subjects which are somewhat outside their specialised field of research. This, too, has a unifying effect, although it does not create or maintain a completely common sociological culture. The fact that sociology is no longer the work of amateurs but is taught and largely practised within universities in which "theory" has prestige means that the prestige-conferring "classics" are taught in practically all universities for better

[2] One of the reasons for the sterility of much of the work discussed by Professor Madge is that it has become an isolated "specialism" which is (as the quotation from Professor Homans implies) content to remain within the limits fixed by the identities of men and pigeons.

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or for worse; there is a *tronc commun* from which sociologists derive some of their intellectual dignity. Durkheim, Weber, Mannheim, Parsons, Merton are repeatedly quoted and invoked over a very wide range of specialised fields of research.

THESE FAMOUS SOCIOLOGISTS are so generally drawn in, not just because those who draw them in wish to avoid the appearance of being no better than intellectual hewers of wood and drawers of water. They do so because there is a deeply felt need among sociologists to be part of an ongoing intellectual tradition and because there is a no less deeply felt need to explain one's particular findings by reference to certain major variables, such as solidarity, equality, deference, authority, charisma, bureaucracy. Contemporary sociologists are as much the creators of their tradition as they are its beneficiaries and prisoners.[3]

It might be said that the unifying classics of sociology are important to its contemporary practitioners because sociology is not at present a real science. If sociology were a science, its master-works would have become so assimilated into the flow of sociological work that their accomplishments would be taken for granted. They remain important because sociological analysis is so much devoted to the elucidation of certain major themes which continue to dominate the attention of sociologists, partly because the great figures drew attention to them, and partly because experience and the concern which they have moulded have shown them to be the proper objects of study.

An effective intellectual tradition is not merely a timeless gallery of works nor is it merely a sequence in time of works arranged by later scholars. An effective intellectual tradition is a linkage of works through influence exercised over time. This is the kind of tradition which operates in the real sciences and it also operates in sociology. In the real sciences, intellectual influence is usually fairly immediate—there are exceptions—and the works which are constitutive of tradition function through entering into the continuing flow; they lose their identity in so doing. Such tradition-setting works provide

[3] The difficulties of forecasting are manifold, as Professor MacRae shows. One of the difficulties is that we cannot imagine anything beyond variations on the themes set by the great figures of 19th- and 20th-century sociology. The fact that the conception of "post-industrial society" is an amalgam of what St. Simon, Comte, Tocqueville, and Weber furnished to our imaginations is evidence that we are confined to an ambiguously defined circle which is too tightly closed.

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a framework of concepts which sets research tasks—and they provide the next stage of research, particular hypotheses to be revised, rejected or confirmed, and observations which may be accepted as given or which require reinterpretation. In sociology the situation is both similar and different.

IT IS SIMILAR in the sense that major works provide a framework of concepts which set research tasks. It is different in that particular investigations are only loosely and vaguely linked with their guiding and legitimating ideas and are also only very loosely linked with those which have gone just before, although treating presumably the same problem at a more advanced stage. Dr. Halsey's criteria of "modern sociology at its best" are as he says "rarely met." He is right when he says that the aim must be "to advance theory through systematic research"; he is also right when he says that the situation in which the "subject as it was once presented in this country—a library of the works of deceased giants, to be admired and discussed but most unlikely to be extended save by the rare appearance of new genius"—must be superseded by a more continuous process in which one investigator takes up where his predecessor left off.

IT IS AT JUST THIS POINT that the great difficulty of present-day sociology lies. To take up where one's predecessor left off entails the exact location of that point; it entails the acceptance of the delineation of the variables studied by the predecessor in exactly the form in which they were put by the predecessor. The point of leaving off in sociology is difficult to locate because vague interpretations of data always exceed the data. The categories involved in interpretation, *i.e.*, in theoretical construction, are always broader and vaguer than the categories in which the data were collected or the observations were made. The latter vary too much from one investigator to another, even though they believe themselves to be working on the same problem. For good reasons or for poor, each subsequent investigator "improves" on his predecessor's working delineation of the relevant variables. What in fact happens is that a slightly different variable replaces the one previously studied; they are both thought to represent the same thing when in fact they do not. As a result, the cumulative and progressive development of sociological knowledge is rendered more difficult. The source of the fault lies in the "great ideas" of sociology; they obviously refer to very important things—otherwise they would not hold the attention of sociologists as they have for so many decades

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—but they are extremely ambiguous, and they defy authoritative clarification.

The unity which transcends specialisation in sociology rests on this common devotion to a relatively small number of "key words." That unity is very expensively purchased. The "key words" and the ideas which they evoke have become inexpungibly enmeshed in the sociological tradition—so much so that they can never be merely an honorific decoration. They have become constitutive of sociological analysis. But the fact remains that they weigh like an Alp on the sociological mind. Theory is recognised as such by the presence of these alpine "key words" in all their misty and simple grandeur. This is not good enough. Sociology needs a much more differentiated set of categories, a much more differentiated set of names for distinguishable things. It must name many more things and name them in agreed and recognisable ways. The "slippage" between "concepts" and "indicators' must be reduced by increasing and refining the variety of "concepts."

THERE IS NO CLEAR and simple way in which to do this. It would be preposterous to appoint a commission of sociological analysts to undertake this task, in the manner of the commissions appointed by the Government of India to devise Hindi equivalents for modern scientific terms. No one would pay any attention to the results of their labours, and rightly so. It will be a long slow process to be carried out in research seminars and in the promulgation of particular research schemes. We must take our leave of the generously stimulating tyranny of our classics.

Meanwhile, much of value will continue to be produced under the guidance of these flexible but too vague and too undifferentiated "key words"; much that is illuminating and plausible will continue to be produced under loose guidance. But if the just and exigent demands of Dr. Halsey and Mr. Runciman for a continuously growing body of consolidated knowledge are to be met, sociologists must change their relationship to their great traditions.

Pioneers & Sectarians

By W. G. Runciman

THE TRIUMPHANT EXPLOSION of sociology in British universities is by now a commonplace. The proliferation of departments and chairs; the ever-rising flood of student applicants; the Heyworth Committee and the Social Science Research Council; the breaching even of the citadels of Oxbridge—it has all the air of a happy ending to another long and hitherto discreditable story of insularity, complacency, and obscurantism. Of course, when examined in detail this picture turns out to be as oversimplified and misleading as such pictures usually are. But however complicated and even paradoxical the true history of sociology in Britain, this is an obviously appropriate time at which to review it, and to ask not only how it has all come about but also how successful it is all being.

As it happens, the useful but limited survey of the last two decades which has been brought out by Dr. Ernest Krausz[1] will, if judiciously misused, afford a good deal of comfort to sociology's opponents. Whatever may have been the author's intentions, British sociologists emerge from these pages as for the most part an uninspiring lot—pedestrian, fractious, parochial, and confused. This is partly because Krausz has conducted his survey under two self-imposed constraints: he restricts himself to work both conducted and published in Britain, and he deliberately accepts the Heyworth Committee's nonsensical distinction between "research" and "fact-finding." But even when allowance is made for this, his survey gives the feel of a subject expanding as much by exhortation as by achievement. There is some brave talk to the effect that "the overall results of sociological research in Britain are not unimpressive" and "substantive contributions have been made to our knowledge and understanding of social life." But the reader who wants to know just what, if any, significant discoveries have been or are likely to be made by British

W. G. RUNCIMAN *is the author of "Relative Deprivation and Social Justice" (Routledge, 1966) and of "Social Science and Political Theory" (1963), published by Cambridge University Press, who will be bringing out his "Sociology in its Place and Other Essays" later this year. He is currently lecturing at Harvard.*

[1] *Sociology in Britain: a Survey of Research.* By ERNEST KRAUSZ. Batsford, 42s. Columbia University Press, $7.50.

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social science may find this survey a disappointment.

The trouble lies, I think, in the way in which sociology is defined. Sociologists are depressingly prone to pick quarrels about this, and to lecture each other on the strength of them about what sort of social research ought to be done instead of going out and doing it themselves. Indeed, some of this bickering shows through in Krausz's book. But Krausz's assumption is that "the main trend in the last two decades has been for sociology to develop into a specialism." This is stated rather than argued, and much even of Krausz's own evidence contradicts it. The truth is that sociology has never been a specialism and is not going to become one; and this is one of the reasons why the conventional picture which I sketched at the outset is so misleading. Defined as Dr. Krausz defines it, sociology appears to consist of community studies, some "problem-oriented" social history, and the study of crime, politics, the family and so on from the "social" aspect. But define it as broadly as it deserves, and its history in Britain not only over the last twenty years but over the last hundred and twenty is rather more distinguished as well as more diverse than this survey would ever lead the reader to expect.

In an interesting essay on "The Origins of British Sociology" which prefaces a selection of papers reprinted from the period between Spencer and Hobhouse,[2] Dr. Philip Abrams has correctly observed that "The striking thing about the development of British sociology is the continuity of its principal traditions. The pattern of work of the 1960s flows from that of the 1830s." It is no less striking how reluctant both sociology's practitioners and its opponents have been to see it in this light. When Sir William Beveridge, one day in the 1930s, asked Professor T. H. Marshall (who is my source for the story) what sociology was, he was most reluctant to accept in reply that he himself was engaged in it. And to this day, a suggestion that, for example, Professor H. R. Trevor-Roper's analysis of witch-hunting in post-medieval Europe is a good example of sociology will be greeted with cries of repudiation and disbelief by those for whom sociology is either housing surveys on the one hand or muddle-headed philosophy of history on the other. But to define it in terms of whatever kind of research into human behaviour the speaker happens to find pretentious or boring is as unfair as to define it in terms of research selected to bolster the argument that it is a distinctive specialism of its own. It has always been as diffuse as its subject-matter requires, and therefore rightly so. As Abrams reminds us, Britain can even claim to have had the first national sociological association in Europe. It was a curiously heterogeneous, not to say eccentric, body, arising as it did from a transient alliance of eugenicists, philosophers, charity organisers, politicians and town planners. They all quarrelled, as they were bound to do, because they all wanted the association to promote their own sort of social research at the expense of the others. But they were, in a sense, all equally right, as the subsequent history of British social research and its diversity has continued to prove.

A PART OF THE DIFFICULTY may seem to be the lack of a single commanding figure comparable in influence to Alfred Marshall in economics or Sir Edward Tylor in anthropology. But L. T. Hobhouse, if not Herbert Spencer, might have filled this role if it had been capable of being filled at all. It is true that Spencer never earned the respect of his more distinguished academic contemporaries such as Tylor, Maine, or Huxley, and that Hobhouse, although more firmly based within the academic establishment than Spencer ever was, lacked the altogether outstanding intellectual gifts of his continental counterparts, Max Weber and Emile Durkheim. But the fundamental difficulty which confronted Hobhouse as the English heir to the tradition of Spencer and Comte was, as he himself quite explicitly admitted, that he was trying to preserve a specialism where none was. After the undergraduate days in which in his own words he "rather innocently took Herbert Spencer's evolutionary theories as the last word of science," Hobhouse recognised that he must dissociate Spencer's empirical sociology from his all-embracing naturalistic metaphysics on the one side and his irrelevant individualistic ethics on the other. But having done so, he was unable to replace Spencer's system with a system of his own. Instead, he turned himself into an uneasy combination of political philosopher and historical ethnologist. His studies of what he termed the "simpler peoples" ought not, perhaps, to be dismissed quite as summarily as later anthropologists, contemptuous of armchair ethnology and suspicious of any hint of cultural snobbery, have tended to do. But he remained throughout his long career a specialist in search of a specialism. In his first editorial for the *Sociological Review* in 1908 (which Abrams reprints), he lamented that

> sociology as a general discipline has sometimes been threatened with destruction at the hands of

[2] *The Origins of British Sociology 1834–1914: an Essay with Selected Papers*. By PHILIP ABRAMS. University of Chicago Press, $10.75, 97s.

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> its own offspring. It tends to be dispersed and disappear into a number of specialisms. In place of sociology we have social sciences. . . .

As Abrams aptly comments, the whole paper "reads as a desperate plea for centripetal movement in the face of overwhelming centrifugal force." It is ironic that a generation after his death the unity of sociology should still be being hopefully proclaimed at the same time as the dispersion into specialisms proceeds as swiftly as ever. It is even a little reminiscent of Spencer himself, who had said in almost the same breath that the achievement of sociology is "to grasp the vast heterogeneous aggregate" and that "within the body of science itself there is an advance from a few simple, incoherent truths to a number of specialised sciences."

THERE ARE OTHER ironies too. Whatever the errors with which Hobhouse or Spencer can be charged, they were entirely right in their acceptance of the one fundamental tenet of sociology, however defined—evolution itself. Yet only now is Spencer at last enjoying something of a revival. The latest evidence of it is a selective (and costly) edition of the *Principles of Sociology* by Professor Stanislav Andreski.[3] Andreski, as he openly admits, is doing for Spencer the best he can. Like Hobhouse, he firmly excises the *laissez-faire* ideology to leave only the empirical history and the now rediscovered "structural-functionalism"; and he is still, it seems to me, too kind to Spencer's analogies between societies and organisms. But the discredit which overtook all forms of "social Darwinism," coupled with the rejection by 20th-century anthropologists of anything savouring of the bogus-historical "comparative method" and "unilinear" evolution, inhibited the proper recognition that not only the biological but also the social sciences are, after all, ineluctably evolutionary. Although Spencer failed (since he remained a Lamarckian) to grasp the real importance of Darwin's idea of natural selection, he does still deserve more credit than he has lately received for his ideas about the evolution of social structures. In 1938, Professor Talcott Parsons (to whom Andreski for some reason refers only obliquely as "an influential American writer") opened his study of *The Structure of Social Action* with the rhetorical question: "Who now reads Spencer?" Thirty years later, the wheel has almost turned full circle. Parsons has come to accept what he calls the "evolutionary perspective"; Spencer is claimed by Professor Andreski not merely to have introduced the concepts of structural-functionalism but even to have "laid the foundations for a cybernetic analysis of social phenomena"; and it is beginning to be something of a question who now reads Parsons. Even Sir Peter Medawar, who can hardly be counted an indulgent critic of pseudo-science, has accorded some guarded praise to Spencer's Theory of General Evolution in his Herbert Spencer lecture now reprinted in *The Art of the Soluble*.[4] "Progress" has reappeared in the social sciences under the names of "development" and "modernisation." Ideas which were neglected or even ridiculed in the pages of Spencer and Hobhouse are taken for granted among now fashionable writers who have probably never read them. Indeed, for Hobhouse the irony is compounded, since he was as aware as any latter-day critic of Spencer's merits as well as his defects. It is doing him no more than justice when Abrams says:

> When the sociology of development was revived in the 1950s there was hardly a backward glance to Hobhouse. But he was a true precursor, and it is the discontinuity which is curious.

AT THIS POINT, it may be only fair to present-day sociologists (and to Dr. Krausz) to recall the well-worn dictum of A. N. Whitehead that a science which hesitates to forget its founders is lost. But spurious proclamations of novelty, like spurious proclamations of unity, can do the subject nothing but harm. If we look back to about 1850, say, it is truly remarkable how similar is the picture to the situation of today. Neo-classical economics is foreshadowed in the political economy of Mill; social anthropology in the first proceedings of the Ethnological Society of London; social administration in the already well-established tradition of "blue-book sociology" and the researches of the Royal Commissions; social surveys in the scrupulously quantitative enquiries into the "condition of the people" conducted by the Statistical Society and the celebrated Census of 1851; sociological fieldwork in the interviews carried out by Henry Mayhew among the London poor; and all this still without mention of Spencer, let alone of Malthus in the generation before, who must on any definition be accounted one of the most influential sociologists there has ever been. Malthus, indeed, serves as a reminder of an incidental but illuminating feature of the story which Abrams doesn't touch on—the number of sociologists, or social scientists, who were admitted to Fellowship of the Royal Society from Malthus in 1819 to Seligman

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[3] *Principles of Sociology*. By HERBERT SPENCER. Edited with an Introduction by Stanislav Andreski. Macmillan, £8.

[4] P. B. Medawar, "Onwards from Spencer," originally published in ENCOUNTER, September 1963, and now in *The Art of the Soluble* (Pelican), 5s.

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

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exactly a century later. Giffen, Jevons, Farr, Simon, Palgrave, Galton, Pearson, Pitt-Rivers and Haddon were all F.R.S.s; and it is yet another irony that the recent change of heart by the Society's Council, which has expressed a willingness to widen its interests in the field of "behavioural science," should be merely a reversion to a tradition which happened to lapse in the years of Keynes and Radcliffe-Brown.

AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND, some of Dr. Krausz's omissions are hard to fathom. He is frank in admitting that his choice reflects his own personal views, and of course he can't be expected to include everything. But on what grounds, for example, include Peter Willmott on East London adolescents but not the Opies on the lore and language of schoolchildren; the Newsoms on infants but not John Bowlby; John Bonham on the middle-class voter but not David Butler; Joan Woodward and Elliot Jacques on industrial relations but not Allan Flanders or Hugh Clegg; D. V. Glass and D. E. C. Eversley on historical demography but not E. A. Wrigley and Peter Laslett; Peter Townsend on old age but not on poverty; or J. A. Banks, Alasdair MacIntyre, and Arthur Marwick on 19th- and 20th-century social history but not W. L. Burn or Asa Briggs or E. J. Hobsbawm?

Nor is there anything in these pages about, for example, the work which has been sponsored by the Oxford Institute of Statistics on the distribution of income and wealth, by the Medical Research Council on the families of schizophrenics, or by the London University Institute of Child Health on the social behaviour of nursery-school children as studied by the methods of ethology. Research arising out of Royal Commissions like Robbins or Donovan or out of the work of the Government Social Survey is ignored, presumably as (mere) "fact-finding." In a chapter on techniques, there is a single passing reference, in a quotation from Moser and Scott's *British Towns*, to the Social Survey's development and use of the Juror-index; yet despite Krausz's own terms of reference, two of his two-hundred odd pages are devoted to an American author's critique of statistical significance testing in survey research. And because of the restriction to work done in Britain, there is of course not even a hint of what may have been done by British sociologists who have chosen to study the behaviour of the members of other cultures than their own.

WHAT IS NEEDED in a survey of British sociology is at once a less circumscribed definition of it than Krausz's and also a clearer exposition of exactly what has been discovered (or, conversely, exposed as false) in the work of

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the researchers to whom reference is made. It matters very little how far they may or may not share a common method, or a common conception of their discipline. Admittedly, the diversity of aims and methods which has characterised British sociology since its beginnings does furnish one of the reasons for the long reluctance of British universities to establish departments of sociology, so called. But this is significant for its achievements only to the extent that it determines the source and direction of patronage. (The exaggerated influence of the eugenicist school of Galton and Pearson is rightly instanced by Abrams as the most notable case in point.) The question of organisation is merely one aspect of the question which a survey should first set out to answer: what has been achieved over the period in question in the explanation of human behaviour and institutions?

Ever since the Scottish Enlightenment of the 18th century, when the foundations of British sociology were laid by Hume, Millar, Ferguson, and Adam Smith, its progress has been fragmented, haphazard, and diffuse. But it has nonetheless been progress; and it is therefore something of a puzzle that the current enthusiism for sociology in all its forms should have resulted less from a recognition of this progress and a desire to build on it than from a desire to imitate the United States. Even Abrams, who is so aware of the continuities, concludes his essay with the unexpected assertion that sociology did not start to flourish in Britain until the social changes wrought by World War II and five years of Labour government.

> Who [he asks] but Marxists was interested in the theory of social class until manual workers began to earn as much or more than white collar workers? Political sociology was superfluous until the Labour Party had lost control of the working-class vote.

This seems to me to confuse progress with fashion. Millar, Ferguson, and Adam Smith were interested in the theory of social class long before Marx was even born; and Abrams himself reprints a paper of J. A. Hobson's in 1910 entitled "The General Election: a Sociological Interpretation" of which he says that "his attempt to interpret gross turn-out and party-preference data in terms of class and regional variations clearly places Hobson in the modern rather than the classical tradition of political science." If by his assertion that only now is British sociology starting to flourish Abrams is merely referring to the 23,657 applicants for university admission cited by Dr. Krausz for the year 1967, then his assertion is true enough, but not necessarily significant. It is safe to predict from this, and from the estab-

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lishment of the Social Science Research Council, that progressively more sociological research will be done in this country in the future than has been done in the past. It is another question altogether whether the standard of research will be higher in proportion.

At the end of his survey, Krausz lists what he regards as the "immediate needs" of British sociology. They are "the acquisition of sounder methods and techniques, the provision of adequate basic frameworks, and the insistence on a close mutual support between empirical and theoretical work." No doubt. But this is a little like saying of a football team that its immediate needs are to play better and to score more goals. Besides, an academic subject advances as fast as its vanguard, not its rearguard. However necessary it may be to encourage the laggards and chastise the incompetents, the future of sociology—which it would be pointless to attempt to predict—will depend on what the ablest, or sometimes the luckiest, of its practitioners or teams of practitioners happen to study; and probably many of these, just as at present, will not be calling themselves "sociologists" anyway. This is not, I had better make clear, because the increasing specialisation of the social sciences makes communication impossible between specialist and specialist. On the contrary: it is characteristic of the social sciences that to explain the classes of institutions and behaviour which they have identified and annexed as their own they must draw on any number of adjacent sciences, both social and (as appropriate) biological or physical. Krausz speaks of the need "for due regard to the interdisciplinary approach." But is there a sociologist in the British Isles (or anywhere else) who would dissent from him? It is precisely because of the emergence of, and overlap between, specialisms of which Hobhouse was so conscious that—as long as it is defined in generous and unsectarian terms—"sociologist" is a useful word.

The difficulty, unfortunately, is that sectarianism is easier detected than dissolved. The continuity between the past and the future of British sociology may extend also to this: it has always needed to be protected not only against its enemies but against its friends.

Gods & Sociologists

By Alasdair MacIntyre

"THE CRITICISM of religion is the beginning of all criticism." Marx's aphorism was prophetic. In the history of sociology it has time and again been the case that the key concepts and theories were framed in the course of trying to articulate a satisfactory account of the relationship of religious beliefs and practices to types of social order. Durkheim, Weber, Evans-Pritchard all provide examples. By virtue of this history we cannot treat *the sociology of religion* as just one more species of that horrifying genus *the sociology of x*; but even apart from the influence of intellectual history we should have to recognise that to understand religion will after all involve understanding how the fundamental categories through which men apprehend and organise their experience originate, survive, and are transformed. Consider, to take an obviously difficult example, the concept of religion itself. Why and how do or should we treat some beliefs and practices as religious and not others? What is religion to be contrasted with?

Most writers on the sociology of religion offer us definitions. But how are we to assess such definitions, and what do we want them to do for us? If the reply is that the sociologist wishes to study possible correlations between religious and other social phenomena or to explore the functions of religion in social orders, or if we are given some other such stock sociological answer, we shall be nowhere near having even a starting-point. For we still do not know against what range of subject-matter to test any proposed generalisations; we do not know what to include under the label "religion." Christianity, Islam, Judaism, Buddhism, Hinduism?

ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, *who was until recently Professor of Sociology at the University of Essex, is now at Brandeis University. He is the author of "A Short History of Ethics" (Routledge, 1967) and "Secularization and Moral Change" (Oxford University Press, 1967), and has just published a critique of "Herbert Marcuse" (Fontana). Among his contributions to* ENCOUNTER *are "Lenin" (May 1968), "Max Weber" (July 1965), and "Nietzsche" (April 1969).*

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

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Ludicrous to omit them. The beliefs in spirit or spirits of the Dinka, of the Yoruba, of the Maori? Certainly. Confucianism, the South Place Ethical Society, Aristotle's belief in the Unmoved Mover, Californian astrology? Why draw a line anywhere? The suspicion grows inexorably that *we* at least have no clear concept of religion on which to draw. Changes both in popular belief and in intellectual attitude during the past centuries have left us with a conceptual catch-all at the level of ordinary language. The initial suggestion that "religion" does not pick out a well-defined subject-matter for study is reinforced and the need to look at the history of the concept itself underlined.

At once we are made to realise that the concept of religion has itself religious origins. Its ancestry lies in a marriage of the syncretistic concept of the ancient classical world with the anti-idolatrous concept of ancient Israel. A god is any object of devotion who can be identified with a member of the pantheon or added to the pantheon; a god is any object of a cult which is rival to the cult of the jealous Jahweh. Fused in uneasy union, these theistic notions provide a view of religion from the standpoint of certain religious traditions. The danger that those whose culture owes so much to those traditions will in consequence view the beliefs of other cultures in a thoroughly misleading way is obvious, and was reinforced by the way in which the West encountered certain other societies. In the nineteenth century those missionaries who sometimes preceded, and sometimes *were*, the first anthropologists naturally enough imposed their own perspectives. The native religion of a culture is that which must be abandoned if the people are to become Methodists or Congregationalists or whatever. How do we escape the limitations imposed by such a view? There are at least three possible strategies.

One is to write about some particular religion, allowing it to define itself in its own terms. This is the procedure of Dr. Stark's massive account of Christianity, which has now reached its fourth and penultimate volume.[1] Dr. Stark however feels free to pass from sociological to theological terms in a way that can be illuminating. He compares the saint and the priest as religious types, defining the saint partly in terms of Weber's account of charisma and the priest in terms of Catholic theology. The cross-cultural definition of sainthood would thus allow him to raise (what goes beyond his task even in so large a book) questions about the differing character of priesthood in different

[1] *The Sociology of Religion: A Study of Christendom. Vol. IV. Types of Religious Man.* By Werner Stark. Routledge & Kegan Paul, £2 5s.

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religions. I make this point to show that in accepting for analytical purposes the viewpoint of a particular religion Dr. Stark does not in any way cut himself off from objective comparative studies. More importantly, he does succeed in laying bare very clearly the way in which Christianity at least (and this certainly holds for a number of other religions) itself contains a sociology or sociologies, not necessarily in very determinate form.

The argument of one of Dr. Stark's earlier volumes supported the thesis that Catholicism, Calvinism, Lutheranism and Anglicanism each encapsulate a particular view of the relationship of individuals to societies, of church to state, and less explicitly of role to person. The sociological view of itself taken by a religion may of course be very different from the view taken of it by an external observer. But one of Dr. Stark's interesting theses is that the Catholic Church's beliefs about itself are a (if not the) central determinant of its social forms in different historical environments.

In so far as it is true that religions contain as part of themselves sociological beliefs about the religion and the society which they inhabit, the sociologist can no longer pretend to that neutrality in respect of the truth or otherwise or reasonableness or otherwise of the religion which he is studying which most sociologists have thought appropriate. For on the sociological claims of the religion he is bound to take a view, since either they will accord with or discord with his own view of that religion and that society. This will be especially important where the sociologist is forced out of the kind of sympathy with his subject-matter so evident in Dr. Stark's writing by an acknowledgement of the importance of the incoherences and contradictions involved in religious belief and practice.

THIS IMPORTANCE is closely related to the importance of incoherence and contradiction in social life as such. The Hegelian perception that it is in the dissolving of contradiction that social orders are dissolved or transformed needs as its complement the perception that it is, in part, through the maintenance of contradiction and incoherence that social orders are stabilised. A sense for the complexity which this involves is an important element in David Martin's excellent *The Religious and the Secular*.[2] Martin's writings are a necessary corrective to any easy misuse of the word "secular." He emphasises the variety of meanings attached to the notion of secularisation, using these as one starting-point for a study of the complexity of secularisation. More particularly, Martin wants

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to underline the mistake of supposing there to be a single sharp transition from a socially established adherence to Christian belief and practice to a socially established set of attitudes and practices which are clear-headedly secular. One crucial part of his view concerns the mish-mash of non-rational beliefs, some Christian, some not, which pervade the life of advanced industrial societies. Another crucial question is "how far a culture can be secularised without having been thoroughly Christianised." Yet Martin's questioning would be more effective if his evidence about the secular character of the past predated the eighteenth century more often than it does. What does emerge unmistakably from Martin's argument however is the way in which processes of secularisation themselves involve successive transformations and redefinitions of the boundary line between the religious and the secular. Hence he provides us with a second and alternative strategy for escaping from the traps posed by the problem of definition.

A THIRD, and perhaps more usual strategy, is to boldly adopt a convenient definition of religion and then try to discover whether crucial generalisations do emerge. The proof of the definition lies in the fertility of consequent hypotheses. This is the approach of Roland Robertson's introductory, but more than introductory book.[3] Robertson's book suffers from what all attempts to survey a large field must suffer from: compression, lack of space to justify important and controversial positions and an impression of leaping from topic to topic, but as an at once analytically acute and wide-ranging guide to a large field there is nothing in any language to compare with it. There is only one major flaw: one-sixth of the book is footnotes. (Somewhere surely some doctoral student *must* be writing a dissertation on *The Footnote as an Art-Form*; if so, he must have his attention drawn to Robertson's finely sculpured specimen.)

The importance of a book like Robertson's lies partly in reminding us how we have at the moment questions rather than answers and so in casting substantial doubt on whether it could possibly yet be the time to try to construct enormous sky-scrapers such as Stark's. What we need above all are theoretically sensitive studies of limited and particular aspects and areas. A model of excellence in this respect is Kenelm Burridge's *New Heaven, New Earth*,[4] a study of millenarianism, which concentrates on Polynesian and Melanesian cargo cults, but ranges as far as India and North America for purposes of comparison. The pattern of these cults is one in which in a situation where Western economic power and Christian missions have invaded the native culture a prophet arises and announces some imminent redemptive happening which will shower a plenitude of Western material goods, of "cargo," upon the faithful. Burridge insists that we must shed any ethnocentric prejudices of our own. We must

> try to stand on the believer's ground, accept the revelation, the prophet and the associated rites and activities as guaranteeing the truth of things, and then attempt to find out what kinds of truth they reveal....

In the study of cargo cults this entails deciphering and taking seriously the implicit moral beliefs about rules which relate power, redemptive activity and material goods. Burridge suggests that if we do abandon our pre-formed attitudes in order to understand cargo cults we shall find ourselves with a standpoint which puts our own former beliefs in question. He might well have gone on to point out—although he does not—the remarkable resemblance between Polynesian and Melanesian attitudes to cargo and our own attitudes to technology. (Naively we contrast "religion" and "technology" sharply. In fact, beliefs about technology—viewed in Burridge's perspective—may turn out to be at the core of

[3] *The Sociological Interpretation of Religion*. By ROLAND ROBERTSON. Basil Blackwell, 36s.

[4] *New Heaven, New Earth*. By KENELM BURRIDGE. Basil Blackwell, 30s., paper 15s.

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our contemporary religion. Wilsonism in 1964 and 1966 was remarkably like some of the episodes described by Burridge.)

When Burridge turns to the task of explanation, he does this in a way that is singularly appropriate for the present stage of sociological and anthropological enquiries. He suggests that we can make prophetic millenarianism intelligible in terms of the tensions set up between an older way of life and a new, and more particularly between a new way of life which has money at its focal economic point and an older pre-market economy. In so doing he necessarily appeals to a set of generalisations about the effects of this type of abrupt social transition, and some logical purist might challenge him to formulate these much more precisely than he does. Such a logical purist would however be mistaken; we can often make true claims about causal connections which are justifiable only if some precisely formulated generalisation is true, without being able as yet to provide the precise formulation. To wait upon over-great precision sometimes sterilises enquiry, and Burridge's discussion splendidly avoids the twin dangers of giving too little and giving too much attention to the requirements of scientific rigour.

Burridge considers in the same tentative, but forceful way the various types of ethnographic, Hegelian, and Marxist theory that might illuminate his proposed generalisations further. To discuss these theoretical issues not in terms of generalities, but in terms of a precise problem gives his argument relevance which is usually lacking in this area. This is one of the most interesting books in the field of the human sciences for some time.

FINALLY both sociologists and literary critics ought to welcome the long overdue translation of Professor Schücking's study of the English Puritan Family[5] as it appears in religious treatises as well as in poems and novels, a study first published in 1929. In so far as this is an historical study of the family, it obviously suffers from lack of attention to non-literary sources. But what Schücking successfully provides us is a key part of the history of literary attitudes to the family and above all a narrative of how the middle-class family became a fit object for literature. "What had to happen to attitudes to the family if the novel were to become possible?" turns out to be an extremely profitable question to have asked.

[5] *The Puritan Family*. By LEVIN L. SCHÜCKING. Translated by Brian Battershaw. Routledge & Kegan Paul, 15s.

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Behaviourologies

By Charles Madge

THE SKINNER BOX, used by experimental psychologists to study learning processes in animals, is the origin of behavioural sociology. A pigeon pecking a target on the box is rewarded by grain and repeats the process. In the terminology of B. F. Skinner, this behaviour by the pigeon is an "operant," which has been "reinforced" by the grain, and hence the process is termed "operant conditioning." Though he experimented with pigeons, Skinner argued that there was a similar sequence in human social behaviour, a suggestion developed in some detail by George Homans. Over the past few years, there has been a rapid development of "Skinner Box" research applied to human beings acting in social situations. The *Journal of Applied Behavior Analysis* published its first issue in April 1968. Two of the younger generation of American sociologists (Robert L. Burgess is 31 and Don Bushell, Jr., is 35), have now assembled a collection of research reports and theoretical discussions which clearly indicate the effectiveness of this approach.[1]

It is indeed easy, Burgess and Bushell say, "to lose track of what's going on two doors down the academic corridor." According to Homans, who contributes an incisive "Prologue," not only psychologists like Skinner but the "psychologists who call themselves social psychologists" have failed to apply the basic principles of behavioural psychology in the social field and this failure "gives sociologists their opportunity."[2] If the tone of Homans' prologue is that of a voice crying in the wilderness, the other contributors are self-assured and confident. Apart from the awkwardness of their technical terms, they write readably and (to use a favourite expression) parsimoniously.

In the last six or seven years, explain Bushell and Burgess, operant research has emerged from its laboratory habitat and moved into field settings. Established generalisations are being applied to the solution of practical problems. Man's institutions—for example the school, the penal system, child rearing, marital relations—"often show a remarkable ability to reinforce undesirable behaviour and simultaneously extinguish behaviour that would be preferable." To make such institutions more effective, reformers should employ "techniques which are self-correcting because they are responsive to their own data." Thus we see in one chapter how the problem behaviour of a four-year-old boy was modified by observing his interaction with his mother in the home setting; in another, how token reinforcement (a kind of "trading stamp plan," with rewards for good work ranging from a snack to a bicycle) was used to improve the performance of low-achieving fifth- and sixth-grade children in a low-income neighbourhood of Kansas City; in another, a programme for modifying anti-social behaviour in retarded adolescent delinquents. These demonstrations are impressive. In the case of the low-achieving schoolchildren, the benefit was substantial—a control group made only about half the gain. The extra cost per student averaged about $250 during the school year, but this, the authors comment with some justice, might well

CHARLES MADGE *founded* "Mass-Observation" *in 1937. A poet as well as a sociologist, he is resigning his Chair of Sociology at Birmingham University to live in France and devote his time to writing. Among his books are "The War-time Pattern of Saving and Spending" (1943) and "Society in the Mind" (1964).*

[1] *Behavioral Sociology: The Experimental Analysis of Social Process.* Edited by ROBERT L. BURGESS and DON BUSHELL, JR. Columbia University Press, $12.50, 90s.

And see B. F. Skinner, *Science and Human Behavior*, 1953; and G. C. Homans, *Social Behavior: Its Elementary Forms*, 1961.

[2] At the risk, possibly, of a raised eyebrow or two among readers of ENCOUNTER, I propose in this context to leave on one side anti-behaviourist criticism associated with Arthur Koestler and others for whom Skinner is something of a bogyman. Nowadays the use of learning theory principles need by no means be taken to imply a reductionist mentality. Nor does the adoption of a behavioural model of man exclude any other model that can be made to work. To quote John H. Kunkel, one of the contributors: "Questions concerning man's internal state are not at issue, for the existence of an internal state is not denied. What is important is the recognition that many behaviour patterns of interest to the sociologist can be explained in terms of learning principles which involve a minimum of inference and supposition concerning man's internal state. These principles, in effect, form the important link between individual behaviour and socio-cultural phenomena, and thus contribute to the explanation of activities through the analysis of sociological characteristics and processes."

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be contrasted with the long-term cost to society of inadequately educated children.

The concluding chapter by Richard M. Emerson on "Operant Psychology and Exchange Theory" is an extension of Homans' prologue. Homans criticises Skinner because

> when he extends his findings from the actions of pigeons to human social behaviour, he immediately jumps to a very impressionistic discussion of such things as government and religion, that is, to exceedingly complex subjects with a long history behind them.

Emerson argues that the sociologist's task of explaining social structure "is not subsumable within psychology." If a sociological concept, a "group norm" for example, is reduced to its equivalent in psychological learning theory, namely an S^D, or "discriminative stimulus," the context of social interaction is eliminated. The way to avoid this, Emerson suggests, is to bring in social exchange theory, which interprets the social process in terms of the exchange of social "power" between individuals or social units, and the tendency towards "balance" in such exchanges. In the process of power-balancing, coalitions are formed, and this leads to the formation of norms. With considerable ingenuity and plausibility, other sociological concepts, such as groups, networks, organisations, hierarchies, and roles and statuses, are redefined as manifestations of social exchange.[3]

SOCIAL EXCHANGE THEORY, if it develops in a generally acceptable form, could provide much needed common ground between social psychologists and sociologists. Its impact can be seen, if in this case somewhat negatively, in Michael Argyle's *Social Interaction*, a masterly overview of what is by now an immense and ever-growing literature—he gives references to nearly a thousand books and articles. A new edition of a much-used text, Cartwright and Zander's *Group Dynamics*, also illustrates the rate at which things have been happening at this critical boundary between psychology and sociology. Of the thirty-five articles reprinted in the 1953 edition, only thirteen survive. This is virtually a new book and one which any serious student will wish to possess. Part Four on "Power and Influence in Groups," to which the editors write a long new introduction and

[3] Major references, besides Homans, *op. cit.*, include John Thibaut and Harold H. Kelley, *The Social Psychology of Groups* (1959); Alfred Kuhn, *The Study of Society: A Unified Approach* (1963); and Peter Blau, *Exchange and Power in Social Life* (1964).

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bibliography, admirably complements Emerson's essay.[4]

Argyle is especially interested in the non-verbal elements of social interaction—raising an eyebrow, clearing one's throat, leaning forward in one's chair. He draws on the work of animal ethologists and of linguistics, as well as on the less-known and overlapping subject-matters of human ethology, interpersonal psychiatry, paralinguistics and kinesics, defined by Birdwhistell as "the science of body behavioural communication." It would be hard to overestimate the gains in knowledge and understanding which have accrued from ethology, the study of animals within the environment in which their behaviour has evolved. Argyle quotes the dictum of DeVore:

> From the perspective of modern field studies, the conclusions based on the behaviour of primates in captivity bore as little relation to the behaviour of free-ranging groups as would a monograph on middle-class society based solely on a study of inmates in a maximum-security prison.

Argyle is similarly scathing about social psychologists who conduct laboratory experiments, usually with groups of students, and often under highly artificial conditions. "They use rather abstract terms such as 'frequency of interaction' (regardless of what is said or done), and 'small social group' (regardless of whether this is a family, a work-group, etc.)." Again: "Members of laboratory groups do not usually take their clothes off, laugh uproariously, cry, attack or kiss each other, or crawl all over each other, as members of families commonly do."[5]

Whether one is studying animals or humans, both lab *and* field are, of course, legitimate places to work in. Skinner's pigeon pecking at its target under the rigid constraints of the experimental situation has demonstrated aspects of learned behaviour of the utmost theoretical interest and practical importance. But interesting and important too is another pigeon, Konrad Lorenz's young and still blind nestling thrusting its beak into that of the parent so that food may be regurgitated into its crop. "Even when reared by a human substitute

[4] *Social Interaction*. By MICHAEL ARGYLE. Methuen's Manuals of Modern Psychology, Methuen, 75s.

Group Dynamics: Research and Theory. Edited by DORWIN CARTWRIGHT and ALFRED ZANDER. Third Edition. Tavistock Publications, 65s. Both quantity and quality make the paperback edition an excellent bargain at 36s.

[5] See articles by E. L. Birdwhistell on "Kinesics" and by I. DeVore on "Primate Behaviour" in *International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences* (1968).

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JONATHAN CAPE

parent, young pigeons attempt to bore their beaks into crevices of any kind." In animals, innate patterns of behaviour are supplemented and interspersed by learned behaviour, but the sequences of innate behaviour remain rigid and stereotyped. In most pigeon species, Lorenz tells us, when nesting the two partners take turns at brooding, the female from late afternoon to next morning and the male for the rest of the time. In one case that he observed, however, the female was carried off by a cat.

> The male bird did not brood much longer than he would have done if he had been relieved by his partner in the normal way, but instead rose from the nest and went to search for food as if he had been relieved according to plan. In the evening, he did not settle on the nest but took up his usual sleeping position *alongside* the nest. Since a cold night followed, the nestlings were dead the next morning. The male nevertheless settled on the nest at about 10 a.m. and brooded on the corpses of the chilled nestlings until the afternoon. This behaviour continued for two days....

The quotation comes from a long paper first published by Lorenz in 1935, now reprinted in translation as part of the first volume of his Collected Papers. Lorenz is of course superb as an observer and writer, and these papers are "literature" in a sense not often applicable to scientific publications. Their splendid qualities more than atone for some rather irksome moralistic speculation in the later chapters of his well-known book *On Aggression*. And we learn from the introduction to the new *Collected Papers* volume that Lorenz has been disquieted not only by criticism of his conjectures on innate aggressiveness in man, but by those who have subsequently outdone him—he admits that his "friends" Desmond Morris and Robert Ardrey have caused him to "wince" and "perspire."[6]

In his *Men in Groups*, the young Canadian anthropologist Lionel Tiger is also concerned with the biological "roots" of human behaviour. He argues that a propensity to form all-male groups is linked with the evolution of the human species. During the long period (as long as twenty million years?) in which man was evolving from his hominid ancestors, he developed an innate "male bonding" tendency which enabled him to become a hunter of other animals on a cooperative group basis.[7]

Tiger draws on all sorts of material, scientific and unscientific, but he fails to convince me that the male associations found in politics, in war, in sport, and so on, are best explained by

[6] *Studies in Animal and Human Behaviour*. By KONRAD LORENZ. Vol. I. Methuen. 80s. See also Lorenz's *On Aggression*. Methuen, 1966.

[7] *Men in Groups*. By LIONEL TIGER. Nelson, 50s.

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a "biogram" or innately programmed pattern of behaviour, if only because other explanations will do as well. The "biogram" theory can probably never be proved or disproved anyhow. And conjectures about human and proto-human behaviour and social organisation millions of years ago are obviously going to remain conjectures. The starting-point of the biogram thesis is Lorenz on "The Bond" (Chapter XI of *On Aggression*), where the great ethologist vividly describes the "triumph ceremony" of the grey-lag-goose, by which two ganders constantly reaffirm a life-long bond of friendship and non-aggression. Towards the end of the chapter Lorenz jumps from geese to men, arguing that both (along with wolves and cichlid fish), are aggressive, and both form "personal relationships," which conversely are not formed by more peaceable species. The strength of the "bond" is proportional to the strength of intra-specific aggression that would otherwise develop.

Tiger naturally looks for signs of "bonding" behaviour in man's nearest relatives, the primates. He attaches significance to an essay by Michael Chance on "the instinctive social bonds of primates," based on observation of a colony of macaque monkeys at the London zoo in 1953.[8] Both this essay and the very thorough observation by Hall and DeVore of baboon societies in their natural habitat indicate social systems based on a competitive hierarchy, with coalitions between small numbers of dominant males—a situation that could be analysed rather well by behavioural sociologists in terms of social exchange theory.[9] The small nomadic hunting-gathering human band, on the other hand, is much more egalitarian. Such bands, Service has written, "differ more completely from the apes in this matter of dominance than do any other kinds of human society." Hunting with stone-age weapons calls for teamwork and intelligent cooperation; and in any case, among existing hunting-gathering bands, the hunting is of far less economic importance than the gathering.[10]

It has been deduced from the evidence of skeleton remains that the bands of palaeolithic hunting-gathering man were also small, with a high proportion of infants and juveniles and relatively few adult males. Some of these males

[8] In S. L. Washburn (ed.), *Social Life of Early Man*. Aldine Publishing Company, Chicago, 1961. Michael Chance is a pioneer of primate sociology, and it is no criticism of his essay that it provided little if any ammunition for Tiger's biogram.

[9] In I. DeVore (ed.), *Primate Behavior*. Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965.

[10] Elman R. Service, *The Hunters*. Prentice-Hall, 1966.

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would be linked as father and son, some as brothers, some no doubt as friends, all probably as kin. Such "bonds" as these are typical of all known human societies. Among primates too Rowell suggests that "for later inter-adult behaviour to be on a friendly and stable basis, two individuals must establish their communication pattern when one or both of them is an infant." The more enduring ties of human kinship make it superfluous, one would think, to postulate a biogram compelling male to bond with male.[11]

IT IS ONLY since neolithic times, when populations and communities grew larger through new food technologies, that politics and war have involved the association of males into nations and armies. By that time *homo* had become sufficiently *sapiens* to innovate politically as well as technically, and to reinforce new large-scale organisations with new symbolic ideologies, which have no precedent in any animal society. Man can proudly boast that he made them without the aid of any biological inheritance except a brain capable of inventing and storing symbols.

The study of human innate behavioural patterns and tendencies has a long way to go and could yet prove surprising. The study of primate and other pre-human social behaviour is of absorbing interest in its own right. But the study of human behaviour in large-scale societies is surely another thing again. The connections which Tiger makes between human biology, animal ethology, and modern society are, I am afraid, more misleading than enlightening. We might paraphrase Homans on Skinner and say that "when he extends his findings from the actions of baboons and macaques to human social behaviour, he immediately jumps to a very impressionistic discussion of such things as government and religion, that is, to exceedingly complex subjects with a long history behind them."

No one could disagree with Tiger that males have been the dominant sex in the vast majority of human societies of which we have accurate knowledge. The division of labour in the existing hunting-gathering band is definite and invariable, a cultural extension of the anatomical difference, helpful for survival and the care of children, but transmissible by culture rather than biogram. No one could deny either that families are most often dominated by a male head. The consequences of this for the adult behaviour of male children brought up in such families is admittedly a well-worn theme, but that is no reason for side-tracking it as completely as Tiger has done. He includes Schachter's *The Psychology of Affiliation* in his bibliography, but does not refer to his analysis of childhood dependence as a source of the human drive to affiliate. Argyle's Chapter II on "The Biological and Cultural Roots of Interaction," or Cartwright and Zander's Part Two, "Groups and Group Membership," contain essential material on the formation of groups, including male groups, which Tiger passes by in favour of his own fanciful hypothesis. For example, the article by Janis on "Group Identification under Conditions of External Danger," largely based on studies of wartime danger situations, and Freud's ideas on group formation, cited by Janis, are not mentioned by Tiger, which is odd, since he thinks it worth while to devote several pages to a novel, William Golding's *Lord of the Flies*, as though it were in some way evidence for the innateness of male bonding. (But, in that case, what about *St. Trinian's*?)

In brief, Tiger has read widely but not relevantly enough, nor has he reflected deeply enough on what he has read. And the sad thing is that this half-digested reading has led him, though liberal by inclination, to strange and illiberal conclusions. Though at his Canadian university he did not belong to a fraternity, he has come to believe in all-male societies as part of the biological order of things. And though his liberal ideology made him a supporter of political rights for women, he is now of the opinion that "even a but partly female-dominated polity may go beyond the parameters of 'healthy' possibility, given the basic conservatism of species." Apart from the suggestion of *lèse majesté*, this should give heart to Trades Union leaders currently in dispute with Mrs. Barbara Castle, not to mention the enemies of Mrs. Golda Meir and Mrs. Indira Gandhi.

[11] H. V. Vallois, "The Social Life of Early Man: The Evidence of Skeletons," in S. L. Washburn (ed.), *Social Life of Early Man*; T. E. Rowell, "Variability in the Social Organization of Primates," in Desmond Morris (ed.), *Primate Ethology* (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1967).

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Drawing a Social Map of Ideologies

"Stratification," Left and Right — By A. H. Halsey

Sociology has many audiences and therefore a collection of five books, all about stratification, cannot necessarily be judged according to the same formula of worth. Much sociological writing is aimed at potential users in government, administration or industry, offering "findings" and prescriptions to the political and social order on which it depends for its existence.

The books by Lynn McDonald,[1] Julienne Ford,[2] and Ronald King[3] are examples, addressed to the makers of educational policy. They all add to our knowledge of the workings of educational institutions against the search for "class abatement." Mr. King's case study illustrates the intrusion of the social class system into the grammar school, conditioning its attempt to inculcate a distinctive set of tastes and social values. Miss McDonald argues that educational selection partly determines the class distribution of delinquency and Miss Ford produces strong evidence against the hope that a classless society can be brought about or even brought nearer by present comprehensive policies for secondary schools. John Raynor's description[4] of the middle class is designed for a different audience. It is a clearly written short text for beginners among whom may be included the intelligent lay reader (if such exists) as well as the beginning student of sociology who certainly exists and indeed has been multiplying at at least three times the rate of other undergraduates during the 1960s.

But the existence of the tyro also indicates a more interesting audience—the academic sociologist—a creature in Britain of the post-war years whose profession has only very recently acquired the numbers, the confidence, the styles of thought and habits of language which it needs in order to talk to itself. The book by Goldthorpe, Lockwood, Bechhofer & Platt[5] is unequivocally sociology for sociologists. It involves a conception of the nature of the subject which presupposes an established profession oriented to pure research. The essential characteristic of this sociology of the inner circle is not, however, an absence of concern with public problems, or at least not those of general significance. The history of great sociologists is a history of great social issues. The aim of the modern profession is to advance theory through systematic research. In this way it is to be distinguished from the subject as it was once presented in this country—a library of the works of deceased giants, to be admired and discussed but most unlikely to be extended save by the rare appearance of new genius.

The transition from an older and piously conservationist orientation to theory began at the London School of Economics after World War II where, for some, the teaching of Edward Shils transformed the conception of remote Olympians (Weber, Durkheim, Marx) into one of charismatic figures urging further enquiry. For others, and in a different way, the inspiration came from D. V. Glass whose enthusiasm for empirical research produced the most important book of the 1950s in British sociology —*Social Mobility in Britain*. In the first ten post-war years a handful of native sociologists, self-consciously professional by virtue of their training at L.S.E. and the ambivalent publicity of their reception, began to acquire reputations in the international fraternity of their discipline. One of these—David Lockwood—made his mark on social class theory in the 1950s through his study of the changing class position of clerical workers. He spent the 1960s in Cambridge where he collaborated with John Gold-

A. H. Halsey *is Head of the Department of Social and Administrative Studies at Oxford and a professorial fellow of Nuffield College. He is the national director of research into Educational Priority Areas. He is the editor of "Education, Economy and Society" (Collier-Macmillan, 1961) and, with G. N. Ostergaard, of "The Power of Co-operatives" (Blackwell, 1965). His article on "The Dilemma of Priority Areas" appeared in the May 1969* Encounter.

[1] *Social Class and Delinquency*. By Lynn McDonald. Faber & Faber, 55s.

[2] *Social Class and the Comprehensive School*. By Julienne Ford. Routledge & Kegan Paul, 32s.

[3] *Values and Involvement in a Grammar School*. By Ronald King. Routledge & Kegan Paul, 40s.

[4] *The Middle Class*. By John Raynor. Longmans, 25s.

[5] *The Affluent Worker in the Class Structure*. By John Goldthorpe, David Lockwood, Frank Bechhofer and Jennifer Platt. Cambridge University Press, 45s.

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thorpe, who came there from Leicester as an able and pugnacious exponent of the professional claims of the subject. Together with two junior partners, Bechhofer and Platt, they formed a research group which has since scattered in the continuing feverish build-up of the forty or so university departments[6] but they have left behind a series of papers and a three-volume work on *The Affluent Worker* which constitutes one of the most notable achievements of British sociology in the last decade.

IN THIS LAST and principal volume of the Cambridge study the authors present their findings on the "embourgeoisement" thesis. They conclude that in the case of three groups of well-paid workers in Luton there remained

> important areas of common social experience which are still fairly distinctively working class; that specifically middle class social norms are not widely followed nor middle class life styles consciously emulated; and that assimilation into middle class society is neither in process or, in the main, a desired objective.

In place of the "embourgeoisement" theory they argue for the thesis of "normative convergence" between some manual and non-manual groups—a process which they see as involving a shift for white-collar workers away from their traditional individualism towards greater reliance on collective means of pursuing their economic objectives and a shift in the case of manual workers away from collective solidarity towards an instrumental approach to work and away from traditional forms of community social life towards greater emphasis on the conjugal family and a privatised style of life.

On the basis of empirical enquiry the Cambridge authors thus seek to carry forward "the great debate" about the evolution of the working class in industrial society. They find their starting point in the Marxist theory of the historic role of the Proletariat as the grave-digger of Capitalism in which "embourgeoisement" is first acknowledged and then explained away as a passing ebb in the flow of the revolutionary tide. This, it may be added, is also

[6] There must surely be a heavy cost to research productivity in these characteristic discontinuities of staffing which are involved in rapid expansion. The resulting pattern is one of tiny departments recently formed and always vulnerable to raiding. The influence of the University Grants Commission and Social Science Research Council could usefully turn in the 1970s to developing half a dozen viable graduate schools. Meanwhile only at the London School of Economics, Essex and Oxford do more than a dozen sociology dons teach more than a dozen S.S.R.C. studentship holders.

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the starting-point for the popular conception of sociology as a source of certainty about human affairs; and hence of much of its attraction and repulsion as either a mild surrogate religion or as an assault on the dignity of individual and collective free will. An inevitable world history has been a familiar notion ever since Marx and Engels vulgarised themselves in the 1848 Manifesto. But the fate of the little man as the puppet of vast and implacable social forces is scarcely less free in those branches of liberal evolutionary thought which interpret social trends in the light of an alleged "logic of industrialism" as leading to the progressive erosion of the working class and its absorption into an overwhelmingly middle-class high-consumption society. By setting their faces against both sets of dreary determinisms the Cambridge sociologists have been able to write an interesting concluding interpretation of their research findings which insists on the potency of *political leadership* in a crucially *open* social situation.

THE ABOLITION of the working class is, of course, on every agenda of social forecasting, socialist or liberal, utopian or scientific. While the fortress of strict Marxist orthodoxy cannot be breached by them, the facts of developing industrialism command a wide measure of agreement outside—rising levels of productivity and leisure, declining manual labour and increasing mobility out of parochial working-class communities. What is at issue is the interpretation of these facts. For example, the New Left sees the break-up of traditional working-class communities as offering new opportunities for effective class solidarity—as men escape from the local particularism of neighbourhood and kin and become aware of common interests on a societal scale—while the liberal proponents of "embourgeoisement" see the same process as evidence for assimilation of workers into middle-class society.

At the same time the recent phases of the debate have involved some paradoxical shifts in the theoretical perspectives of Left and Right. Thus one element in the controversy, which is clearly brought out in the Cambridge account, concerns the importance to be attached to changes in the "material basis" of society. This continues to occupy pride of place in the arguments of Marxist fundamentalists. But it is also increasingly stressed by anti-Marxists as a set of technological determinants in the most advanced branches of industry which tend to break traditional divisions between manual and non-manual work, enlarging white-collar ranks, raising incomes and easing the working conditions of all, and thereby replacing old conflict with new harmony. Conversely, however, the neo-

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Marxists have been led towards laying increasing emphasis on "super-structural forces." They hold, according to the Cambridge authors, that,

> in the case of neo-capitalism, the dominant class characteristically retains its power not only, or even primarily, through its control over the means of violence or of production but, more fundamentally, through its control over cultural institutions and agencies: schools and universities, literature and the arts, mass *and* minority media —in fact over the entire set of means of creating social consciousness.

Hence the essential debate has now come to turn not so much on the changes in incomes, standards of life, conditions of work and patterns of residence, about all which there is widespread agreement, but on the meaning of these events for the participants and their interpretation by the intellectuals. The central issue, then, is taken to be the setting of the Cambridge research findings against (on the one hand) the neo-Marxist theory of alienation and (on the other hand) the liberal theory of progressive "embourgeoisement." In the first camp the experience of workers devoid of intrinsic reward, the privatisation of out-of-work life and the prevalence of "commodity" consciousness may all be taken as indicative of a condition of profound alienation and unfreedom within the "consumer society," but of a condition from which some mass movement of protest and rebellion must (or at any rate could) eventually stem.

Alternatively, in the second camp, support may be found in the evidence for the view that the new affluent worker is moving towards "a conservative and individualistic, rather than a radical and collectivist, outlook on economic and political issues."

The view taken by Goldthorpe and his colleagues of the New Left interpretation is careful and not unfriendly. They think of Marx's original characterisation of "alienated labour" as a reasonably accurate account of their own major conclusions. "It is not the satisfaction of a need, but only a *means* for satisfying other needs." Nevertheless, they reject some of the assumptions which underlie the Alienation thesis. In particular they refuse to accept that all industrial and more general socio-political orientations are derived fundamentally from the work situation. On the contrary they argue that the effects of technologically determined conditions of work are always "*mediated* through the meanings that men give to their work and through their own definitions of their work situation." Many Luton workers had come voluntarily from work of a less alienating character and had chosen to sacrifice meaning for pay. Indeed some of them interpret their own lives in terms which would reverse the alienation argument. Their concern with standards of consumption is not a reflection of their alienation as producers but the opposite—a motivation for them to take up this kind of work. On this view there is a clear need for more sociological investigation of the social sources of "consumption-mindedness" which, in any case, cannot be assumed to be evidence either of alienation or of status-seeking. Lockwood's aphorism that "a washing machine is a washing machine is a washing machine" is salutary in both connections.

THE TREATMENT given to the "embourgeoisement theory" is even more careful and less friendly. Exaggerated extrapolations of doom for the Labour Party were made after its defeat in 1959 on the assumption of a causal link between working-class affluence and a shift from Labour to Conservative voting. Here the Luton research findings confirm the national test of the elections of the 1960s and, in any case, the recent appearance of Butler's and Stokes' *Political Change in Britain*[7] has put an end to simple-minded

[7] *Political Change in Britain: Forces Shaping Electoral Change.* By DAVID BUTLER and DONALD STOKES. Macmillan, 90s.

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psephological trend-mongering and has given massive support to the conception of an intricately complicated and therefore open political situation. But some interpreters went further. One sociologist, Josephine Klein, concluded from a review of research into family and community in Britain that

> not only have many clerks come from manual working-class families and made changes in their manner of life accordingly, but manual workers themselves are also adopting a middle-class way of life.

In order to test this theory the Cambridge group adopted a bold research strategy. They were sufficiently confident of its falsity to seek the conditions which would be as favourable as possible to its confirmation, *i.e.*, to study a group of manual workers whose conditions of work and patterns of living appeared highly conducive to those shifts in values, norms, reference groups and patterns of association which "embourgeoisement" implied. They looked for a population which was affluent, economically secure, physically mobile and consumption-minded. As regards the industrial setting they sought advanced technology, progressive employment policies and harmonious industrial relations. In relation to the community they looked for newness, instability and openness, social heterogeneity, economic growth and relative isolation from traditional industrial regions. That the search was difficult was itself a comment on the extent of "embourgeoisement." In the event they found a reasonable approximation to the ideal in three Luton plants (Vauxhall, Skefco, and Laporte). They took a sample of married men who in 1962 were regularly earning at least £17 a week gross. As it turned out, "embourgeoisement" was not confirmed among these workers either in their industrial behaviour, their relations to neighbours or their aspirations and social perspectives. In research terms therefore it was a gamble that paid off. The study of the crucial case illustrated the possibility of learning more by studying less.

YET THE RESEARCH DESIGN, it must be remarked, was economical almost to the point of inadequacy. It was essential to the testing of both the "embourgeoisement" thesis and the exploration of the authors' alternative theory of normative convergence to have data on two other fixed social points—the traditional working class and the middle class. Because no control group of traditional workers was provided for, reliance had to be placed on previous studies for comparative material showing the degree to which the Luton workers diverged from traditional patterns of attitude and behaviour. A small group of electrical workers was included in the study but they constitute only small numbers which (as they say in the computing laboratories) have to be tortured to produce large results.

Moreover, the authors have not presented all the possible evidence from their own study to enable the reader to judge for himself the differences between the manual and non-manual Luton groups. And, most important, the white-collar sample has not been used, as one might have expected, to determine a systematic set of norms of "embourgeoisement" against which to measure the aspirations and social perspectives of the affluent manual workers. Some comparisons are given (for example, on parental aspirations for children), others are missing (for example, the description given to present and desired areas of residence). Again, it is extremely interesting that the strongest tendency among the affluent workers was to regard the class system

> as being primarily a matter of money; or, to be more precise, of differences in the incomes, wealth and material living standards of individual groups.

But while this was true of 56% of the affluent workers it was *also* true of 35% of the white-

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collar sample; and only 30% of the clerks distinguished four or more classes and thereby met the authors' own criterion of a distinctively middle-class view of the stratification system (*i.e.*, as an elaborate hierarchial image of society based on differential prestige). It would seem therefore that, although the evidence is sufficient to dispose of the more naive versions of the "embourgeoisement" thesis and at the same time gives support to the alternative theory of convergence, there is still need for a research design of the demographic type which would produced a much more detailed social map of ideologies.

On reading (and approving) the political lessons which they draw from their study I was struck by a significant omission from the authors' survey of "the great debate." This is the thread in the liberal/socialist tradition of criticism of the Affluent Society which points to and advocates very different political inferences from those normally associated with the social perspectives of "embourgeoisement." Affluence has always had its enemies and not only among Christian moralists like R. H. Tawney whose *Acquisitive Society* (1921) is the most powerful modern critique of the idea that the sin of avarice can secure the foundations of a civilised society. In secular writing it is the problem of affluence and poverty which prevents the final extinction of political economy as a branch of social science, though it depends precariously on the eccentricities of professional economists like Galbraith, Myrdal, James Meade and Edward Mishan. The main burden of this long-established discussion now rests in sociology, but it is given little or no attention in the Cambridge authors' recapitulation of the issues. Given their political conclusions which seem to me to have more affinity with the Tawney tradition of political democratic socialism than with any of the writers they discuss, this is curious.

In summary, however, it may be said that the Cambridge study demonstrates the essential characteristics of modern sociology at its best. First, it seeks problems from the theoretical traditions of the subject which are relevant to important social issues. Second, it formulates theoretical propositions in a clear and testable form; and third, it attempts to disprove them by economical empirical investigation. This formula is rarely met.

Nisbet & His "Titans"

Towards a New Sociology — By Julius Gould

Robert Nisbet is a distinguished Californian sociologist. In a period of outstanding turmoil both for his State and for his University, he has kept his "cool"—and produced in recent years several monumental works of scholarship. *The Sociological Tradition* and his more recent *Social Change in History*[1] show a formidable grasp of sociology both past and present. They survey, from different angles, the past of sociology—its roots in philosophy and dogma. But indirectly in *The Sociological Tradition*—and by direct confrontation in *Social Change in History*—Nisbet raises key questions about the subject's future.

Central to *The Sociological Tradition* is the work of selected Continental writers—whom Nisbet calls the "Titans of 1830–1900"—Tocqueville, Comte, Le Play, Marx, Durkheim, Weber, Tönnies and Simmel. (The period 1830–1900 is somewhat loosely conceived: the reaction to the Enlightenment, in De Maistre and Bonald, clearly ante-dates this period—Durkheim was still writing after 1900, and more importantly it was in the period 1900–1920 that Weber was to write his major works—Tönnies wrote his best-known book in 1887 but survived until 1936.) On Nisbet's argument these writers were dominated by certain "unit ideas"— community, authority, status, the sacred, and, finally (in a number of extended, and surprisingly non-Marxist, senses) alienation. These ideas—and the sociological vocabulary that they generated—all illuminate what either was or appeared to be threatened by industrialism, individualism, and social dislocation. Marx, of course, is very hard to square with this tradition—and Nisbet himself points out how strongly Marx approved the "obsoleteness of the local and kinship in-

Julius Gould *is Professor of Sociology at the University of Nottingham. He edited the Penguin Social Sciences Survey for 1968.*

[1] *The Sociological Tradition.* Heinemann, 35s. *Social Change in History.* Oxford University Press, 58s.; paper, 22s.

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stitutions."[2] But for the rest of his team he makes an imposing plea that sociology was born from a paradox:

> Although it falls in its objectives and in the political and scientific values of its principal figures, in the mainstream of modernism its essential concepts and its implicit perspectives place it much closer, generally speaking, to philosophical conservatism.

Nisbet's Titans were reacting to the fruits of the Enlightenment, to the French and the Industrial Revolutions, and, notably—in the case of Tocqueville—to the American developments since 1776. It would be very surprising indeed if the great minds of the 19th century—both those mentioned and others—had not brooded as to what was happening to old and settled ways.[3] What is open to argument is how far the writers discussed, despite their convergence upon Nisbet's "unit ideas," formed a tradition that was constant and viable: and, not unimportant, whether it was a tradition of which they were aware and which they were, so to speak, conscious of handing down. How much of the convergence, in fact, is "constructed" by hindsight? Clearly enough these writers, even those who were exact contemporaries, did not meet regularly, if at all; nor were they fully conversant with each other's work. Often enough they did not feel any special intellectual sympathy with each other. (To give one example, Marx's views on Comte are well known and are as uncomplimentary as are his views on most of his peers.)

The truth is, and I think Nisbet would agree, that there was more than one sociological tradition at work in the early 19th and 20th centuries. Looking back at the contemporary deposit of these traditions we see the uses, often crude or farcical, which modern writers have made of the idea of "system." The sources of this motif are to be found in curious places not visited (in *The Sociological Tradition*) by Nisbet himself—in, for example, the writings of Pareto. Again the Machiavellian tradition may have gone underground in the age of the "Titans" but it was neither invisible nor dead. From the 1930s onwards Pareto came to be incorporated into sociological thought—though like the "cycles" he studied his reputation has oscillated. His vision, like that of the "Titans," was limited: he failed to see many "unborn" social and political formations. But unlike many later "system theorists" he was, of course, keenly aware of the key of the role played by élites in the manipulation of force and ideology.

Take another example. One sees—no doubt with a touch of chauvinism—that English writers are not included in Nisbet's survey; patriotic Americans will detect some comparable omissions. But were there no sociological strivings in these happy lands, deprived though they were of Continental *angst*? Perhaps the cut-off point of 1900 justifies the gap—but were the developments of sociology at the University of Chicago from 1892 onward born from a domestic void? In Britain, too, there was a quantitative, reformist tradition which somehow failed to meet its Continental analogue. There was a philosophical strand too. I would not wish to force the work of J. S. Mill and T. H. Green and Leonard Hobhouse into a constructed framework, but their writings were responses to the social and political climate of England in their day. It could be argued that their responses were too restrained and lacking in imagination—or that they stood aloof from this or that body of descriptive material. If they lacked what Nisbet calls "iconic imagination"

[2] Marx sits uneasily in Nisbet's galère of "Titans." The similarity of *form* between some Marxian and some "conservative" ploys should not obscure the differences in content and purpose.

[3] Other areas of Europe (Tsarist Russia and the Austro-Hungarian Empire) were by 1870 involved in deepening crises. But their writers made a much later and very different impact on social thought.

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whence came this insipidity? Nisbet rightly shows that sociology (like any other creative response to "big" questions) arises from a mixture of personal and social stress. Yet I feel that the *differences* within these stresses need quite specific explanation—something which a sociology of sociology might in time produce. And I feel too that the clarity of Nisbet's "unit ideas" may, without intention, conceal the variety of interests which his "Titans" pursued.

THAT THE "UNIT IDEAS" need a supplement is confirmed by *Social Change in History*. The twin themes that dominate that work are "growth" and "development"—with their attributes of immanence and continuity. These ideas, too, had a powerful vogue in the nineteenth century. But they emerged before 1830—and moved on irresistibly beyond 1900. Starting with the ancient Greek notion of *physis*, the power of *X* to realise its inner principle, to "become" what it "is," there emerged a uniquely powerful habit of mind. No summary can do justice to Nisbet's resourceful exploration of this habit from Plato down to modern functionalist sociology. Protean as the approach has been over two millennia, it has, from the start, emphasised the course of growth (whether of organisms or civilisations) that was alleged to be "natural" and "determining" as distinct from the flow of accidental or superficial "realities." It had its Christian as well as its secular advocates. It dealt variously in messages of progress and in doom-laden stories of degeneration and decay. It presided over the debates on "natural order" in the birth of economics. It governed the exercises in "conjectural history" that Auguste Comte inherited and embellished. It antedated the Darwinian impact on social thought but marched smartly in parallel with it. It supported and strengthened the 19th-century essays in "comparative method"—in the work of ethnographers and others who sought to rearrange cultural traits in a progression of types. This had a self-serving, ideological result:

> The Comparative Method was a means of substantiating not merely the progressive character of change in time—that is, its movement from the simple and undifferentiated to the complex and highly differentiated—but also the manifestly advanced position of the West. For whatever else critics of Western society might say of it, however necessary reform or revolution might be to its further advancement, no one could take away from the West its position at the top of the evolutionary hierarchy of cultures.

The gambit is not only protean but almost immortal. For it survived the decline of evolutionary sociology—entering as metaphor and as platform into the work of its functionalist heirs. They too recognised that social systems were exposed to "the incessant impact of random events" but, nonetheless, made the basic assumption that "independent of all this there are sources of change within social systems, more or less natural sources, and that from these there flow patterns of change that are as congruent to the social system as growth is within the living organism."

I think Nisbet clearly establishes both the attractions and the pitfalls in the developmental approach. The attractions to the Western mind at least are powerful enough.

> Difficulties notwithstanding, it is safe to say that as long as human thought is capable of abstraction, as long as human beings are lost in wonder

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> at what has happened in the almost infinite vistas of the past and what will, or is likely to, happen in the infinite vistas of the future, just so long will the metaphor of growth and all its derivatives be used. For the metaphor serves what might well be called a dogmatic or prophetic function in man's life. We cannot do without dogma and prophecy; each is a part of the very framework of a social order. Belief in Providence is a dogma; so is belief in Progress—or, if we prefer, belief in cyclical recurrence or in the transhistorical nature of redemption. Prophecy, in its temporal as well as moral connotation, is probably an inalienable part of the human condition and of human aspiration.

This may be a long way from science—but men do not live, or die, by science alone. Indeed the fate of the old dogmas is far from clear: and new ones can still be born. After all there seems enough social dislocation around to call them into being: it may produce its own mystagogues as rebarbative as last century's discarded brands, though probably less educated.

THE MAJOR PITFALLS were in fact avoided by the classical writers in the development tradition. They were fully aware that they were examining abstract "constructed entities" to which the picture thinking of endogenous growth could be seen, or made, to apply. They deliberately "abstracted" from concrete historical events—for reasons which included what Comte, speaking for his own procedures, called approvingly "cerebral hygiene." They were concerned (often in a narrow, self-limiting way) with problems of classification or typology. The game they played (and it had countless variants) was to trace growth and progression from and within "ahistorical" types. The trick was to transfer logical sequences or gradations into a story of continuous growth with its own inner rules of motion and propulsion. But it is a trick that has never been performed on any stage. Indeed the principle of continuity is itself a metaphysic—dignified two hundred and sixty years ago by Leibniz as one of his "best verified maxims": nature makes no leaps.

This particular trick may be worthless—but is the game entirely absurd? There is in principle no reason why typology should not be prised loose from prophecy—and a fond overdue farewell be given to ancient "maxims." As Nisbet observes.

> No doubt a considerable measure of the typological is inseparable from the study of social behaviour of human beings, for it would be very hard to pretend that such entities as church, family, and nation are not real in the allegiances they inspire, in the authorities they wield, and in the transforming effect they have so obviously on the behaviour of human individuals and "populations."

Arranging entities into types is an elementary but indispensable tool of the intellect. The way forward is to produce more adequate typologies, grounded in description, unobsessed by Aristotle, Leibniz, or their sociological successors. Nisbet has his fun (and justifiably) with Talcott Parsons for reviving evolutionary motifs in his later work. And, of course, it is true more generally that modern functionalists, influenced by anthropological research and criticised for their alleged failure to "explain change" have defensively compounded some old philosophical mistakes. But it would be equally in error to suggest that these have been the only recent sociological enterprises—even within "functionalism." In fact the search for a more realistic and empirically grounded typology has been intensified—in the study of political as well as social man. This was a vital impulse in post-war American sociology—at least until the mid-60s plunged it into febrile gloom and passionate self-laceration.

The study, for example, of "new states" (and old societies) has been a major and worthwhile sociological industry—bringing in material of a range unknown to a Leibniz or a Comte. It is true that for a time those who interpreted this data equated "modernisation" with a convergence to a Western or American model. Ethnocentrism proved hard to expel both from theory and from hard-nosed policy research. Events, in the developed as well as in the developing parts of the world, have given a rude shock to this interpretation. But rich information has been unearthed about a variety of cultures. And more is to come if non-Western sociologists, now more numerous than hitherto, succeed where many of their Western colleagues have failed—in putting reason before dogma and passion.

THE MODEL of "social change" criticised by Nisbet chose to neglect "such non-developmental and strictly historical matters as events." Years ago F. W. Maitland made the same point less politely: "Of course we must not ask the sociologist for anything so unscientific as a precise date. . . ." Nisbet invites us to ask (and Maitland would approve): "What are the conditions under which actual social change takes place in the history of a given institution or given mode of social behaviour?"—and these would include not only *internal* conditions but external shocks and intrusions. An alliance with history (including contemporary history), if properly cemented, could not solve sociology's problems. But it would clarify matters by purging it of nonsense. And it could produce a new idea-system, one relevant not to our ancestors but to ourselves and our future.

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The Futurity Play

By Donald G. MacRae

HARUSPICATE or scry? There is something always a little repulsive about societies in which the future is made into an industry. How could one Roman haruspex contemplate another without a smile? Did an ardent papal astrologer like Paul III read the heavens before convoking the Council of Trent? Do Bertrand de Jouvenel and Herman Kahn engage in mutual consultation? Need we in Britain really have to feel our inferiorities the more keenly because of the sorry performance of the Social Science Research Council's committee on the next thirty years? (It *is* a sorry performance, and a text on the disasters of not understanding the importance of sociological imagination.) These questions all admit more than a conjectural answer. But the fact obstinately remains that we too live in an age obsessed by our anxieties and therefore by the desire to fix and reify tomorrow that we may at least behave more practically today. Such anxieties are particularly to be found in rich and bloated eras, in societies at once learned and cruel.

But to dislike such activities does not abolish them. The present is where we have to live. The scrutiny of the future is a fact of today, and its most accepted mode is scientistic. When we read of "canonic variations" in prophecy we feel that we are in touch with hard science and are inclined to accept what we are told. Contrary to what Max Weber believed, we do not become more rational in our acts, but merely more rationalistic: the forms of superstition change; the quantum of non-natural belief apparently remains constant. In a new book, devoted to those items in the present he believes centrally relevant to the future, Mr. Peter F. Drucker manages to avoid a number of fashionable superstitions.[1] He expects the unexpected to happen. He apologises that he considers only one "dimension of our experience and existence." He firmly holds that the future will not merely extrapolate on present trends but also be discontinuous—hence his title—with the immediate past.

The journey he takes us on may be one-dimensional, but the scenery is rather various; the landmarks observed through the mists of time-to-be are numerous and impressive, and the geniality of the author's hopes is invigorating. It is not a tight, scholarly book. Very few sources or references are given. There are plenty of small slips—quite a few of them about Britain—and a certain cavalier disregard for getting proper names quite right. Nevertheless the book is well worth reading and the task is painless. Enterprising scholars indeed may find points to steal without acknowledgement and give formal elaboration: it has happened before now with Peter Drucker. His fertility of ideas is constant and lifts him, as in nearly all his work, far above the level of popularisation. Unfortunately some of his richness is gained by an imprecision of terms. I am no slave to definitions, but it would be nice if Mr. Drucker would stop and define a little more often. As we shall see, "knowledge" is one of his key terms, and I am still uncertain as to what is or is not knowledge in his analysis.

The first part of the book reads like an apology for a continuing and changing bourgeois capitalism. Certainly the human race has not yet done better, but another apologia is hardly needed. Yet here Mr. Drucker is saying something which, if not new, needs saying. We are constantly being told that we are in and have been living through an age of unprecedented technical change; new industrial revolutions are proclaimed at least once every eighteen months. Mr. Drucker has two points. First, a time-travelling economist from 1913, knowing nothing of more than a half-century of war and revolution, and arriving in the present would find out nothing not already in his extrapolations about our present world economy save perhaps the poverty of Russian farming and the industrial and commercial advance of Formosa, Hong Kong, and Singapore.

Secondly, most of our technology is not very new. Industrial chemistry, electricity and electronics, the triumph of the internal combustion engine in airplanes and cars, and so on have all proceeded much as might have been expected. Of course there are new things, but none of them has been beyond educated guessing except in their all-important detail. Antibiotics began with Ehrlich; synthetic fibres and materials have a long history. Computers really

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[1] *The Age of Discontinuity: Guidelines to our Changing Society*. By PETER F. DRUCKER. Heinemann, 63s.

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are new, but they are exceptional; space travel, for example, depends entirely on huge, conceptually simple Newtonian engines. Genuine novelty is to seek. In addition the fact that no major nation has modernised since 1913 in the sense of industrialising is surprising and might well disappoint our imaginary time-traveller if he were filled with the sort of optimism that men might reasonably feel in those last days before the age of political terror began.

Now (Mr. Drucker argues) novelty is about to break in. He is not concerned with the political aspect of society—it is this that, in part, permits his optimism—nor with the obvious changes in feeling and expression and expectation that have made the 1960s so peculiarly vertiginous immediately after the deep, deep peace of the world of Eisenhower, Macmillan, and the "end of ideology." The novelties he is concerned with are among the more banal aspects of his book, which then picks up. They are first the Information Explosion, then the Exploitation of Seas (about which we hear mercifully little), the emergence of New Materials and their development (about which we also hear little), and last the new needs created by the demand of Megalopolitan life. It is only through the last of these that population growth impinges on Mr. Drucker's analysis, and this omission is surely another source of his optimism. On the other hand, he has much to say about the consequences of the rising duration of the life span and the problems of what to do with the time it gives us. Only perhaps fifty per cent of the population can enjoy the tumult of prolonged adolescence which our universities have become.

Despite Mr. Drucker I do not believe that most of us can change—far less enjoy changing—our avocations in middle life. But this is his unique prescription for happiness.

Nor am I satisfied that Mr. Drucker can really have his cake and eat it. If adolescence, for example, is to be prolonged—and an extension of the period of education can mean little else—then you cannot really attack the empire of the Ph.D. There is, I suppose, no question that the increase of numbers of graduate students is an instance where more does mean worse. This is less true in America than in Britain, for in Britain and the British economy, the really bright are still reluctant (as compared with the second-rate) to engage in the graduate grind and its apparent postponement of adult responsibility bought at the price of other and often more onerous neuroses. (It is also true that the British graduate still, if he is competent, needs graduate formation less than his American opposite number. Our tense, packed, first degrees take at least our better people to the standard of the representative American master's degree.) To be fair Mr. Drucker attacks the Ph.D. not for such reasons but for specialisation: "To be sure, we need people of this kind, but only a few of them in any area. The greatest need is for the man who can develop and teach the application to end results of knowledge and information drawn from diverse disciplines. . . ."

Certainly we need educated men, "generalists" if we want to call them that, but how we get them other than by education itself is hard to see and not illuminated here. The problems of the university today and the invention of prolonged post-adolescence cannot be solved in a few pages. A great deal of Mr. Drucker's cheerfulness could not bear up to the exposure involved in treating big subjects in a few thousand rather than in a few hundreds of words. In these pages there are a lot of facts, but in areas of which I know anything there are also a lot of mistakes. Presumably every reader will find the same thing in his own field. It is the price of being a generalist, perhaps, and there is a sense in which this book is an apologia for an author's catholicity.

But it doesn't much matter: this is a book of ideas and perspectives, not of facts. The central idea is that the future will be surprising, and

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one is almost inclined to add an "Alas!" Most futures are banally political. Mr. Drucker's involves only the social and the technical. He foresees the end of the managerial age—how far is Britain yet in it?—and a new entrepreneurship geared to a world economy of which all existing economies are merely interdependent segments. This is and will be an economy of marketing and consumption. All consumers are and/or will become essentially the same in their demands in all societies. The obstinate differentia of cultures, always about to be but never in fact eroded, will at last begin to abdicate their ancient reign. Mr. Drucker's new world is both buoyant and euphoric.

Its emperor is Knowledge. As I have already said what is meant by "knowledge" is not altogether clear. It means science and technology, means fact and theory, means know-how in management and marketing, means instant access to data. The masters of knowledge, moving obliquely like the bishop or the knight across the chess board, will deliver us from many of our secular evils. Unfortunately, as chess players know, the rook moving squarely along the grid is a more powerful piece: Bureaucracy and Politics are conspicuously absent from these pages.

Yet, for all my criticisms, I believe that this is a good tract for our times and should be widely read, particularly in England where faith in any vision of a future, or in any new course of action, has never burned so low. It is not that the author is wrong or does not attempt enough. He gives off ideas like a squib, and some of the sparks can and should catch fire. It is rather that, as in a single book he must, Mr. Drucker works under a self-denying ordinance. His future is limited because the political, administrative and military along with the domestic, religious and cultural are areas of life which he does not (or seldom) touch on.

Consider again our time-traveller from 1913. Why, for example, would he find Russian agriculture so backward? The reasons are, of course, political; but what a world of politics is concealed in that statement—war, revolution, civil war, collectivisation, tyranny, famine. Can anyone in our iron century assume that such things either do not continue or cannot come again? The hard fact is that in the short run always, and in the long run often, despite the other forces at work, the political aspect of life dominates, controls and interpenetrates every other aspect of existence. It is this, the most powerful and the least predictable aspect of existence, that the Futurists always ignore. Utopias either assume that politics are over (*Brave New World*), or stale-mated (*1984*), or at a single point of universal crisis (Wells' *The Sleeper Awakes*). This is not, and will not be the case.

THE DECADE JUST ENDING has helped us to redefine power. However Charles de Gaulle is judged he was for long more actively powerful, positively and negatively, than the masters of holocaust in White House or Kremlin. The new simplicities of the end of ideology and a balance of mutual terror were real enough; but they were merely additional factors on the crowded stage of power. How that drama will be played out will dominate the actual well-being and suffering of men and women at least as much as those factors about which the Futurists are so concerned.

At the same time those mysterious elements that control culture and ideology are not exorcised: nothing is more striking than their endurance and their capacity for recombination. The national, regional, class, generational and religious differences of culture are particularly disruptive in the present age. We understand something, but very little about them, and we may well be facing new discontinuities in our history because of them. It is perfectly possible that we are undergoing one of those great revolutions of sensibility which are labelled after the event by names like Renaissance, Reformation, or Romanticism. One can speculate indeed on a clash occupying the generation to come between new or refurbished sensibilities, ideologies and expectations on the one hand, and the new resources of administration and policies in a world where mechanical memory and bureaucracy do not fail or wane. We know nothing yet of the implications of the forces in much of the world towards division, regionalisation, and schism; and of their relation to the perfectly real world of economic integration and supra-national organisation. We are so blinded by ideas of imperialism descended from British liberalism, J. A. Hobson, and Lenin that we only imperfectly descry the new forms of empire which already exist. Our demographic problems may not be so much those of mere numbers as of the relations of demographic cohorts—or they may be problems of both taken together.

Playing the future is an unavoidable and important game. Our hopes as well as our fears are bound up with the fact that it will be discontinuous with our present. Perhaps our best hopes are not to be found in the perspectives of Mr. Drucker's valuable essay but in the sheer inventiveness, unexpectedness and resistance of the individual human animal to the terrors of existence.

THESE terrors of being concern our other authors, with one exception, rather little.

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Mr. Drucker is amiable, humane and human, imaginative, sometimes slipshod, and a born writer. The rest of these people are book-makers of different kinds and on the whole a depressing lot. My most expensive and pretentious specimen of futurology is *Mankind, 2000*, edited by Robert Jungk and Johan Galtung.[2] It is specifically depressing, not because it is about the future, the non-existent, the possible, and therefore the dread. It is depressing because it is bad, technicist and scientistic, and smug. Of course no book by over thirty contributors can be wholly bad, but this one tries hard. It deploys a vogue word of the late '60s (and I prophesy, the '70s)—*systems*—frequently. The idea of system in biology, societies and machines is old and rich and growing richer. But it should act as a warning light to readers that they are perhaps about to be conned by imitation science and logic. Of course these pundits are for peace, full bellies, education and creative leisure—if that means anything. They convey quite a lot of facts. They have some bright technical ideas. One of them, Professor Gabor, starts well by saying that as the "space of possibilities is so multi-dimensional" and wide that nothing can be said of it, so he will sensibly concentrate on "how it should be." So he does, but he has only nine pages. I wish he had had more. I cannot say the same about most of the remaining 359 pages.

Mankind, 2000 is the result of a conference, so many people will believe that much should be forgiven it. And of course conferences often convey real advantages to the conferees. Professor Stanley A. Hetzler is a lone academic tackling a huge subject. His *Technological Growth and Social Change: Achieving Modernisation*[3] is densely written and closely printed. His second page has him on the edge of a "slough of despondency...." His penultimate one tells us that "Technology is a socio-technological entelechy containing the seeds of its own growth, which can, fortunately, be implanted independently of the more superficial social and economic stock factors with which it is commonly associated." If you translate that, you will see that it is largely true. The author recognises the weaknesses of the assumption that we (in his case the Americans, but the British might well be included) are a good or likely future for the third world. As he puts it, he happily "jumps overboard" from time to time and makes sensible if undocumented assumptions. But he does not command enough facts, present or historical, nor is he sophisticated enough in social analysis to get very far. Students of the slippery subject of "development" will come to no harm but not much good. Realism and imagination strive to break through. Perhaps they will do so in his next book.

At least he spares us from a pseudo-problem, that of leisure. The third world is, in general, under-employed: that is one simple reason why it is poor. One of the accredited bogy-men of futurology is under-employment in a cybernated mass-consumption society. Perhaps; if I am mugged by the young in Notting Hill or Central Park I may regret the leisure that permitted this. But on the evidence the developed world, with its increasing bureaucratic demands on time apart from "gainful employment," is not in too much danger from leisure. The "new town blues"—remember them?—of the automated housewife far from her mum belong, along with "alienated man" and a number of other demons of bad sociology, to the human condition. That condition is deplorable enough, but leisure is not a subject in its serious consideration. Mr. Glasser, to whom as an adopted Glaswegian I was favourably disposed, in his book on leisure[4] reads like a bright man in a hurry. He is short on fact, shorter on theory, long on speculation of a Sunday supplement kind. We need a new morality, he tells us. Without it leisure will plunge us into the desert of nihilism. There, very likely, we will die. That, after all, is a kind of solution. So (suggests Mr. Glasser) could be religion, but he doesn't expect it. To me this is a non-book for the present and for the future but it will pass a sabbath morn on which the Sunday heavies don't arrive.

At first I took Professor V. C. Ferkiss to have written another non-book about the present and the future.[5] Its first words are "To the stars!" Actually it is a free-swinging, learned and often imaginative book. Despite the opening words and rather more of Jacques Ellul and Teilhard de Chardin than I care for—much as I love nonsense (and nonsense should be loved) I cannot take Teilhard—it is open-minded and interesting. One can learn from it a great deal of social diagnostics. In a way that of course is what all futurology is about; the diagnosis of the present and prognosis from it. Herman Kahn may be all wrong about the year 2000 but he is a fact about the mind and society of modern America—even more so about what is now yesterday's America, the time of Mr. McNamara. In his earlier chapters Mr. Ferkiss really tells us a lot about technology and society today. He

[2] *Mankind, 2000*. Edited by Robert Jungk and Johan Galtung. Allen & Unwin, 120s.

[3] *Technical Growth and Social Change: Achieving Modernisation*. By Stanley A. Hetzler. Routledge, 45s.

[4] *Leisure, Penalty or Prize?* By Ralph Glasser. Macmillan, 50s.

[5] *Technological Man: The Myth and the Reality*. By Victor C. Ferkiss. Heinemann, 55s.

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puts down such myths as that of a new technocracy rather nicely. He takes politics seriously, even if he hopes too much from it. But he recognises its continuing centrality: power remains power, and its issues recur however techniques or bureaucracy wax and change. The end of his book is, however, too uplifting. Welcome to technological man? A full, rich, responsible, Wellsian future? To relax and enjoy inevitable rape may be wisdom: it is not joyful wisdom.

But I enjoyed two-thirds of this; I was unfamiliar with a shameful number of his references and I shall follow them up in my business as academic sociologist.

IT IS AS AN academic sociologist that I turn to my last three books.[6] Rose and McQuail are youngish British sociologists. Perrucci and his colleagues are American sociologists. All three share a common outlook, though they have diverse intentions. None is a futurologist. All are concerned with themes central to futurology. Rose is writing a tract and an exposition for managers and the British lay public. McQuail is for students who want to know the state of play in a given academic game. Perrucci is reporting actual research. It is the most important, bitty, worst written of these three books. With all of them we are well away from free speculation, diagnostics, threats of apocalypse and, alas, imagination. Sociology is not the enemy of imagination; in fact it needs it, like all scholarly activity. In the context of the universities it is unlikely to get it. Still, even without it much may be done.

For example Mr. Rose gives a clear, sensible, hortatory account of computers, what they do, how, for whom, and who makes them. I learned less than I hoped. The relations of computers to government, financial—as distinct from industrial—concerns, and to university and other research are underplayed. The human component of the symbiosis of man and machine in the computer world is to seek and so, as a consequence, the social situation of a world of perfect, instantaneous, unending memory for and of human error is hardly considered. Yet this surely is one reason to dread these machines. So is the possibility that they will narrow the categories of our economic, technical and administrative thinking, but it is merely mentioned. This is a good work of exposition. It should really help managers in British society. But though Mr. Drucker is less than clear on the "knowledge revolution" he is a pretty essential complement to Rose.

Mr. McQuail is very well documented. Hamon in France, Anders (whatever one's judgment of him) in Germany, and the Reith report on advertising are among the few omissions from his judicious bibliography. But what a remote book this is! How far from life and the actual media! Everything is processed by, preferably, American research. Quantitative research rather than the identification of historical or social fact is king. It is like making love in a diving suit: sociologism rather than sociology. Despite the sections "The Content of Mass Communications" and "The 'Uses and Gratifications' Approach to Studies of Mass Communications" the actuality of what is communicated and how is not here. The possibility—has Mr. McQuail never read Durkheim?—that our categories of understanding and social action and thought are conditioned and changing by the new world of symbolic representation hardly rears its head. But this is what matters as fact and as sociology. It is also central to setting parameters for a realistic futurology. And it is not here. Still, students on the track of a safe Ph.D. will be greatly helped. Why?

The Perrucci volume about engineers is full of data, not always as up-to-date for the British as I hoped, about engineers in various societies and in America where they will soon be one per cent of the population. It tells one about the training, high upward mobility, limitations, powers, organisation, changing knowledge (and obsolescence) of engineers. There is no comparable modern book. It is of intense interest, for all its barbarous prose and consequently sometimes barbarous thought, for of the learned professions this is one of the most socially and economically central to every country. In Britain it is still under-valued and its role and ambitions too small, and this is one of the causes of our long if relative decline in the comity of nations. Engineering education is certainly weak in knowledge of related disciplines like economics and, increasingly, sociology. Its culture is philistine and only partly, in the areas about which I know anything, scientific in a strict sense. But if I were a futurologist I would study it closely. Here, in fact, is technological man, influential rather than powerful. Here are, inevitably, an increasing number of our fellow citizens. Producing books like this is one of the things sociology at its simplest, if most technical in a sense, is about. Along with Mr. Drucker I have been given most to think by Mr. Perrucci and his colleagues. It is in between these extremes that I found a mean of no great Aristotelian virtue. These three are, though, the books for any honest haruspex.

[6] *Computers, Managers and Society*. By MICHAEL ROSE. Penguin, 7s. *Towards a Sociology of Mass Communication*. By DENIS MCQUAIL. Collier-Macmillan, 16s. *The Engineers and the Social System*. Edited by ROBERT PERRUCCI and JOEL E. GERSTL. Wiley, $9.95, 94s.

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Other Sociology Books Received

Bruno Bettelheim. *The Children of the Dream.* Thames & Hudson, 50s.

Scott Donaldson. *The Suburban Myth.* Columbia University Press, 90s.

Jean Duvignaud. *Change at Shebika.* Allen Lane, 45s.

Ernest Gellner. *Saints of the Atlas.* Weidenfeld, 63s.

Sylvia W. de Groot. *Djuka Society and Social Change.* Royal Vangorcum.

E. T. Hall. *The Hidden Dimension.* Bodley Head, 42s.

Tom Harrisson. *The Malays of South-West Sarawak before Malaysia.* Macmillan, £12.

Craig MacAndrew and Robert B. Edgerton. *Drunken Comportment.* Nelson, 42s.

Donald McIntosh. *The Foundations of Human Society.* University of Chicago Press, 95s.

John McLeish. *The Theory of Social Change.* Routledge, 21s.

D. F. Medhurst and J. Parry Lewis. *Urban Decay.* Macmillan, 65s.

Rama Mehta. *The Western Educated Hindu Woman.* Asia Publishing House, 50s.

J. Clyde Mitchell (ed.). *Social Networks in Urban Situations.* Manchester University Press, 55s.

Iona and Peter Opie. *Children's Games in Street and Playground.* Oxford University Press, 40s.

Aileen D. Ross. *Student Unrest in India.* McGill-Queen's University Press, 112s. 6d.

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AUTHORS

James Wellard has written a number of books on explorations, archaeology, and personal travel including *Great Sahara* (1964), *Lost Worlds of Africa* (1967). He contributed an article, "White Lady or She-Devil?", to the October 1968 ENCOUNTER. His new book, *Desert Pilgrimage*, which will include his article in this (and the following) number, will shortly be published by Hutchinson....

Frank Tuohy is the author of *The Ice Saints* (Macmillan, 1964, and now Penguin) and *Warm Nights of January* (Macmillan, 1960). He contributed a short story, "The Trap," to the January 1965 ENCOUNTER, and his report from China appeared in the December 1966 number. His story in the present number is, as he writes us, "part of a projected autobiographical sequence...."

LETTERS

Amis, Davie & Hobbits

KINGSLEY AMIS [ENCOUNTER, December] asks me straight questions, and shall have straight answers.

1. As he surmises, I'm in sympathy with the loss of nerve represented by the Moratorium Days—the more so since up to now they have represented a movement by Ismene, not Antigone.

2. What it would have meant if nerve had been lost in 1805 or 1940 is beside the point. In that poem of mine 17 years ago I made it plain that we turned the crucial corner some time between 1940 and 1945:

> *When that was over, nothing else would serve*
> *But no one must be daring any more.*

The reason's obvious; since then the techniques of warfare, even if euphemistically "limited," have been too hideous for any civilised nation to have recourse to.

3. Yes, I agree that Communism in all its versions has shown itself both tyrannical and aggressive. And tyranny and aggression are too high a price for me to pay for any Communist pie in the sky; but we've no right to think that for others the pie may not be cheap at the price. A Bolivian peon or a Vietnamese farmer has every right to decide he'd rather be red than dead, for instance from starvation. Thus Communism is polylithic in the sense that it's a very different proposition for a Bolivian or a Vietnamese from what it is for Amis and me.

4. And yes, of course there are pocket-Creons among the demonstrators as there are in Creon's bodyguard and wherever else one looks. We can't get rid of them; they become more than a minor nuisance only when they can attract a following, when Antigone thinks she can use them or is content to be used by them. And so Antigone is to blame for them.

Amis is right, of course, to point out I've no grounds for thinking Pavel Litvinov would refuse office of authority in a civilised Russia. Also I'm sorry for starting off my article with that bit about patriotism; it was stupid and tasteless.

DONALD DAVIE

Stanford University

IT WILL NOT quite do, I think, for Donald Davie to dismiss the darker possibilities of the situation in 1805 or 1940 as beside the point. They are only beside his point, a separate one about modern techniques of warfare. That point itself is limited, I think fatally, by the obvious consideration that, while civilised nations may or may not find these techniques too horrible to use, uncivilised nations like Russia or China will be troubled by no such

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compunction. Davie's position implies—quite inexorably, I would argue—eventual, or speedy, surrender to the latter.

I agree that a Bolivian peasant or a Vietnamese farmer, or anybody else, has the right to decide he'd rather be red than dead, *i.e.*, to surrender all his rights in perpetuity. (I am less happy about his right to surrender his descendants' rights as well, which is of course included in his own act of surrender.) Anyway, the trouble is that Communism has never been inaugurated by peasants or farmers having exercised that right to decide, always by a revolutionary minority or an occupying power having forced the system upon them. And, although I know Davie to be the least hierarchically-minded of men, I don't think that he or anybody else should get away with saying that, while Communism obviously wouldn't suit him or me or you, it might be fine for these chaps in Bolivia or Viet Nam. How can anybody know that such chaps wouldn't really mind what we would mind? Of course, if they do "decide" to go Communist, nobody will ever know subsequently how they feel about this or any other matter.

KINGSLEY AMIS

Lemmons, Hadley Common,
Barnet, Hertfordshire

Pornography of Violence

MAY I MAKE a few comments on what Pamela Hansford Johnson says in her article, "Peddling the Pornography of Violence" [ENCOUNTER, February]?

First of all, our Working Party was concerned with the Obscene Publications Acts. These do not in practice have any significant effect on radio, television or the commercial cinema since the controls for these are in the hands of the directorship of the BBC and the ITA in the case of radio and television and the British Board of Film Censors and local authorities in the case of the cinema. The Working Party did not suggest any alteration in or relaxation of these controls.

The Obscene Publications Acts do not and cannot control the volume of sex and violence to which the public is exposed either in the mass media or through books, newspapers, magazines, etc. and only very marginally do the Acts control the quality of the portrayals of sex and violence in these media. The Acts have not been changed in substance since 1959 but what can be and has been published since that date has dramatically changed. Legal sanctions hobble along behind what is regarded by a few individuals in authority as acceptable day by day and it is the person who gets out of step with the ebbing and flowing tide of permissiveness who gets clobbered.

The real point so far as I am concerned is whether the Obscene Publications Acts are rational; if not whether they can be made rational and if they cannot be made rational whether it is essential to preserve an irrational law. I incline to the view that the law may well do more harm than good, which is why I think it should be repealed.

Miss Hansford Johnson raises the fallacious argument that if one doubts whether certain books can deprave and corrupt one is claiming that books have no effect. No such argument is expressed or implicit in anything said by the Working Party. Of course, books can have an influence for good or ill. The relevant questions are firstly does pornography corrupt and deprave and secondly should it be singled out for legal sanctions as compared with publications which might encourage drink, which might encourage unpopular political views or which in the opinion of a jury might be regarded as in any possible way having an undesirable influence.

Those who dislike the report usually describe its style as flippant. Those who approve of it refer to the brilliance of Mr. Benn Levy's prose. I would point out that we were not a Royal Commission and the jargon of such august bodies can perhaps be left to the corridors of power. In expounding the report on occasion I have used my own language but I have almost always found that the report says what I am trying to say very much more readably and I do not think that, because it is readable, it is not serious in intent.

I agree with Miss Johnson when she says that the enormous pressures around us to be sexy, trendy, naked and joyously promiscuous may cause our children to take physical love cheaply. It is not because I wish to see more promiscuity, less moral behaviour, that I think the Obscene Publications Acts to be wrong. I do not think that chastity is outmoded. I think that too much obsession with sex and violence diminishes the arts but I think that this is a matter which must be dealt with by arguing the case for morality and restraint and self-discipline on the moral plane and not by retaining futile and irrational legal sanctions which merely offer a challenge to the *avant garde*. It is natural that increased freedom opens new fields which have to be explored by writers and in this there will undoubtedly be deplorable lapses of taste; but I believe that when we get away from legal sanctions there is greater hope that self-discipline may re-assert itself.

The crudity of much that is published today is deplorable but freedom may well ultimately have the effect of raising standards.

JOHN MONTGOMERIE

London

THE AIM of my piece was to discuss the whole "permissive" set-up in more general terms than Mr. Montgomerie seems to realise, and to contrast the method of the Working Party Report, which deals with violence only incidentally, with the Eisenhower report, which deals with it exclusively. I did not imply that the Working Party explicitly put books into neutral: but that is where they usually are put, by those who want no restraint even upon the most raw of hard-core pornography. Mr. Benn Levy's prose is both brilliant *and* flippant: there is no reason for these terms to be mutually exclusive.

PAMELA HANSFORD JOHNSON

London

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

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